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ABSTRACT  
 
We perform an initial study on the field of covenants and its use in corporate bonds in Norway. 
Based on the respective loan agreements, we construct a database that includes key bond and 
issuer characteristics and the covenants, containing close to all the issues in the period between 
01/01/1998 and 03/31/2008. We find that the use of covenants has increased significantly, and 
the market has obtained experience and become more professional within several dimensions. 
Furthermore, we find that several bond characteristics influence the use of covenants. However, 
our study does not find concluding evidence of a relationship between covenants and firm 
specific variables.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
“A bond covenant is a provision, such as a limitation on the payments of dividends, which 
restricts the firm from engaging in specified actions after the bond are sold” Smith and Warner 
(1979, p: 117) 
This thesis is about covenants. We define covenants as written clauses included in the loan 
agreement, restricting or imposing certain actions on the borrower. We will describe and analyze 
the use of covenants included in corporate bond issues in Norway based on the period from 
01/01/1998 to 03/31/2008. To the best of our knowledge, no studies on the subject prior to this 
have been conducted on Norwegian data. This is also the reason for our relative broad approach 
to the subject. Thus, an important part of this thesis is to construct a comprehensive database to 
be used as foundation for our work and for research to come. 
The market for corporate bonds in Norway has increased from a neglectable size in the 90’s, to 
become an important market during the 21
st
 century. In 2007 the nominal value of corporate 
bonds registered in VPS was more than NOK 150 billion. The globalization in the world of 
finance has also reached this market, and the largest group of owners of corporate bonds is 
foreign investors. Especially in the US, but also in other European countries, the investors are 
familiar with the use of covenants. Thus, the rapid increase in the share size of the market, its fast 
development, and the foreign influence and demand, adds to the importance of understanding the 
use of covenants in the indentures, and is part of the motivation behind this work.  
The pioneer work of Smith and Warner (1979) is the foundation for the later studies on the 
subject. They show how the use of covenants in financial contracts can reduce the agency cost of 
debt – the agency costs associated with the conflicting interests of the issuing firm’s bondholders 
and the stockholders. They argue that not only can the conflicting interests between the two lead 
to a shift in welfare from the bond- to the stockholders, but also the actions taken by the 
management to secure the stockholders’ interest, can reduce the total value of the firm. Much of 
the later work on the subject focus on the issuing firm’s future growth- and investment 
opportunities, probability of financial distress, in relationship to use of particular covenants (e.g. 
Nash et.al. 2003). Contrary to most of the recent literature that are looking at one or a few 
specific covenants, we focus on the entire specter of covenants included in the bond contracts. In 
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that way our approach is similar to that of Smith and Warner, but our analyses is to a larger 
extent founded on quantitative data.  
Our main goal with this thesis is to describe and analyze the use of covenants in corporate bonds 
in Norway, and how this has changed over the last ten years. We have not found any 
comprehensive boilerplates or practical guides on the subject to exist. Other than the work of 
Smith and Warner (1979) and the Mergent FISD dictionary database, we have not been able to 
find this type of information on other markets either. Thus, in order to reach our goal we have 
constructed our own database including the bond characteristics, the covenants included in the 
indentures, some key information about the issuing firm, and macroeconomic conditions. We use 
the two sources, Smith and Warner (1979) and FISD, as basis for the categorization of the 
different covenants, but reading through the loan agreements, we needed in some cases to expand 
their work in order to better describe the situation in the Norwegian market. The finished 
database contains of close to all the corporate bond issues in the period, a total of 438 indentures.  
Our approach to this work is primarily based on the quantitative data we have collected. In 
addition to this we will use some qualitative sources. We conducted a longer, semi-structured 
interview with three representatives from Norsk Tillitsmann ASA (NTM). We also had contact 
with both NTM and Pareto Securities in the course of our work. We will use the qualitative 
sources primarily to check the reliability and plausibility of our findings, analyses and general 
understanding of the market, but also to add a more practical dimension to our work.  
We will show that the average use of covenants in Norway has increased rapidly during the 
period, and analyze possible explanations for this development based on key bond characteristics 
such as conversion rights, call provisions, pledged assets, denominated currency, listing and 
priority. We will present the theoretical and economical rationale behind the different variables 
and how they are expected to affect the use of covenants in general, and how this corresponds 
with our data. If relevant, we will extend the analysis to include the effect on the specific 
covenants. Similarly we will include firm specific variables such as the age and size, and the 
firm’s probability of default. We will illustrate a strong relationship between many of the bond 
characteristics and the use of covenants in general. Based on theoretical and economical 
arguments, the inclusion of some specific covenants should be influenced by bond characteristics. 
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We will present examples from our data indicating that the market has “learned” about these 
relationships and has become more “mature” during the period.   
Due to the lack of information on the subject combined with a fast evolving market, we believe 
there is need for a comprehensive description and analysis of the different covenants, and how 
they are being used. We will in this thesis provide this, and present the economic rationale and/or 
the consequences of including them in an indenture. We will also look at; which and who include 
them, and how the use has developed over time. Based on this we also present the benefits and 
consequences of including the different covenants, both in respect to the issuer and the 
bondholders. We will show how the impact of some covenants can be far reaching and prove 
expensive for the issuer. On the other hand, vague and unclear covenants can provide little real 
protection for the bondholders and also make monitoring the issuer harder and more costly. Thus, 
it can prove valuable for both the issuers and the bondholders to have an in-depth knowledge of 
the loan agreement in order to understand both the direct and more indirect consequences. We 
will also show examples of how the use of covenants and the writing of the loan agreements has 
become more detailed and sophisticated during the period, in line with potentials of improvement 
we find in the earlier contracts. We will argue that this indicates that the market has “learned” 
and increased its competence in the use of some covenants. Furthermore, we hope that our work 
of the different covenants can in some way assist in promoting this process. 
We will also, based on our analyses of the markets use of covenants, formulate and test five 
simple hypotheses about the relationship between the average number of covenants included in 
each contract and some key variables. We will show how these tests indicate, different from the 
Agency Theory of Covenants, that the firm’s probability of default (measured by the Z-score) 
does not affect the use of covenants, but that the age and the size of the issuing firm does seem to 
have an effect. The tests will also confirm what we find in the descriptive analyses; the bond 
characteristics seem to have a strong influence the number of covenants included in the 
indentures. We will also confirm that the use of covenants has increased significantly during the 
period.     
Reisel (2004) finds that by including financial covenants, firms can significantly reduce the cost 
of debt by as much as 311 basis points. The aspect of spread will not be a main focus in our 
thesis, but in order to better explain the variables influencing the use of covenants we will 
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construct a multiple regression model. Because of the problems with omitted bias we cannot 
exclude the spread from our model. Bradley and Roberts (2004) demonstrate empirically how 
covenants and yield are determined simultaneously, creating a problem of endogenous variables 
in our model. This problem reduces the reliability of the output from our full sample regression 
model. However, for some of the key bond characteristics, we will show that because of the large 
significant coefficients, we can probably say that the direction which we find they affect 
covenants are correct, and in line with our other analyses. We will also present some possible 
approaches to bypass the problems in our model.   
1.1 Structure – the two parts of the thesis 
We have divided the thesis into two parts, where we in the first part – chapters one through four - 
presents the foundation for the second part. In chapter 2 we will start by presenting three 
important works that most later literature are based on; Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers 
(1977) and Smith and Warner (1979). We present the theory derived from these studies – the 
Agency Theory of Covenants – and the cost of several types of conflicts that covenants can help 
reduce. We will also point out how financial distress influences this, and the potential costs of 
including covenants. The chapter will also present of some of the most important empirical work 
done on the subject. We will use the elements of this chapter to explain the use of covenants, and 
we will also later on compare our findings to those of previous studies.  
In chapter 3 we will provide the reader with some important background information to the 
Norwegian market for corporate bonds. We will briefly present the history and size of the market, 
and its key participants. The intention is to increase the understanding of our analyses in part 2 by 
explaining the context of our work and pointing out some peculiarities about the Norwegian 
market.  
The first part of our thesis is finished with presentation of our sample selection and the 
construction of our database, in chapter 4. We will describe the process in which the data is 
collected, the choice of input, and the database’s scope. We will also focus on the validity of the 
data, and this is one of the reasons why the presentation will be quite comprehensive.      
In part two we use the constructed database to describe and analyze the market and its use of 
covenants. We will in chapter 5 present the most important bond characteristics such as 
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conversion rights and security, and show how this influences the use of covenants both in theory 
and in our data. We will illustrate the development during the period and how this corresponds 
with the development in the general use of covenants. We will also in the chapter present and 
analyze some issuer specific variables in a similar matter.  
We will in chapter 6 present the individual covenants we found included in the loan agreements. 
We have divided them into categories based on their workings and the type of protection they 
provide the bondholders. We will show, based on theory, economic rationale and/or empiric 
studies, the purpose of including the covenant, and the costs and effects. Thus, the chapter will 
focus on describing and analyzing the different covenants, who and how they are used and the 
development during the period. The chapter is finished with an analysis and description of the 
typical bond that includes covenants.  
In chapter 7 we present five hypotheses based on the analyses in chapter 5 and 6. By using simple 
t-tests we want to take the analyses of the previous chapters a step further, and to some extent 
compare this to previous empirical work. We will base our test the average number of covenants 
in each contract and look at the entire period. 
In chapter 8 we construct a multiple regression model in order to try to explain how different 
variables affect the use of covenants. We will present both the input and the output of the model. 
A large part of the chapter will be devoted to explaining the validity and complications of the 
model and we will present possible ways of working around this. 
Finally, in chapter 9 we conclude on our work, and present possible further research. 
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2 THEORY AND EMPIRI 
All theoretical and empirical work on the subject of financial covenants is in some way based on 
three articles published in the late 1970s. First, M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling (1976) 
developed in their article, “Agency costs and the theory of the firm”, a theory of the ownership 
structure of firms. Their theory explains why debt is used to finance firms also before it generates 
tax benefits, and why lenders often place restrictions (e.g. covenants) on the borrowers’ behavior 
during the time of the loan. They also explain why some industries use debt financing, and others 
do not. Their main focus is the nature of agency costs, how they are generated by debt and 
outside equity, and who bears the expense.  
Second, Stewart C. Myers (1977) argued in his article, “Determinates of corporate borrowing,” 
that a firm’s optimal capital structure, hence its optimal amount of debt, depends on the value of 
the firm’s future growth opportunities. Furthermore, assets in place should be financed by debt, 
because the cost is sunk, and he explains why firms should try to match loan maturity and asset 
life. He uses option pricing techniques to show how the firm’s growth opportunities can be 
viewed as real options and can help explain corporate borrowing. His argument, that managers of 
firms with real options can engage in suboptimal investment strategies, is an important 
contribution to the later work on bond covenants. 
Third, the first article to directly cover the use of covenants in bond contracts was written by 
Smith and Warner in 1979. The article, “On financial contracting,” was based on the earlier work 
by Jensen and Meckling, and Myers. Using a boilerplate of covenants and primarily a qualitative 
method, they research the conflict between bondholders and stockholders by testing the 
“irrelevance hypothesis”
1
 and the “costly contracting hypothesis” (CCH). The CCH states that 
controlling the conflict between the bond- and the stockholder increases the value of the firm. 
They find support for this hypothesis, and show how the use of covenants in financial contracts 
can reduce the agency cost of debt. They argue that not only can the conflicting interests between 
bondholders and stockholders lead to a shift in welfare from bond- to stockholders, but also the 
actions taken by the management to secure the stockholders’ interest can reduce the value of the 
total firm. Furthermore, restrictive covenants are written to provide incentives that ensure a firm-
                                                           
1
 The conflict does not affect the firm’s total value.  
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value-maximizing strategy. It is in the stockholders’ best interest to include covenants, as the 
value of the debt increases, and the agency costs associated with the bondholder–stockholder 
conflict are reduced.   
2.1 The conflict between bondholders and stockholders 
Stockholders hire managers because they believe that their competence and expertise will 
increase the total value of the company. Thus, theoretically the management should act on behalf 
of the stockholders and preserve their interests at all times. In reality, this is not always the case, 
as the extensive research on the subject illustrates.
2
 In our analysis, we disregard the agency cost 
derived from this conflict. This assumption also underlies the work of Smith and Warner as well 
as later work on the subject. We will argue that the assumption does not considerably affect our 
analysis. Generally speaking, the managers’ interests are more in line with the stockholders than 
the bondholders. Means to increase the managers’ incentives to follow a stock maximizing 
strategy, such as stock options, have also increased in recent years. The managers’ acting on 
behalf of the stockholders is the source of the conflict between the bond- and the stockholders. 
They sometimes find themselves in a position where they can transfer wealth from bondholders 
to stockholders if the company has risky bonds outstanding. In their pioneering work on bond 
covenants, Smith and Warner (1979) identify several important sources of conflict between the 
two groups, and their work is the foundation for the Agency Theory of Covenants. 
2.2 The Agency Theory of Covenants (ATC) 
The Agency Theory of Covenants is based on the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers 
(1977) and Smith and Warner (1979). The conflict between the bond- and the stockholders is the 
centre of the theory. The studies showed that after a risky bond is issued, management has the 
possibility to transfer wealth from the bondholders to the stockholders. Acting on behalf of the 
stockholders, the management can take actions that reduce the value of the outstanding debt as 
well as the total firm value. The investors, being rational, expect this and take it into account 
when calculating the price they are willing to pay for the bond. This way, possible ex post 
opportunistic behavior from the management results in an ex ante reduction in the bond price. 
This is a central concept in this thesis. We refer to this cost as the “agency cost of debt”, and 
according to the ATC, one way to reduce these costs is by including covenants in the debt 
                                                           
2
 See for instance, Besanko et.al. (2007), p. 115  
Page | 9  
 
contracts. It is the firm’s stockholders that bear these agency costs, who therefore have incentives 
to minimize them. By including covenants restricting the kinds of actions that lead to agency 
costs, thus ensuring bondholders that their wealth would not be compromised after the issue, the 
value of the firm’s debt will increase. It is important to emphasize that including covenants is not 
without cost, either directly or as opportunity costs. As long as the extra price investors are 
willing to pay exceeds these costs, it is rational for the stockholders to include covenants in the 
debt contracts. According to the ATC, restricting the managers’ behavior through the use of 
covenants is one way to reduce the agency costs of debt. The covenants can help better align the 
managements’ interests with the bondholders. Smith and Warner (1979) identified four main 
conflict areas that result in increased agency costs, and that the covenants should aim to reduce. 
The list is not definitive, and other actions and conflicting interests may also influence the agency 
costs of debt.    
2.2.1 Sources of the conflict between bond- and stockholders 
2.2.1.1 Dividends 
Dividends are used to transfer some of the company’s wealth to the shareholders. The dividends 
can be financed by retained earnings, reducing the amount spent on investments. If the company 
has positive NPV projects, this will reduce the value of the company. By reducing investments, 
the value of the bondholders’ stake can be diluted, as they have less collateral for their claims. 
The managers can also drain the company for value by selling assets and paying out the proceeds 
as dividends, in the worst case leaving the bondholders with worthless claims.  
2.2.1.2 Asset Substitution 
Jensen and Smith (1985) observed that the value of the stockholders’ equity rises and the value of 
the bondholders’ claim is reduced when the firm substitutes high risk for low risk projects. Asset 
substitution is therefore also often referred to as risk-shifting. It is well known that when a 
company has taken on risky debt, it can increase the value of its outstanding equity by increasing 
its projects and/or the riskiness of assets (variance). When choosing between mutually exclusive 
investment- projects, value can be shifted from the bondholders to the stockholders. One way of 
explaining this is by looking at the stockholders’ residual claim as a real option, a call option on 
the company’s assets (see, for instance, Black and Scholes, 1973, or Myers, 1977). In other 
words, if the value of the firm’s assets exceeds the value of the debt, the shareholders will choose 
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to exercise their call option, paying the debt and getting the assets in return. Based on standard 
options pricing, the value of this real option can be said to increase when the volatility on the 
underlying assets (the company’s assets) is increasing. By taking on projects with higher variance 
than stated when the bonds were issued, or by selling assets and replacing them with higher 
variance assets, the managers can increase the stockholders’ value at the expense of the 
bondholders’ value. Debt covenants can help resolve this issue by limiting the borrowers’ 
investment and operation policy. These types of covenants cannot eliminate the problem entirely, 
but they create obstacles for managers looking to increase the company’s variance. Many 
covenants address this issue both directly and indirectly. 
2.2.1.3 Claim dilution  
By issuing more debt with equal or higher priority, or secured by pledged assets, the value of the 
bondholders’ claims will be reduced. The value of the bondholders’ claims will be reduced, as 
issuing new debt increases the firm’s likelihood of default (see, for instance, Masulis, 1980). The 
interest rate they receive does not reflect the risk they are taking on. If the new debt is secured by 
a pledge, this further dilutes the claims of the prior bondholders. To prevent claim dilution, 
several types of restrictive covenants can be included in the debt contracts. Fama and Miller 
(1972) coin the term “me-first” rules for these kinds of covenants, as they pledge that new or 
other claims will not supersede those of the bondholders. 
Large debt-financed corporate buyouts (LBOs) in the 1980s showed how event risk can be an 
extreme example of claim dilution. According to Asquith and Wizman (1990), bondholders lose 
on average 2.5 percent of their value after such events, with most of the losses in bonds with the 
least protection from covenants.  
2.2.1.4 Underinvestment 
Underinvestment refers to when managers do not take on positive NPV projects because they 
only benefit the bondholders. Myers (1977) and Jensen and Smith (1985) argue that when a 
substantial part of a firm’s value is derived from future investment opportunities, and it has 
outstanding risky bonds, the management has incentives to forego positive NPV investments. The 
management of a levered firm has incentives to limit the scale of investment because the 
additional returns from further investments primarily accrue to the bondholders. Firms with high 
growth opportunities are likely to be faced with more investment decisions in the future. When 
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presented with a positive NPV project and the managers believe that the gains would be split 
between bondholders and stockholders in such a manner that the stockholders do not receive a 
normal return, they may reject the project. 
This conflict can be reduced by including financial covenants. Myers (1977) and others suggest 
that dividend restrictions should be included in the debt contracts to minimize this problem. This 
would lead us to believe that we will find covenants restricting or controlling the payment of 
dividends in firms with high growth and a lot of future investment possibilities. Limiting the 
management’s freedom to spend the company’s free cash flow can be an effective measure to 
prevent the underinvestment problem. Not having the possibility of distributing cash flow to the 
owners, the management is in some sense forced to invest (or build up a cash reserve). Other 
financial covenants can also help reduce this problem. Myers (1977) shows that levered firms are 
more inclined to refuse positive NPV projects, making restrictions on leverage a useful tool in 
this context. 
The opposite situation may also be relevant, and is usually called over-investment. The term 
refers to situations in which the management retains the company’s cash flow in order to finance 
negative NPV projects. This reduces the total value of the company. 
2.3 Financial distress 
2.3.1 Implications and the effects of financial distress 
The above text showed that the management can have incentives, in addition to the opportunity to 
transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders. In times of financial distress the incentives are 
particularly strong, as the potential benefit is much higher. The conflict between bond and 
stockholders becomes clear in the situations when it is uncertain if the bondholders will receive 
their promised payments. Bodie and Taggert (1978) show that underinvestment will intensify 
during periods of financial distress. This is mainly because when in financial distress, the benefit 
of new investments would most likely come to the bondholders. During times of distress the 
value of the firm is declining (Smith et al, 1989), hence increasing the underinvestment and claim 
dilution problem as the ”economic leverage” of the firm is increasing. Thus, when in distress the 
implicit gearing of the company increases and the value of the outstanding bonds decreases. 
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In this situation, the stockholders do not bear much of the risk associated with new investments, 
and the management can be tempted to “gamble” with the firms remaining wealth (when in 
trouble, double). The management can be tempted to take on negative NPV projects as long as 
the potential upside (the cash flows volatility) is high enough. Limiting the managerial behavior 
in these situations can significantly reduce the agency cost of debt in these situations.  
 
Usually the management can postpone the default of the company, giving them time and 
opportunity to transfer value from the bondholders to the stockholders. In practice, it is often in 
such times of distress that the stockholders can materialize the wealth transfer. This is a 
recognized problem and some of the most extreme actions are restricted by law in most 
developed countries. The agency cost is negatively related to the firm’s financial status, hence the 
ATC predicts that the poorer the company’s financial condition is, all else equal, the more 
covenants is included in the debt contracts. It also predicts that small and highly levered firms 
have a higher probability for including covenants. This should also be true for volatile firms, 
firms with many liquid assets (e.g. not specialized), and in companies with information 
asymmetries. Myers (1977) argues that firms with considerable growth opportunities also will 
include covenants, based on the argument that the growth opportunities can be seen as a real 
option. According to ATC theory, since covenants on public bonds is more difficult to 
renegotiate, it is also more likely that these types of firms would prefer to use private debt.    
2.3.2 Measuring the probability of default - the Z-score 
We use the Z-score as a measure of the probability of default in our analysis in part two. It is 
based on the pioneer work by Altman, who built the first multivariate credit scoring model (Z-
score) in 1968. Using a 20 year data sample (1946-1965), and collecting a large number of 
variables from the all the firms balance sheets, income statements and some key market values, 
he selected the five most relevant and best predictors to build his model on. The resulting score 
was then used to classify a firm. Almost all credit score models in use today are variations on this 
theme. Altman concentrate on the quantitative measures, but emphasize that the qualitative part 
should not be forgotten. We base our analysis on the newest edition of Altman’s work on credit 
rating and default risk (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006, pages 233-264), and the formula below 
adjusted to be used on private firms (page 246). 
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2.4 The cost of including covenants 
By including covenants the agency cost of debt can be reduced, but this comes at a price. First of 
all it reduces managerial freedom and flexibility, which can prove costly in certain situation. For 
example, if a company has restrictions on merger activity, it might have to pass out on 
investments that would have yielded positive synergies and increased the total value of the firms. 
Many situations can incur when the cost outweighs the benefits of including covenants. Smith 
and Warner (1979) argues that an optimal contractual structure exists, making it an important 
consideration for the issuer. Furthermore, Begley (1994) argues, based on empirical evidence, 
that the firms based their decision on which covenants to include in the contracts on their 
perceived cost of including them. She also emphasizes the importance of the firm’s probability of 
financial distress and future growth opportunities, when deciding for which covenants to include. 
This leads to the notion that how the firm values different types of flexibility and freedom will 
determine which covenants they include in their issues. A specific combination of covenants will 
be the most valuable for a particularly company, and is based on its characteristics and 
perceptions.  
2.5 Empirical findings to date 
In this part we provide a short presentation of some of the most important empirical work done 
on the subject to date. All the work is done on US data, and show that there is much empirical 
support for the ATC, and the early works of especially Smith and Warner. There also exists some 
expectations, and there is several limitations regarding the empirical work done so far.  
I. Malitz (1986): “On financial contracting - the determinates of bond contracts”; researched a 
sample of 252 public debentures issued by 223 different firms. The main focus is three categories 
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of covenants; sinking funds, dividends restrictions and debt restrictions. He finds that it is the set 
of covenants, not the individual ones that provide protection, and that this is what he finds in the 
contracts as well. The primary result is empirical evidence showing that firms with high financial 
leverage benefit more from including restrictions than firms with lower leverage, hence are more 
likely to include them. He also finds that asymmetric information plays a significant role in 
determining the value of including covenants in the debt contracts. Difference in information 
regarding future investments opportunities also seems to have a significant impact, increasing the 
benefits of covenants when the difference in information between bond and stockholder is 
significant. This is often the case in smaller firms.  
J. Begley (1994): “Restrictive covenants included in public debt agreements”; examines 130 non-
convertible public debentures (issued between 1975 and 1979). She finds that firms with a higher 
probability of bankruptcy, fewer assets in place and generating less operating cash flows are more 
likely to include covenants that restrict dividends and additional borrowing 
Nash, Netter and Poulsen (2003): “Determinants of contractual relations between shareholders 
and bondholders”; look at 496 public bonds (issued in 1989 and 1996), finding a negative 
relationship between the use of covenants and future growth opportunities, indicating that the 
firms try to preserve their flexibility and that this outweighs the benefits of including them. This 
is contradictory to previous findings, but they only find this for covenants restricting further debt 
and dividend payments. For other types of covenants the use is significantly lower for firms with 
higher growth opportunities, supporting earlier work. In line with other previous and later work 
(the ATC), they find that the use of other types of covenants is mainly driven by the probability 
for financial distress.  
N. Reisel (2004): ”On the Value of Restrictive Covenants: An Empirical Investigation of Public 
Bond Issues”; she finds that by including financial covenants firms can significantly reduce their 
cost of debt by as much as 311 basis points. This implies substantial agency costs. She also 
investigates the relationship between other covenants – investment, asset sale and payout 
restrictions – and the cost of debt, but does not find a significant relationship. Furthermore, she 
interprets her results as being consistent with the argument that it is too costly for high growth 
firms to include restrictive covenants on investments, asset sale and pay outs.      
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M. Billet, T. King and D. Mauer (2007):”growth opportunities and the choice of leverage, debt 
maturity, and covenants”; with a large sample evidence that consists of 7 016 observations (1989 
to 2002), representing 1 410 different firms, they find a positive relationship between covenants 
and growth opportunities, debt maturity and leverage. They also find evidence suggesting that 
covenants can reduce the agency cost for levered high growth firms. 
2.6 Short on the risk and pricing of corporate bonds 
The risk and pricing of bonds is a large area of study, and for a review on the subject we will 
refer the reader to other texts.
3
 Shortly put, the value of any bond is determined by discounting all 
the future coupon payments and the face value, calculating the present value of the expected 
future cash flow. An appropriate effective interest rate is used as the discount rate, and is based 
on the prevailing market rates. Therefore, if the going market rates increases the value of the 
bond decreases, as the present value of the future cash flow is lower. This effect is referred to as 
the interest rate risk and is one of three factors determining the risk of a bond investment; interest 
rate, credit and liquidity risk. A large part of corporate issues in Norway are floating rate notes 
(FRN), and are not affected by the interest risk.  
The second factor affecting the price of a bond is called the credit risk. It is determined by the 
probability of the issuer not meeting its debt obligations in terms of late or failed payments or 
bankruptcy. The higher the credit risk, the more the investors demand to be compensated in form 
of higher interest payments.
4
 Including covenants may reduce the probability of financial 
distress/default, hence reducing the bonds credit risk and lowering the issuer’s price of debt. 
Thus, in this paper the effect of covenants on the bonds yield will primarily be related to the 
influence this type of risk.    
Third, the price of a bond is influenced by its liquidity risk, and can be measured by the bond’s 
buy/sell spread. Investors demand compensation when buying bonds with low liquidity. If held to 
maturity the liquidity risk is neglect able. This is often used as an argument for why investors 
with a long-term horizon (e.g. the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global, “oljefondet”) 
should use this to their advantage and in assets (bonds) with a low liquidity.  
                                                           
3
 For further discussion see for instance; Bodie, Kane and Marcus , (2005) chapter 14 
4
 The average rating for firms listed on Oslo Børs is BB. 
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3 CORPORATE BONDS IN NORWAY 
This chapter provides the reader with a brief overview of some important aspects of the 
Norwegian corporate bond market. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part gives a 
presentation of the markets history, explains how bonds are listed and traded, and how the market 
has developed in terms of traded volume. The second part presents the most important market 
participants and their function. Last, we have a short piece emphasizing some other key 
distinctions in the corporate bond market that the reader should be aware of. We will show how 
corporate bonds have become an important part of the Norwegian financial market during the last 
years, and provide the reader with background information that may increase the understanding 
of our analysis. 
3.1  The market 
3.1.1 History of the market 
The market for corporate bonds in Norway is relatively new. Before the crises in the Norwegian 
banking industry in the early nineties, mortgage and power companies dominated the market. The 
market was strictly regulated, and certain types of firms were banned from issuing bonds all 
together. The mortgage companies had a panel matching borrowing and lending, and trade was 
done through market maker agreements. The bank crisis was a distinctive Scandinavian 
phenomenon at the time, and has many similarities to the situation in the UK at the time of this 
being written. A number of the mortgage companies went into bankruptcy as a result of the crisis. 
The banking sector in Norway was given massive governmental aid, and was forced into 
restructuring and consolidations. The crises also resulted in changes in the laws regulating the 
Norwegian financial industry. In 1992 the financial regulations was relaxed. Commercial banks 
were for the first time allowed to borrow in the bond market, and the softer regulations also made 
it easier for new types of firms to issue bonds. The amendments lead to a significant increase in 
the bond market turnover (among other things because of banks borrowing to buy struggling 
mortgage companies), and soon commercial banks became the dominant borrower in the private 
sector. The market for corporate bonds at that time was almost non-existing. Only a handful of 
the largest companies in Norway issued bonds, and few investors paid much attention to the 
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market. In chapter 6 we show the development in the number of corporate issues and the types of 
firms using the market since 1998.  
3.1.2 Oslo Børs and the trading of bonds 
The trading of bonds at the Norwegian stock exchange is done through one of its 63 members.
5
 
38 of the members are international, reflecting the important role foreign investors play in this 
market. The most dominant sectors both in regard to stocks and bonds are oil & gas, offshore oil 
service, shipping, fisheries & fish farming, and IT
6
. The stock exchange administrates two 
markets for bond listings. The traditional market – “Oslo Børs” is subject to the EU directives 
regulating the security markets across Europe. In 2006 EU issued new directives increasing the 
regulations (e.g. demanding consolidated financial statements complying with International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) and increased requirements to the prospectuses). In addition 
to the traditional market for listing and trading of bonds, Oslo Børs opened the Alternative Bond 
Market (ABM) in June 2005. The new market was in many respects a reaction to the increased 
regulations from the EU. The regulation of ABM is independent of international agreements and 
is less extensive. It is primarily based on the regulations of Oslo Børs as of 12/31/2005, but the 
prospectus rules and application process is simplified. However, the information requirements 
and the trading rules are the same for both Oslo Børs and the ABM. ABM is divided in to two 
subcategories, one for bonds aimed towards retail investors (allmennheten) with a face value of 
less than NOK 500.000 and one for professional investors with face value exceeding this limit. 
Bonds not listed on the exchange are traded in the same way as those listed. 
3.1.3 The size of the market 
Figure 3.1 illustrates how the market volume has increased during the last years. In 2006 Oslo 
Børs and the ABM had a total turnover of NOK 718.5 billion (disregarding repos), reflecting a 
daily turnover of NOK 2.9 billion
7
. During 2006, CDs and bond issues listed amounted to 
approximately NOK 120 billion. To put this in perspective, the stock market raised NOK 51 
                                                           
5
 oslobors.no 
6
 Oslo Børs, (2006) 
7
 Oslo Børs, (2006)  
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billion in the same year.
8
 Total amount of outstanding corporate bonds per 12/31/2007 was 153 
NOK billion.  
Compared to our neighboring countries the market for bonds is relatively small in Norway. 
Especially Denmark has a long tradition for using bonds (the market is approximately three times 
larger than in Norway). 9 In other respects the two countries are fairly similar, and can provide us 
with an idea of a potential for future increase in Norwegian bond market.    
Figure 3.1: The Norwegian bond market in nominal values divided according to type of issuers (1992-2007) 
 
Figure 3.1: Source: Swedbank/First Securities (2007). * per 09/28/2007. Y-axis in NOK billion. 
3.2 Key market participants 
3.2.1 The Issuers 
Looking at the total market for bonds in Norway, the government, banks, insurance and industrial 
companies are the largest groups of issuers. Figure 3.1 illustrates how both the total market and 
especially the market for corporate bonds have increased since the change of legislation in 1992. 
At the end of 2007 the corporate bond market was worth approximately NOK 150 billion
10
, and it 
is playing an increasingly important role in the market. In chapter 6 we take a closer look at the 
types of industrial firms issuing bonds. 
                                                           
8
 Oslo Børs, (2007) 
9
 Oslo Børs, (2006) 
10
 Swedbank/First Securities, (2007)   
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3.2.2 The Investors 
Figure 3.2 shows the relatively insignificant role national private investors play in the Norwegian 
corporate market. We leave to other studies to explain the reason for this in detail, but the reader 
should note that the opportunities for private investors (especially the smaller ones), to invest in 
corporate bonds in Norway are limited. Generally speaking, we will also argue that the “man in 
the street” in Norway has little knowledge about the market, at least compared to for example that 
of the US, Denmark or other countries where bonds are more common and have a longer history. 
The few private investors that use the market primarily invest in indexed bonds. In regard to our 
work on covenants, it is important to bear in mind that the lenders almost exclusively are 
professional and institutional investors. Foreign investors have the largest ownership of corporate 
bonds in Norway. Historically, this group has primarily invested in government bonds, but the 
increase in corporate issues the later years has boosted their interest. This may have had an effect 
on the use of covenants in Norway, as the investors are used to have this kind of protection when 
investing domestically. We made the same calculations as in figure 3.2 for the entire bond 
market. The results are very similar, but foreign investors have a larger share of the corporate 
market compared to the total market. (Norwegian insurance companies and private pension funds 
have the largest share of bonds overall in Norway.) 
Figure 3.2: The ownership structure of outstanding corporate bonds in Norway 
 
Figure 3.2: Based on numbers received from VPS (Norwegian Registry of Securities) 
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3.2.3 The Managers 
The managers help the firms to organize the bond issues, and after writing the indenture, take it to 
the market. Managers also operate in the secondary market, operating as an intermediary between 
investor and the exchange. We will in our analysis in chapter 6 explain more of their effect on the 
issues and the use of covenants. The reader should bear in mind throughout the analysis that there 
can be several factors influencing the managers’ effect on the use of covenants, for example; 
reputation, skills, routines, specialization, network and strategies. 
3.2.4 The Trustee 
The trustee serves as an intermediate between the issuers and the bondholders, and may act on 
behalf of all the bondholders. Prior to 1993, the bond managers, or possibly other investment 
banks, acted as trustees. As a result of the bank crises of the early nineties, investors started to 
question the dual role and conflicting interest of the banks - acting as both trustee and at the same 
time being a part of the bilateral loan. In addition, as a result of the crisis the publics’ trust in the 
banks was generally low, and it forced the business to find other solutions to preserve the role of 
the trustee. A group consisting of the most important members of the Norwegian financial 
market, including the largest commercial banks, insurance companies and some large institutional 
investors, together founded “Norsk Tillitsmann ASA” (NTM) in 1993
11
. The three largest owners 
today is “DnB NOR Bank ASA” (13.95 %), “Nordea Bank Norge” (10.41 %) and “KLP 
forsikring” (10.36 %)
12
. Roughly 95 percent of all Norwegian bond issues have a trustee. NTM’s 
market share as trustee is approximately 90-95 percent, depending on the unit of measurement 
applied. All high yield corporate bond issues in Norway use NTM as trustee, and most other 
corporate issuers do the same. The exception is primarily a handful of private placements not 
using a trustee at all. All listed bonds are required to have a trustee. The fact that no external 
lawyers or other financial institutions act as trustee illustrates the dominating position NTM has 
in the Norwegian market. Several law offices have tried to enter the market, but none has 
succeeded to this day.
13
  
The trustee’s primary task is to monitor the borrowing firm and to make sure it complies with the 
clauses laid down in the loan agreement. One of the advantages of having a trustee is that it 
                                                           
11
 norsktillit.no 
12
 Section based on information from NTM, (2006) 
13
 Private conversation with Elise Breivik, (NTM), 05/07/2008 
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enables the bondholders to speak with “one voice,” and they can act on behalf of all the 
bondholders. It also helps solve the problems with free-riding in regard to the monitoring of the 
issuer, and can prove valuable as it can help ease solving minor problems and conflicts that arise 
during the life of the bond. The potential free-riding problem is also the primary reason why the 
issuer covers the costs of using a trustee. The trustee has a continuous dialog with the issuer, with 
the intention of preserving the rights of the bondholders. NTM also helps issuers to determine if 
certain actions are in line with the loan agreement.  
NTM also plays an active role in the writing of the bond contracts. They often make the first draft 
of a loan agreement, and cooperate closely with the issuing manager. This way they also have a 
strong influence on the use and phrasing of bond covenants in Norway. Their influence can help 
explain the homogeneity of the bond contracts, as boilerplates are used to some extent. 
Furthermore, an important part of NTM’s work is monitoring high yield loans, assuring 
predetermined changes in security are complied with during the different phases (e.g. security in 
a rig construction contract which by delivering of the rig is transferred to a security in the rig).
 14
 
NTM also have a role as an agent in bank syndicate, except for the payments. They go through an 
account operator, but missing payments becomes NTMs’ responsibility.  
3.3 Other important Norwegian distinctions 
In this chapter we have showed the growth in the Norwegian corporate bond market, and the 
bond market in general. Some of the biggest and most important Norwegian firms raise capital in 
this market (e.g. Telenor). In our work we refer to this kind of issues as “cash- flow backed” bond 
issues. Large corporations with a solid financial history, issue bonds that are primarily secured by 
their expected future cash flow, hence the name. In the resent years new types of firms has also 
started using the market. This is bonds issued to finance a particular project or purchase of one or 
several specific assets. The asset is usually used as collateral, and it is the cash flow from the 
future use of this particular asset that shall repay the debt. We refer to these issues as “asset- 
backed bonds”. Figure 3.3 illustrates a typical structure of a high yield asset- backed issue. 
                                                           
14
 Same as security agent in banking consortiums 
Page | 22  
 
The reader should also bear in mind that for both these types of issues, the primary reason for 
issuing public debt instead of private, is to reduce the number of covenants and lower the general 
control of the lender.
15
 
Figure 3.3: Typical firm balance behind an asset-backed issue 
 
Source: NTM (2006) “Bond Trustee as Investor Protection” 
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 Private conversation with Ola Nygård, (NTM), 05/05/2008 
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4 DATA SAMPLE – CONSTRUCTING A DATABASE 
The primary objective of this thesis is to provide the reader with an overview over the use of 
covenants in the Norwegian market for corporate bonds. Before this, very little time has been 
devoted to the study of this subject, and data on was scarce. Thus, an important aspect of our 
work was to construct a database recording the use of covenants. The database primarily consists 
of four different types of data; covenants, firm specific information, bond specific information 
and macroeconomic figures. The part of the database containing the details about the bonds key 
information is based on data provided by NTM and their electronic database, Stamdata. They also 
provided us with electronic copies of all the loan agreements. We created our database by reading 
through these contracts, and collating this with the bonds general characteristic. This part of our 
database includes close to all the corporate issues in the period. The key information about the 
issuing companies was collected using the Amadeus database.
16
 In this chapter will consists of 
four parts. The first two parts explain the process of constructing the database, the third go 
through some possible sources of error, and last we present the calculation of the companies Z-
score.       
4.1 Sample selection 
Owing to the fact that we had to read through all the contracts that was to be included in the 
database, we had to limit our total sample. First, we took a sample test of bond contracts issued 
by a number of different types of businesses. Based on this test and talks with representatives 
from both NTM and Pareto, we got strong indications that basically the only issues in Norway 
that include covenants are the corporate bonds. As a further check, we examined about ten issues 
for each line of businesses, using the business classifications found in Stamdata. This preliminary 
work indicated that other types of issues had short and more standardized loan agreements with 
close to none covenants. One reason for this can be the strict regulations imposed on some of 
these sectors. This is especially true for the Norwegian savings banks, accounting for a large 
percentage of the total issues. Both their financing and their operations in general are regulated 
by the authorities. They issue primary capital certificates (grunnfondsbevis) instead of common 
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 AMADEUS is a comprehensive, pan-European database containing financial information on over 10 million public 
and private companies in 38 European countries”  (Amadeus) 
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stock. Thus, the relationship between bond and “stockholders” is somewhat different from the 
traditional situation, also making the need for protective covenants less obvious. Insurance 
companies and commercial banks also have legal restrictions in regard to their capital structure 
and financing, and we did not find covenants used in the sample contracts. Our random sample 
reading of ten power companies’ contracts did neither reveal any use of covenants. For these 
reasons we chose to exclude all of these types of issues, leaving us with corporate bond issues. 
An important objective with our work is to explore how the use of covenants has developed over 
time. Thus, we needed a relatively long data period. The market for corporate issues in Norway 
before 1998 was close to none existing. Therefore, our choice of corporate bonds is even more 
interesting as we can examine the market almost from its very beginning and provide an accurate 
and close to complete description of this market.
17
 The relative long sample period is one of the 
reasons why we have not included short term notes such as Certificates of Deposits (CD). We did 
some random sample tests, however, of short term notes. We found that the CD’s in our test 
sample did not include any covenants, and we choose to exclude all issues with maturity of less 
than a year. 
Table 4.1: Sample 1 
 
We found 509 corporate bonds issued in Norway between 01/01/1998 and 03/31/2008. This is 
based on our findings at Stamdata and our cross checking against an internal database provided to 
us by NTM.
18
 Our cross checking makes our sample including close to all issues in the period. 
However, we got only access to 438 of these loan agreements, issued by 230 different companies. 
As we can see from table 4.1, 62 contracts were not available because they were private 
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 21 issues between 1963 and 1998, with no more than four issues a year (NTM). 
18
 The internal database contains information about all issues in the Norwegian bond market since 1943 
Year All issues Private placements Not available Sample 1
2008 6 0 1 5
2007 125 6 1 118
2006 109 1 0 108
2005 81 8 2 71
2004 56 13 0 43
2003 43 16 1 26
2002 25 8 0 17
2001 33 9 1 23
2000 18 0 1 17
1999 6 0 2 4
1998 7 1 0 6
Total 509 62 9 438
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placements, while nine loan agreements did not NTM manage to procure, and other sources was 
not of help either.  
4.2 Constructing our database 
In order to construct the database, we used the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) 
as a starting point.
19
 Most researches (e.g. Reisel, 2004, and Billet et.al., 2007) that have done 
empirical work on the subject, uses this database. Thus, making this as our starting point, we can 
better compare our results to previous work and the situation in the US. However, the database 
we have built is what we would like to call an adjustment to the Norwegian market. We have 
included some additional categories not found in the FISD, which we believe is important in the 
Norwegian market. Generally speaking, most of them are a result of special conditions in some of 
the most important businesses in Norway such as oil and shipping. We describe these on how 
they are used in more detail in chapter 6.1 and 6.5.20 Some of the FISD categories of covenants 
are also modified slightly, in order to better describe the prevailing conditions in Norway. Other 
modifications is a result of the difficulty we had obtaining extensive information about the FISD 
categories. We also looked at the main categories that NTM uses in order to get a better 
understanding of the Norwegian distinctive characteristics
21
. Thus, some covenants are either 
broader or narrower defined in our database than in the FISD. The analysis in chapter 6 provides 
the reader with an understanding of all the covenants, but for replication purposes we will direct 
the reader to appendix 1 and the definitions of all the covenants included in our database. For 
readers unfamiliar with covenants in general, a better understanding can also be obtained by 
looking at the appendix.      
The first step in constructing our database was to create a list of all the issues in the period and 
their respective ISIN numbers.
22
 To our surprise and to the best of our knowledge, no institution 
in Norway have created such a list (i.e. sorting the bonds by issue year and containing the ISIN 
numbers or other information), and we could only obtain unstructured “data files”. We created 
such a list by searching through the Stamdata database. Based on this list we collected bond 
                                                           
19
 Interpretation of FISD covenants and what they include is based on “Corporate bond securities: Database 
Dictionary", by Mergent.  
20
 See appendix 1 for definitions 
21
 At the meeting 04/11/2008 
22
 International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) - an alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies a security. It 
consists of a two character country code, a nine digit number and one check digit. 
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specific information from the Stamdata by looking up each individual ISIN number. We typed 
inn all the available information about the different issues and downloaded the respective loan 
agreements whenever available.
23
 After completing this work, we sent NTM a list of the loan 
agreements not found at Stamdata. They were so helpful and returned the ones they were able to 
obtain.
24
 The private placements proved impossible to obtain. The exact results of this work can 
be seen in table 4.1.  
After completing the list of issues and collecting the loan agreements, we started the work of 
reading through them. Based on the FISD classifications, the process described in the next 
chapter, we created a large Excel file containing all the bond information and the covenant 
categories. We used this to register the covenants in each bond contract. Upon completion of this 
work, we collected information on each issuing firms by using the AMADEUS database. We 
used this database because of the relatively high number of foreign issues in our data and because 
of the possibility of exporting information to Excel. In addition to the financial statements we 
collected data on the year of incorporation and other firm specifics. The bond issues were linked 
with the financial data as of the first of January the issuing year. 25 For some issuers we had 
problems finding the corresponding financial statement. In the cases this was a problem, we used 
the financial statements for the previous year or at the end of the bond issuing year. We did not 
find the relevant information for all the issues, reducing our second sample to and 323 issues (and 
162 issuing firms), see table 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
23
 Appendix 2 shows how the bond specific information is presented at Stamdata 
24
 The remaining contracts were tried to obtain through www.oslobors.no, but they could, of course, only provide 
us with loan agreements for listed bonds. 
25
 The latest financial statement is our best estimate of both the bond issuers’ financial situation and investors’ 
knowledge about the company on the bond issuing date. We have disregarded that some firms in our sample 
publish quarterly reports. 
Page | 27  
 
Table 4.2: “Sample 2” 
 
In other words, we operate with two data samples. Sample 1 includes all loan agreements and 
information about the bonds. In Sample 2 we have excluded the issues that we could not find 
company specific data for. In the descriptive analysis in the next two chapters we primarily use 
Sample 1, and the analysis can be viewed as representing all the issues in the period. We will not 
clearly distinguish between these two samples in the following parts, but bear in mind that if we 
only discuss covenants, Sample 1 is used. If our discussions both can be related to covenants and 
firm specific information, Sample 2 is used. 
Finally, the macroeconomic factors used in the analysis are based on figures from SSB
26
 and 
Norges Bank. We have included all the relevant interest rates; the Sight deposit rate, different 
maturities of NIBOR, and several Government bond interest rates.  
4.3 Sources of errors – reducing the risk of subjective interpretation  
Since collecting information from loan agreements is subject to some degree of individual 
interpretation, this can be a source of error. We faced this challenge by first carefully working us 
together through 30 contracts. We discussed our findings with one another and compared it to the 
FISD database and other empirical work on the subject. We also discussed the initial findings 
with NTM
27
 and Pareto
28
. Based on this preliminary work we continued the registrations. We 
divided the data in two and read one part each. When finished we switched data and read through 
the contracts one more time, as a cross check.  
                                                           
26
 Statistics Norway 
27
 Meeting with representatives 04/11/2008 
28
 Private conversations with Stian Winther (Pareto) 
Issues by firms not "Correct" financial 
Year Loan agreements in Amadeus statement not available Sample 2
2008 5 1 0 4
2007 118 50 0 68
2006 108 18 0 90
2005 71 13 1 57
2004 43 6 0 37
2003 26 6 3 17
2002 17 4 4 9
2001 23 4 2 17
2000 17 0 0 17
1999 4 1 0 3
1998 6 1 1 4
438 104 11 323
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Furthermore, clauses can also be subject to a misinterpretation because of the use of complicated 
legal terms in the contracts. We believe that our initial work and discussions also reduced this 
problem significantly. Readers with detailed knowledge of the FISD database may also find that 
we have broader (or narrower) definitions of some of the covenants with the same name as used 
in the FISD. We do not view this problem to be of importance, but when in doubt the reader is 
asked to consult appendix 1 for the definitions of all the covenants used in our database.       
4.4 Calculating the Z-score – the probability of default 
As we did not have reliable ratings on most of the companies in our sample, we had to make our 
own estimations based on the companies’ financial statements. We based our analysis on the 
newest edition of Altman’s (2006) work on credit rating and default risk. We use the model 
adjusted for private firms, because it was not possible to get market data for a significant number 
of the firms in our sample. The most obvious reason is that 81 of 261 firms were not, and have 
not been, listed. We also found it difficult to get historical market data for quite a few of the listed 
companies (e.g. the issuer’s market capitalization on the time of the bond issue was difficult to 
obtain). Another simplification we had to make due to lack of information in the financial 
statement is the assumption that retained earnings equals ‘other shareholders funds’ found in 
AMADEUS. This includes for example premium on shares which should have been excluded 
from retained earnings. Thus, we might have a too high estimate on the z-score. Due to lack of 
information in some financial statements, our sample is reduced to 261 contracts when testing on 
z-score.  
In the next chapters we will use the constructed database to describe and analyze the use of 
covenants in the Norwegian corporate bond market, and how this has developed over the last ten 
years. However, our focus is mostly concentrated on the 21
th
 century due to few observations in 
1998 and 1999.  
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5 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS – THE ISSUES 
We will in this chapter describe how the corporate bond market in Norway has developed the last 
ten years in terms of important bond characteristics. Our sample covers more or less all the 
issues, and can be viewed as accounting for the entire market in the period. We will show how 
the issue types change over time. We will present analyses to help explain the development in the 
types of issues, and how it possibly can affect the use of covenants. The main goal of this chapter 
is to illustrate how issue characteristics can influence the use of covenants, and to describe the 
development in the market. The chapter is divided into three parts. First, we present and analyze 
some important bond characteristics. Second, we take a closer look at the security linked to the 
bonds, and some aspects of exchange listings. Last, we describe aspects of the issuing firms and 
the bonds’ managers. In appendix 3 we have provided the reader with a table summarizing the 
use of the bond characteristics. 
5.1 Bond characteristics  
5.1.1 Convertibles vs. bonds 
We find that issues classified as either bonds or convertible or exchangeable bonds make up the 
market for corporate issues in Norway over the last ten years. Table 5.1 illustrates the percentage 
of total issues for the two different types in each year. The development can indicate that 
convertibles are the preferred type in more turbulent financial markets. Percentually, convertibles 
were mostly used in the period between 2000 and 2003 - a period characterized by turmoil in the 
capital markets around the world. The rapid increase in the use of convertibles in 2008 supports 
the argument, but for the macroeconomic conditions to be a reliable predictor, we should have 
found some increase in the use of convertibles in the second part of 2007. In turbulent financial 
markets, the price of risk tends to increase. For most firms, the price of issuing new debt 
increases, and convertibles are one way to lower this direct cost of borrowing. The development 
can also be ascribed to shifting trends in the financial market or changes in the types of firms that 
issue bonds.  
It is important to bear in mind these changes in the use of bonds and convertibles because they 
can influence the use of covenants. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that since the holders of 
convertibles can recapture value transferred from bondholders to stockholders, the management 
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is less likely to engage in such activities with outstanding convertibles compared to bonds. We 
will expand this line of argument, and emphasize how convertible rights can narrow the gap 
between the bondholders’ and the stockholders’ interests.
29
 We find strong indications that there 
is a negative relationship between conversion rights and the number of covenants included in the 
contracts. The average number of covenants per contract is 5.48 for bonds and 2.8 for 
convertibles. Table 5.1 shows the development over time and clearly illustrates this notion. The 
way convertible issues align the bondholders’ interest with that of the stockholders may be one 
reason for our findings. Another reason can be that convertibles in general have lower priority 
and less security for their claims. We find that 60 percent of the subordinated issues are 
convertible bond; furthermore, we find that unsubordinated issues include 5.2 covenants on 
average, and subordinated 3.4. This indicates that the bonds’ priority also influences the use of 
covenants in general. One reason for this is that subordinated issues do not usually include 
pledged assets, and have a plain and simple structure. NTM has argued that convertibles in 
general should include less restrictive covenants and have a lower priority.
 30
 We find this to be 
true on average for every year in our data.    
Table 5.1: The type of bonds and average use of covenants 
 
5.1.2 Call options  
Table 5.1 shows that over 61 percent of the issuers last year included a call option in their bonds, 
and it is widely used in the entire period. The call options terms vary among the contracts, from 
the very detailed to more general ones. In our data we find provisions both resembling European 
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 Later research on the topic (see, for instance, Anderson 1999) challenges this line of argument. 
30
 Meeting with representatives from NTM, 04/11/2008 
Year
Of issues Avg. Covenant Of issues Avg. Covenant Of issues Avg. Covenant Of issues Avg. Covenant
2008* 20 % 15.0 80 % 7.8 40 % 9.5 0 % n.a.
2007 88 % 9.0 12 % 6.9 61 % 10.5 8 % 10.6
2006 81 % 5.5 19 % 3.1 49 % 7.6 4 % 4
2005 94 % 2.8 6 % 0.0 35 % 4.5 3 % 3.5
2004 79 % 2.7 21 % 0.2 26 % 1.6 0 % n.a.
2003 77 % 2.1 23 % 0.0 12 % 5.7 0 % n.a.
2002 65 % 4.4 35 % 0.0 53 % 4.8 0 % n.a.
2001 74 % 1.4 26 % 0.2 26 % 0.2 4 % 1.0
2000 59 % 1.7 41 % 0.7 35 % 1.0 6 % 0.0
1999 75 % 2.0 25 % 0.0 75 % 2.0 0 % n.a.
1998 100 % 3.2 0 % n.a. 33 % 5.0 0 % n.a.
* per 03/31/2008
Bonds Convertibles Callable With Warrant
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and American options.
31
 Those that resemble American options specify a date from which the 
option is valid. The option can be exercised anytime between then and the date of maturity. On 
the other hand, the European options state one or several specific dates at which the options may 
be exercised. The dates always coincide with the date of interest payment, and some include a list 
of all exercise dates and the prevailing strike price for each date. As would be expected, the value 
decrease as maturity approaches. We find that the options resembling European options are the 
most frequently used in Norway.32 
5.1.3 Warrants – not affecting the loan agreements 
In general, warrants are used as a “sweetener” to make the bonds more attractive for the investors 
– something extra in addition to the interest payments. By including them, the issuer may lower 
the cost of borrowing and/or increase the investors’ interest for the issue. Warrants are similar in 
structure to stock options, and provide value for the investors by letting them take part in the 
firm’s upside potential. The maturity of warrants is usually measured in years, not months, 
reflecting the fact that they typically have much longer maturities. They are issued by the firm, 
and have a dilutive effect as new stocks are issued when the warrant is exercised, thus 
representing a cost for the existing stockholders if exercised. The use of warrants is relatively low 
in Norway, but has increased over the last three years. We find the highest use in 2007, when 
eight percent of the issues had a warrant attached. One possible explanation for the development 
can be that the use depends on the type and size of the firms that issue bonds. Furthermore, we 
find that warrants are included in the periods characterized by a lot of new businesses being 
introduced to the market. These firms are smaller and not as familiar to the investor community. 
This can lead us to believe that new firms, either because of their share size, lack of track record 
or high value of future growth opportunities, add warrants to their bonds in order to obtain more 
favorable terms. As with convertibles, warrants make the bondholders’ interest more aligned with 
that of stockholders; therefore, we would expect to see the same negative relationship with the 
use of covenants. The reason why we do not find this is most likely the small share of the issue’s 
total value the warrant represents. This indicates that warrants are just a “sweetener,” a small 
bonus for the bondholders, and do not affect the shaping of the contracts.  
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 For more on options and option pricing, refer to for instance Brealey et.al, 2006, page 538. 
32
 Common for all options is the provision that the loan trustee and the bondholders must be informed at least 30 
banking days before an eventual redemption. 
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5.1.4 Interest type and payments 
Table 5.2 shows how the share of fixed and floating rate issues in Norway has been relatively 
stable over the last ten years, each accounting for approximately half of the issues.
33
 One might 
be surprised by the high number of floating rate bonds (FRN).
34
 According to Pareto
35
 the choice 
of fixed interest versus floating interest rate are determined based on the issuers expectations of 
future development in the interest rate and the managers expectation of demand for the different 
types. The difference though is not of high importance for the issuer or the bondholder as both 
have the possibility to swap the interest rate. FRNs are stated as a spread over a money market 
reference rate, most commonly the three-month Norwegian Interbank Offer Rate (NIBOR).
36
 
Bonds issued in USD use the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as the reference rate. The 
bonds’ interest frequency determines if the three- or six-month rate is to be applied.   
Table 5.2: Interest types  
 
Very few alternative types of interest rates have been issued over the last three years. Looking at 
table 5.2, we see that there was some use of zero-coupon bonds between 2002 and 2004, but they 
are almost completely absent the last few years, even as the total number of bond issues has 
increased.  
Most bonds in Norway make quarterly interest payments. Looking at the development since 2000 
in table 5.3, the interest rate frequency has substantially increased. Annual payments used to be 
the common practice, but we see a clear shift towards quarterly and semi-annual payments. Much 
                                                           
33
 The reader is asked not to ascribe too much value to the 2002, due to the effect of the Kværner restructuring.  
34
 Norway has, compared to almost every other country, a very high number of floating rate mortgages and bank 
loans. A possible explanation is that this is also reflected in the corporate bond market. 
35
 Represented by Stian Winther 
36
 NIBOR is a currency swap rate between NOK and USD. 
Year Fixed issues
Average 
interest rate 
(%)
Fixed spread FRN issues
Average 
spread
Zero coupon Adjust & Step
2007 42 % 8.870 8.870 55 % 3.59 1 % 2 %
2006 46 % 8.620 8.620 53 % 3.11 1 % 0 %
2005 49 % 7.310 7.310 48 % 1.97 1 % 2 %
2004 42 % 6.990 6.990 51 % 1.60 7 % 0 %
2003 54 % 8.010 8.010 38 % 1.22 8 % 0 %
2002 35 % 7.650 7.650 24 % 0.93 18 % 23 %
2001 30 % 9.898 9.898 65 % 2.43 0 % 5 %
2000 59 % 9.965 9.965 35 % 1.72 0 % 6 %
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of this development is due to the fact that most of the FRN bonds almost solely have quarterly 
payments now, but also because the fixed rate bonds have increased their interest frequency and 
include both semi-annual and quarterly payments.  
Table 5.3:  Frequency of payments (2000-2007) 
 
5.1.5 The spread 
Table 5.2 and figure 5.1 illustrate how the interest rates and spreads on corporate bonds have 
developed compared to the most common Norwegian reference rates. The reader is asked to 
disregard the low spread in 2002 because of the effect of the restructuring of Aker Kværner on 
the data.37 The FRN spread has been between approximately 100 and 350 basis points over the 
last eight years. We find that the spread in general has increased during the period. This can be an 
indication of increased credit risk among the issuers over these years, or because the markets 
demand higher compensation for taking on credit risk. A similar shift is observed in the fixed rate 
issues, as the spread between the reference rates and the average coupon rate is increasing; 
however, this spread in fixed rates is also influenced by other factors such as interest rate risk, 
thus making the FRN spread a better indication of the average risk of the companies issuing 
bonds each year. If the issuing firm’s volatility has increased on average, all other things being 
equal, this would according to the ATC result in an increase in the overall use of covenants. We 
find a strong increase in the average number of covenants included in each contract during the 
period, and the issuing firms’ increased credit risk may help explain the development. It is 
difficult to estimate how the spread in general affects the use of covenants. The two are 
                                                           
37
 They issued several bonds that year with interest rates lower than the next one on the list by more than 200 
basis points, and the effect is enough to interrupt our sample that year.  
 
Year Annual Semi Annual Quarterly
2007 8 % 28 % 64 %
2006 27 % 19 % 55 %
2005 44 % 8 % 48 %
2004 42 % 12 % 47 %
2003 42 % 15 % 42 %
2002 59 % 18 % 24 %
2001 26 % 9 % 65 %
2000 59 % 12 % 29 %
Interest Payments
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dependent on each other, creating problems analyzing as they are determined simultaneously. We 
will address this issue in chapter 8. 
Figure 5.1: Development in spread (2000-2007)  
 
5.1.6 The currency – a more international market 
We find that corporate bonds in Norway are issued in either Norwegian kroner (NOK) or USD.
38
 
Table 5.4 shows how the number of issues denominated in USD has increased from zero in 2001 
to 36 percent of all new issues in 2007. Foreign issuers amount in total to 40 percent of the total 
USD issues, but the rest are issued by firms registered in Norway. One third of the USD 
denominated bonds was issued by companies outside Scandinavia.  
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Table 5.4: Denominated currency in new issues 
 
The increase in foreign denominated issues can illustrate two important factors that may 
influence the use of covenants in general. First of all, covenants are used more abroad, 
particularly in the US, but also in many European countries. If these firms perceive that they 
benefit from using the same contracts in Norway as they do at home, we would expect the 
number of covenants to increase as the share of foreign companies increase. Secondly, the 
increasing share of Norwegian companies issuing bonds in USD can be viewed as an indicator of 
the increasing number of foreign investors in Norway. In chapter 3 we show how they are the 
largest group of owners of corporate bonds, and Norwegian firms might want to issue bonds in 
foreign currencies to attract this large and growing group of investors. The investors probably 
value the reduced or eliminated currency risk.
39
 It can additionally provide the issuing companies 
with a valuable currency hedge, as more firms do business abroad. Furthermore, the foreign 
investors are most likely used to being protected by covenants. All other things being equal, it 
could be reasonable to expect them to demand covenants on Norwegian issues as well. Our 
interview with NTM supports this line of argument.
 40
  Among other things, they point to a group 
of investors in London that has been somewhat influential over the past few years. The demand 
from these investors and investors alike is a plausible explanation for the increasing use of 
covenants in Norway over the past few years. The increase in bonds denominated in USD 
coincides with an increase in the overall use of covenants. It is also possible that foreign issuers 
have introduced new covenants to the Norwegian market that local firms have adopted later on. 
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 If USD is the home currency there will be no currency risk associated with investing in Norwegian UDS bonds 
40
 Meeting with representatives from NTM, 04/11/2008 
Year
Issued in 
NOK
Issued in USD
2008* 60 % 40 %
2007 63 % 36 %
2006 72 % 28 %
2005 76 % 21 %
2004 98 % 2 %
2003 96 % 4 %
2002 82 % 12 %
2001 100 % 0 %
2000 100 % 0 %
1999 100 % 0 %
1998 100 % 0 %
*Per 31.03.2008
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We find considerable evidence supporting this line of argument in our data. Most striking is the 
fact that the average number of covenants included in contracts issued in USD is more than twice 
as high as for those issued in NOK. On average, the USD denominated contracts includes 8.71 
covenants, but the figure for NOK issues is 3.99.  
5.2 Trading and security 
5.2.1 Bond listings 
Eight percent of the total issues in 2007 were listed on Oslo Børs, and only 30 percent were listed 
on one of the two bond exchanges in Norway. The number of listings has decreased from 2004 to 
2007, and no bonds have been listed so far in 2008
41
. The introduction of a new exchange in late 
2005, the ABM, does not seem to have counteracted this trend. Nonetheless, it can be argued that 
the ABM has been a relative success after all. It captured 30 percent of the listings during the first 
year of operations and was the dominant exchange by 2007. The reason for ABM’s relative 
success looks to be the same as for the drop in listings on Oslo Børs and listings in general. If the 
bond is secured by pledged assets or guarantees, the exchange requires extensive documentation. 
All the assets and securities need to be thoroughly described and valued, and the process of 
listing the bonds becomes very time-consuming and expensive. This is an important reason why 
very few Norwegian high yield issues with guarantees or pledged assets are listed on the 
exchanges. If the assets are not yet in place, the structure becomes even more complicated and 
may change over time, making it very difficult to list the bond. One example of such a dynamic 
structure is when a small and perhaps recently started oil rig firm wants to issue a bond in order 
to finance the building of a new rig. The borrowers would most likely demand some sort of 
security or sky-high interest rates to invest in a bond like this. One obvious solution is to use the 
asset as collateral, and we see this solution very much used by firms like this in our data. 
Typically the bonds are at first secured by an escrow account
42
 and/or the construction contract is 
used as collateral. Gradually, as the rig is built, it is included in the security. Sometimes 
expensive equipment, i.e. tools and materials that are acquired as part of the building process, are 
also included in the pledged assets. This composition of the security is common among asset 
back bonds issued by small firms in the shipping and the oil industries. The structure makes 
                                                           
41
 03/31/2008 
42
 A financial instrument held by a third party on behalf of the other two parties in a transaction. Can include 
securities, cash or assets, and is released upon the fulfillment of some pre-defined obligations. 
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listing the bond complicated, because of the requirements for valuation and reporting in regard to 
the pledge. 
Figure 5.2: The percentage share of new issues listed each year 
 
We find it likely that the increase in young firms that secure their issues with pledged assets, and 
the increase in the use of pledges in general, can explain much of the decline we see in the 
number of listings over the last four years. We will in the next part of this chapter take a closer 
look on the effect of the bonds’ security. In general, we can say that the bonds that get listed are 
those that have little security attached, few covenants and a largely straightforward structure. 
Figure 5.3: The development in the use of pledges and guarantees, and the share of listed bonds 
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5.2.2 Pledges and guarantees – the increased use and its effect on covenants 
In the previous chapter we argued that extensive bond contracts are less likely to be listed. Figure 
5.3 illustrates the relationship between that the use of pledges and guarantees and the number of 
new listings, and the trend lines indicates a strong negative relationship. The use of pledges has 
increased from close to zero in 2000 to 50 percent in 2007, at the same time as the number of new 
listings has fallen considerably. There are several possible explanations for the development in 
the use of pledges. First of all, the number of high yield issuers has increased in the period. One 
way to reduce the yield and the lenders risk is by pledging assets as collateral for the payments. 
The increase in bond issues from small and young firms seen in figure 5.4 can provide an 
explanation for the rapid increase in the use of pledged assets as security. The economic rationale 
behind this is primarily the fact that young firms do not have much available financial history. 
When firms issue bonds, the investors, rating agencies, and other key players make their 
assessment of the firm’s credit risk and future prospects based to a large extent on its financial 
history. Investors can settle for the firm’s future expected cash flow as “collateral,” if the firms’ 
financial history and future outlook is satisfactory. For young or small firms, or firms in very 
volatile businesses, this is seldom the case. Thus, as the number of young firms increases, we 
would expect to see the use of pledges increase. We find some support in our data for this, as the 
correlation coefficient between the two is 0.7514. It is also important to bear in mind that the 
lines of business these young companies are in, affect their ability to use assets as collateral for 
their debt
43
. Most of the high yield firms that issue bonds in Norway are in capital intensive 
businesses, primarily shipping, oil, and oil supply. These firms often issue bonds to finance one 
particular asset, which will be the core of the companies’ operations and the foundation for their 
future cash flow. There is a well-functioning secondhand market for most of these types of assets, 
and they are usually very liquid, increasing the value of the pledge from the lender’s point of 
view. These firms are in general quite risky, and in order to be profitable, the projects often 
depend on volatile prices such as the price of oil or freight rates. The extent to which these firms 
use pledges indicates that their cost of including them is less than the value the lenders place on 
them. The cost for the issuer is primarily an increase in the marginal cost of debt. By using assets 
as collateral, they increase the price they have to pay or debt in the future and lose control over 
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 For example, IT or telecommunication firms seldom have assets that can serve as collateral 
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their assets, but altogether it seems that the benefit for many issuers is higher than the cost of not 
including it.  
The inclusion of guarantees seems to have the same relationship as pledges with regard to the 
number of listings, but it is not as widely used. From the year 2000, the use of guarantees 
increased from zero to 12.4 percent in 2007. Figure 5.3 shows that there also seems to be a 
positive relationship between the use of pledges and guarantees. This is supported by the fact that 
72 percent of the contracts that had some sort of guarantee also had a pledge. One important 
reason for this is that the guarantees are included in the type of asset-backed bonds described 
above. In these cases, the asset does not exist at the time of the bond issue, and guarantees by for 
example a mother company are included in the collateral. Combining guarantees and pledges can 
be one way to insure the lenders that their claims are always secured. The relationship may also 
be a natural result of the way these types of businesses are often organized. In these businesses, it 
is common to create subsidiaries for a specific project or asset, and it is not unusual for the 
mother firm to guarantee for the bonds that the subsidiary issues. Usually this is just for a limited 
period of time, until for example the vessel is built and delivered. This practice can help explain 
the increase we have seen over the last three to four years in the use of guarantees, as well as the 
close relationship that seems to hold between the use of pledged assets and guarantees.    
Figure 5.4: Average number of covenants, percentage of issues with pledges and by young firms 
 
Figure 5.4: Left vertical axis shows the average covenant usage in each year. The right vertical axis shows percentage of total 
issues in a year which have pledge assets in addition to the share of total issues done by firms younger than three years. 
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We find strong indications of a close relationship between the use of securities and how many 
covenants are included in the indentures. The use of covenants can be seen as a means for 
protecting the pledged assets, and serve as an explanation for the relationship. From the 
bondholders’ perspective, the inclusion of covenants helps preserve the value of their collateral 
by limiting the management’s possible disposal over it. This is especially true if the assets are 
liquid and a secondhand market exists, as asset substitution and liquidation may be particularly 
tempting for the stockholders. As we will show in chapter 7, many covenants attempt to minimize 
these problems, and some are also directly aimed at protecting the pledged asset. We find this to 
be a plausible explanation for the rapid increase we have seen over the last four years in the 
average use of covenants. The fact that the use of pledges to secure the bonds has increased 
threefold during the same period can help explain the development in the use of covenants, 
because many of them both directly and indirectly serve as a protection of the pledge. It is also 
possible that when issuers use pledged assets, they also automatically include a few “standard” 
covenants that protect this asset, but we do not find much evidence to support this line of 
argument.  
One might think that securing a bond issue would result in less use of covenants. By giving the 
bondholders claims over some of the company’s assets, it can be logical to expect them to settle 
for less restrictive covenants. This definitely does not seem to be the case in Norway over the last 
ten years. The contracts that have pledges have more than three times (9.5 compared to 3) as 
many covenants included in their contracts, and many of these serve as protection for the pledge.  
Furthermore, all these figures do have basically the same type of development over the period. 
This might indicate that the market in general is evolving. New types of firms are starting to use 
the market and the participants have gradually learned how to best use more sophisticated 
techniques, including elements such as collateral and covenants. Later on, we will present other 
examples and arguments for such a relationship.  
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5.3 Issuers and managers 
5.3.1 The issuing firms  
More than half of the issuers of bonds in Norway over the last ten years have only issued one 
bond. This is a possible reflection of the fact that there are few large companies in Norway, or 
that the market for corporate bonds is relatively immature. On the other hand, table 5.5 shows 
how some of the largest Norwegian companies use the bond market rather actively. The issuers 
are generally speaking in capital-intensive businesses. The number of companies with only one 
issue also illustrates the large number of issues by young and small firms.  
  
Table 5.5: The companies with the most issues over the past ten years  
 
Over the years, the share of foreign companies issuing bonds in Norway has increased 
considerably. Most of the increase is due to Swedish firms using the Norwegian market. 
International firms in oil and shipping with a strong connection to Norway also make up a 
substantial part of the increase. Many of these latter companies are registered in so-called “tax 
havens” like Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, but they have a significant part of their operations 
in Norway or have Norwegian owners (e.g. Northern Offshore Ltd and Seabird Exploration). 
Some of the issuers have a less obvious connection to Norway, but we find that most of them are 
by far either Scandinavian or registered in tax havens. This weakens any argument for foreign 
firms introducing covenants to the Norwegian market.  
Companies
Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA 17
Ocean Rig ASA 9
Petrolia Drilling ASA 9
DNO ASA 8
Entra Eiendom AS 7
Telenor ASA 7
Aker Kværner ASA 7
Norske Skogindustrier ASA 6
Olav Thon Eiendomsselskap 6
DOF ASA 6
Seadrill Limited 6
Number of different issuers last ten years 230
With one issue 146
With two or three issues 56
More than three issues 17
Number of issues by foreign firms 65
Number of foreign firms 35
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Figure 5.5: Share of firms younger than three years 
 
One evident trend in regard to the issuing firms in our data is the rapid increase of young firms 
that issue bonds. Here, we define young firms as those that were incorporated three years or 
earlier prior to the respective bond issue. Figure 5.5 gives a good illustration of how young firms 
stand behind a continuously increasing share of the total issues. It also shows the rapid increase in 
the number of issues in general. First of all, this fact is important to bear in mind when we discuss 
covenants in general at an aggregated or average level. The number of issues has almost tripled 
from 2004 to 2007, ascribing more importance to the later issued contracts when looking at total 
average figures. Secondly, the increase in young firms that issue bonds may help explain the 
increase in the number of covenants. We illustrated in figure 5.4 how there seems to be a 
relationship between the number of young firms and the use of pledges. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the number of young firms and the average number of covenants included in 
each contract seems to be even stronger. The correlation coefficient between the development in 
the two figures is as high as 0.932. This may be interpreted as a relationship between the firms’ 
age and the number of covenants they include in their bond contracts. Generally speaking, there 
can be a number of different economic rationales behind this relationship. First, the firm’s age 
can be interpreted as a measure of its future growth opportunities. Previous empirical work (see, 
for instance, M. Billet et al. 2007) finds a positive relationship between future growth 
opportunities and covenants. It can be a useful simplification, as the real growth opportunities for 
the firms in our data are difficult to estimate.
44
 Second, firm age may also serve as a good 
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indicator of the companies’ probability of financial distress. We showed in chapter 2 why 
investors will demand more covenants as the probability of default increases. Young firms in 
general have a higher probability of financial distress, and therefore, all other things being equal, 
investors’ value covenants more when they are included in young firms’ contracts. One could 
also argue that the investors are not only uncertain about the companies’ ability to redeem the 
loan and pay their interest on time, but also their “willingness” to do so. For the lender, it is much 
more difficult to predict the actions of a company and management with no track record. This can 
be one of the reasons why one could expect these firms to include more covenants in general. As 
figure 6.3 shows, the average use of covenants per contract has almost tripled from 2003 to 2007, 
from a mere 3.7 to 11.6. Prior to 2003, the average number of covenants used in contracts was 
relatively stable. During the same period, the number of young firms in percentage of total bond 
issues also approximately tripled. 
5.3.2 The business sectors 
In what follows, we will use the NACE rev 1.1 classifications of activities in order to classify the 
different firms. Over the past ten years, 49 different business sectors have issued bonds in the 
Norwegian market, but 29 of them have only issued bonds once or twice. Table 5.6 shows that 
only eight different industries have more than ten issues, and they amount to 70 percent of all 
issues in this period.
 45
 We will focus on these industries in the following analysis.  
As we can see, the two dominant industries during the period are, perhaps not surprisingly, 
Service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction, and Sea and coastal water transport. The oil 
and gas sector is dominated by the firms Ocean Rig and Petrolia Drilling, while Wilh. 
Wilhelmsen dominates the shipping category. 
Table 5.6: Business sectors with the most issues 
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 We were able to find the business sector code for 323 issues 
Average covenant Measure Share Issues 
Business sector Issues  pr issue numb. of comp young firms after 2004
Service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying 58 4.86 40 % 40 % 60 %
Sea and coastal water transport 52 2.65 40 % 15 % 63 %
Letting of own property 31 4.61 45 % 42 % 65 %
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 22 5.36 41 % 45 % 68 %
Other financial intermediation n.e.c. 18 6.50 56 % 94 % 83 %
Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy 16 5.50 69 % 31 % 94 %
Building and repairing of ships 15 7.33 47 % 87 % 93 %
Management activities of holding companies 14 6.07 50 % 14 % 100 %
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Table 5.6 shows that the category Building and repairing of ships includes the most covenants per 
issue, but category is strongly influenced by a large number of Aker Kværner issues, that 
included several covenants in their restructuring process. Large firms tend to use identical 
contracts over a longer period of time. Thus, a high market concentration in a business generally 
has a negative effect on the average number of covenants in an industry. The center column in 
table 5.6 is a measure of the concentration and shows the number of different companies included 
in the industry in relation to the industry’s total issues. The higher the percentage figure, the more 
different issuers are in the industry. The measure is on average about 50 percent, indicating that 
the firms on average have two issues each. We have not been able to find any reliable 
relationship between the business sectors and the use of covenants in general. One reason could 
possibly be the relative homogeneity of business sectors using the market the most.  
5.3.3 The managers 
Table 5.7 lists the managers with the most issues in the period. By this measure, Pareto is the 
largest, more than twice as big as the number two company. On the other hand, measured in total 
issue size (volume), DnB NOR has been larger than Pareto for many years. There also seems to 
be a difference in the type of issues the respective managers take to the market. One example is 
also how DnB NOR issues more bonds that get listed than the other companies. In fact, 80 
percent of the issues they manage get listed at some point. Combined with the fact that they have 
a large volume and relatively few issues, this illustrates how they in general manage large and 
simple bond issues. We showed earlier how listed bonds on average include less covenants. Thus, 
the issuer can to some extent predict the use of covenants on an issue. Furthermore, table 6.8 
displays how the average use of covenants varies quite a bit between the top managers. The 
difference can be ascribed to a range of different factors, including difference in the issuing years, 
specializing in business sectors, or issue type, or it can reflect a conscious strategy or the level of 
experience. At any rate, it appears to have an effect on the use of covenants, but it is not easy to 
conclude with much certainty at this point whether it is a result of the sample selection or 
deliberate choices, or other factors. 
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Table 5.7: Top managers based on number of issues, and the use of covenants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top managers 1998 - 2007 Issues
Average covenants per 
contract
Pareto Securities 162 6,21
DnB NOR 69 4,01
Nordea 57 3,47
Swedbank/First Securities 35 5,57
Fearnley 30 6,43
ABG Sundal Collier 23 5,83
SEB Merchant Banking 20 6,55
Fokus Bank/Danske Bank 12 3,67
Fondsfinans 9 3,22
Andre 21 n.a.
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6 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS – USE OF COVENANTS 
We will in this chapter describe and analyze the use of the different covenants that we have found 
to be used in Norway during the period. We have divided the chapter into nine parts, where the 
first eight parts reflects the different categories of covenants. We have based the categorization 
on the workings of the covenant and the type of protection it provides the bondholders. The 
chapter will provide the reader with insight on the different covenants, why they are used, who 
uses them, the development during the period and possible explanations for this. We will finish 
the chapter by presenting and analyzing typical features of a bond including, and one not 
including covenants. An extensive summary of all the covenants presented in this chapter is to be 
found in appendix 4.46 
6.1 Security protective covenants 
6.1.1 Negative pledge – an important and widely used covenant 
The negative pledge covenant is one of the most frequently used covenants in Norway, and is 
included in half of the bond contracts issued since 1998. The wording in a negative pledge clause 
can differ somewhat and is not always open to straightforward interpretation, but the intention 
and protection is more or less the same. When included in a loan agreement, the negative pledge 
clause limits the issuer from issuing new debt secured by pledges in the firm’s assets. Basically, 
we find this covenant in two versions, depending on how the issue is secured in the first place. 
The first version is used if the bond issue in question is protected by pledged assets. In these 
cases, the covenant usually states that no additional debt is to be issued using the same asset as 
collateral. The second version is if the bond is not secured by any assets or guarantees, and the 
covenant states that no new debt is to be issued which is secured by any pledged assets unless the 
original bondholders are given equal or better protection. Both versions protect the bondholders 
from getting their claims in the issuer’s assets diluted. The covenants also protect against the 
dilution of creditor priority. The covenant usually restricts the borrower from issuing additional 
debt with a higher priority than the bond, unless the bondholders are given the same or better 
priority as the new debt. This way, the covenant both directly and indirectly protects the 
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 Chapter 6.1-6.3 (4A), 6.4-6.6 (4B) and 6.7 (4C). Pair wise correlation between the most used covenants are shown 
in appendix 5. 
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bondholders by preventing the dilution of their claims and thus the lowering of the value of the 
bonds. The bonds’ value is also protected, as the clause can reduce the borrower’s incentives to 
issue additional debt if the covenant increases the cost of new debt significantly. Issuing 
additional debt can also reduce the value of the bonds by increasing the probability of financial 
distress. For this reason, it might prove valuable for the bondholders to include the covenant 
when lending to small and/or young firms, especially those in capital-intensive businesses. Their 
ability to raise new affordable capital often depends on the firm using its assets as collateral. 
Thus, for these issuers the cost of including this covenant is in many ways of a similar nature to 
the cost of including pledged assets.   
The use of the negative pledge clause stands out in many ways. We find it used in every year in 
our data, and it is one of the covenants included in most of the contracts overall in the last ten 
years. The use of the covenant has an increasing tendency; the use has doubled from 2000 to 
2007, but it fluctuates more compared to most of the other covenants. This can be interpreted as a 
sign that the use of the covenant is well-incorporated in the market and that underlying factors 
determine its use. 
Figure 6.1: Pledge vs. negative pledge. 
 
We have previously mentioned that there seems to be a relationship between the use of pledged 
assets and negative pledges, as well as covenants in general. Figure 6.1 indicates a quite strong 
positive relationship between the two, a notion supported by the fact that the correlation 
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coefficient is 0.85. Looking at the early years in the period, we see that many contracts included a 
negative pledge without pledging assets. In fact, as many as 52 contracts, twelve percent of our 
data, include the negative pledge as the only covenant in the contract altogether. These types of 
contracts are divided equally over the entire period, and eighteen different companies have issued 
them. A possible reason for the relatively frequent use of this covenant alone can be the large 
firms that have been issuing bonds several times over the period. Because these firms issued their 
first bonds in a period of a relatively low-developed bond market, very few covenants were 
imposed. In our data, there is a tendency for firms to issue identical or similar contracts over a 
long period of time. This can explain why many contracts still use the negative pledge as the only 
covenant. On the other hand, we still find that some firms issuing bonds for the first time in the 
later years also only include this covenant. Thus, not only do we find that the use of this covenant 
is to some extent influenced by the use of pledges, but also that it has been used throughout the 
period as an independent and often the only covenant. When used alone, it is generally issued by 
large and high-rated companies. The relatively high number of such issues may be the reason 
why we find little connection between the age of the firm and the use of the covenant, in contrast 
to many other covenants. In general, this covenant seems to have an important place in the 
market. The pattern of use suggests that it is has been well-known throughout the period. In the 
later years, the use has been influenced by issues secured by pledges and that uses the covenant to 
protect this asset, but it seems that other factors also play an important role in determining its use.     
Table 6.1: Negative pledge vs. firm age 
 
 
Issues firms < 3 Firms < 3 years Firms > 3 years Issues firms > 3
2000 1 0.0 % 31.3 % 16
2001 2 100.0 % 33.3 % 15
2002 3 100.0 % 33.3 % 6
2003 0 0.0 % 47.1 % 17
2004 3 66.7 % 44.1 % 34
2005 17 29.4 % 57.5 % 40
2006 40 57.5 % 34.0 % 50
2007 39 53.8 % 65.5 % 29
Use of negative pledge
Year
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6.1.2 Junior security and senior debt issuance – debt restrictions applied differently 
The covenant we call “junior security” is not used in FISD. It resembles the negative pledge, but 
in contrast to the negative pledge, the covenant restricts the borrower from issuing subordinated 
claims in one or all of the firm’s assets. The covenant is primarily used in issues secured by a 
pledge in order to prohibit any other claims in the asset regardless of its priority. It is not self-
evident why this covenant is included. First, because junior claims do not dilute the bondholders’ 
claims and will always rank behind in the event of a default, and second, because it seems that 
other, more common covenants such as restrictions on indebtedness may provide the same 
protection. We will not argue that the rationale behind including this covenant is to protect the 
pledged asset, but rather that it functions as a more “sophisticated” way of restricting the issuers 
from issuing new debt. We would like to illustrate this point with a short example as follows. 
This covenant is primarily used in asset-backed issues, where proceeds are used to finance the 
purchase of one particular asset. We argued earlier that such companies likely need to use their 
assets as collateral in order to raise debt. Including this covenant makes it difficult for the issuer 
to take on additional debt with the assets in place today, but if the company wants to expand and 
purchase new assets, the covenant does not hinder this. In other words, the covenant protects 
against the issuer increasing its financial leverage as long as the company structure is the same as 
today, but the covenant does not influence the financing of company growth in general. If the 
company is regarded in the future (by others) as financially sustainable and can obtain affordable 
financing without the use of collateral, the covenant does not inhibit this. This distinction is in 
many cases desirable, and can be difficult to obtain using the more traditional restrictions on debt 
and security.         
As we can see from figure 6.2, the covenant was recently put to use for the first time. The Junior 
security was used for the first time in a bond issue managed by DnB NOR in 2004; it has 
increased annually with an average of 4.9 percent, and was included in 19.5 percent of the new 
issues in 2007. 
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Figure 6.2: Security covenants - Development 
 
The senior debt issuance covenant is also in many ways similar to the negative pledge, but its use 
and function differ somewhat. The covenant is included to prevent the issuing firm from raising 
more than a given amount of senior debt. The covenant is used on unsubordinated issues, and the 
intention is to ensure that senior claims do not increase to disproportionally high levels. The 
subordinated issues rank often ahead of the firms’ equity in terms of liquidation preference. They 
have in general very few covenants included, and are usually convertibles. The covenant sets an 
absolute level of how many superior claims the issuer can obtain. In this sense, it is similar to 
restrictions on indebtedness, but we will argue that the primary function of this covenant is to 
protect the priority of the bondholders’ claims from being diluted. This is because it allows the 
issuer to issue as much debt as it would like as long as the new claims are not superior to the 
bond. Thus, the primary objective for this covenant is not to protect against an increased 
leverage, but to protect the security and priority of the bondholders’ claims. 
6.1.3 Materials to be included in the security – pledged assets under construction 
As in the previous section, the covenant is created based on our findings in the Norwegian bond 
contracts, and we find it to be very interesting. We have not found any covenants similar to this 
in the Mergent database or mentioned in the empirical work on the subject. The covenant is in 
many ways a good illustration of the recent development in the level of detail in which the 
covenants are being used and phrased. The covenant states that material, equipment, and parts of 
any sort that are acquired as part of the construction process shall be included in the pledged 
asset. The covenant is primarily used by asset-backed bonds in which the asset is under 
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construction. When included in the contracts, it helps to ensure that the bondholders’ claims are 
secured by as much security as possible, pending the completion of the original pledged asset. 
During the construction period, the covenant is used to ensure that material equipment acquired 
in this period shall be separated from other material equipment and machinery and identified as 
belongings to the borrower. The covenant can prove valuable to the bondholders if complications 
arise during the construction of the asset. It provides protection against other creditors, in 
particular the company in charge of building the asset. If disputes about, for example, payment or 
other aspects of the construction contract should arise, the covenant can prevent the constructer 
from using equipment that rightfully should be a part of the bondholders security, as security for 
their own claims. More than 60 percent of the contracts that include this covenant also include the 
junior security covenant, which illustrates how these two are used on similar types of issues.  
The covenant is included in contracts that are pledged with assets under construction. Thus, the 
increase from zero use prior to 2006
47
 to being included in 9.3 percent of the contracts in 2007 
can be explained by the increase in these kinds of issues. There are also many issues of this kind 
in 2006 and 2007 that do not include the covenant, and there are also such issues prior to 2006. 
Hence, this can be interpreted as an indication that the market participants have learned how to 
use this covenant over the last two years. We will argue that including the covenant involves very 
few costs for the issuer, and the main reason why it is not included in every contract, where it is 
relevant, is primarily due to a lack of knowledge or that it is regarded as unnecessary. We argue 
that the costs are low because all the issuer’s stakeholders (e.g. stockholders) have strong 
incentives to see the asset completed. We also think it is fair to assume that the value of, for 
example, a finished vessel is higher than the value of its parts. Thus, the management will never 
have strong incentives to transfer wealth from the bondholders to the stockholders during the 
construction process. The covenant therefore mainly protects against other creditors’ claims in a 
similar manner as the negative pledge. Contrary to the above covenants, this does not increase the 
issuer’s price of new debt, and we would recommend it for use in every contract, if relevant.     
The share level of detail in the covenant also indicates that the market has evolved over the last 
few years. We find a general tendency that the contracts have become more detailed and specific, 
especially during the last two years. The covenant is a clear sign of this development.  
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6.2 Corporate actions covenants – the put options 
6.2.1 Change of control clauses (CC) – redemption if company control changes 
The CC is used to protect against unwanted changes in the issuer’s ownership structure. It can be 
used to retain and ensure that the present owner remains in control during the life of the bond. 
Lending money is a business based largely on trust, and the use of this covenant illustrates how 
important this element can be. We actually find that several contracts specifically name the 
persons that must be in control of the company, and how much of the company’s shares these 
persons must own. More commonly, the covenant does not specify individuals, but states that this 
covenant is triggered in the event of a change in control. A change of control event is usually 
defined as a shift in the company’s majority control; the phrase “more than 50 percent of the 
votes” is used for when change of control has occurred. In this “voting power percentage” 
covenant, we have collected all information regarding the trigger point for CC’s. When CC 
appears, the trigger point is stated in 83 percent of the cases, and 50 percent is the most 
commonly used trigger. The covenant can also state a maximum share of the company that any 
single shareholder may hold, but this is used much less than the two other versions. The two 
covenants discussed in this chapter differ from most other covenants in that they are generally 
formulated as a put option that is triggered if the terms of the covenant are violated. The 
bondholders can exercise this put option and force the issuer to redeem all or parts of the loan at a 
predetermined price. The redemption price is stated as percentage of par, and is usually between 
102 and 107 percent of par.         
The CC provides protection against hostile takeovers, because it will trigger an event which may 
substantially reduce the company value.
48
 The covenant affects the total value of the firm, as the 
entire loan may have to be redeemed prior to maturity and at a higher price. On the other hand, 
this covenant can be potentially costly to include for both the issuer and the bondholders. The 
company taking over is often bigger and has lower volatility than the target firm. All other things 
being equal, such takeovers will increase the value of the bond, as the probability of financial 
distress is, most often, reduced. If this covenant interferes with these kinds of desirable mergers, 
it can prove costly for the bondholders. In the case of friendly takeovers, it can also involve costs 
for the stockholders. The aim of mergers or acquisitions is to take advantage of synergy effects, 
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and if the stockholders in both companies did not find the move beneficial, they would not go 
through with it. Smith and Warner (1979) use this as an argument against the importance of 
including restrictions on merger activities and covenants like the CC. The put option will not be 
exercised in valuable acquisitions, and otherwise the stockholders will stop the takeover. This is 
of course a valid argument in many cases, but it is not difficult to imagine acquisitions that the 
stockholders might view as beneficial but will decrease the value of the bondholders’ claims. One 
example can be if the acquisition results in a shift to a more risky strategy. This may be the case 
if for example a shipping firm operating solely on long term contracts and in a stable market 
niche merges with a company that only uses spot contracts. If these two companies merge, the 
result will be an increase in volatility for the first company, and it will increase further if the risky 
price strategy is applied to the entire new company. Other examples can be a change in 
jurisdiction or that the merged company is taken off the stock or bond exchange, reducing the 
flow of information. Thus, such events may reduce the value of the bonds and possibly transfer 
wealth from the bondholders to the stockholders. It can also be difficult to estimate the synergy 
effects, and having the possibility to not be a part of the merging process can be valuable for the 
bondholders. Also, in 74 percent of the bond indentures, the covenant is combined with other, 
more general restrictions on merger activity.  
We find the covenant to be especially important when included in convertible bonds. In addition 
to a fixed income investment, the bondholders have a call option on the company’s equity. As a 
simplification, one could say that the value of an option depends on the underlying asset’s 
volatility – increased volatility results in a higher option value.
 49
 As described above, the 
acquiring company is often larger and has lower volatility than the acquired firm. All other things 
being equal, such a merger will decrease the value of the bondholders’ call option, even if the 
merger contributes to positive synergies. A merger like this may have positive effects on the 
bondholders’ fixed claims, and the proportion between these two factors determines the impact 
on the bonds’ total value. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the exercise of the call 
option is dependent on the bondholders being able to value the underlying asset. This is normally 
done by looking at the market price for the company’s share. Mergers often result in the new firm 
being delisted for a shorter or longer period of time, making valuation difficult and more 
subjective. The new organization can also include features that make valuation more challenging. 
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In these cases, a merger will also reduce the value of the bondholders’ conversion rights. 
Therefore, we expect the CC more frequently used in convertible bonds than in others, and 
possibly a relationship between the size or age of the firm and the use of the covenant. The latter 
is expected because we believe that small and/or young firms have a higher probability of being 
acquired by other firms, and also because they have a tendency to use convertibles more often.  
Figure 6.3 illustrates the share of new bonds and convertibles that have included the covenant 
each year. As the figure shows, bonds include the covenant more often as measured in percentage 
of issues for every year except 2007. This is contrary to our and NTM’s
50
 expectations prior to 
this analysis.  
Figure 6.3: Use of Change of Control in bonds and convertibles 
 
We will argue that this is an illustration of how the market is immature and in a learning process. 
Generally, convertible issues include fewer covenants, both because they usually have lower 
priority and security and because their interests are more in line with the stockholders than the 
holders of regular bonds. We believe that the increase from zero use of convertibles in 2005 to 
their inclusion in almost 90 percent of the issues two years later can only be explained by 
learning or some kind of new awareness. It can be a late reaction to the Aker Drilling case, 
51
 
foreign influence, or a number of other factors that may have triggered it. At any rate, the 
economic arguments for including the covenant in convertible bonds are very strong. The fact 
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that it is included in all four convertible issues so far in 2008
52
  also supports the argument that 
the market has learned the value of including the covenant. It is now included in almost every 
convertible issue. We also find support for this in talking to Pareto.
53
 Prior to 2006, Pareto has 
not included the covenant in any contract, but as of 2008 it is company standard to include it in 
all convertible issues the company manages.     
6.2.2 Asset sale clause – redemption if certain assets are sold 
The asset sale clause requires the bond issuer to use the proceeds from the sale of certain assets to 
redeem the bonds at par or at a premium. It is in many ways similar to the CC, but it specifies 
which or how much of an asset, and not shares, is to be sold to trigger the possible redemption. In 
some cases it also specifies one or more assets that the firm is obligated to acquire in order not to 
trigger the asset sale clause. The definition of assets can be relatively broad based, and the 
covenant may be stated based on certain shares, rights, or companies that are to be acquired or 
not sold. The covenant is used to protect bondholders against the issuing firm selling pledged 
assets and the case where the firm only has a few assets accounting for its total cash flow. As 
much as 88 percent of the contracts with an asset sale clause also include pledging of assets, 
emphasizing the importance of this covenant as a protection for the bondholder against the 
borrowing firm selling the security asset. In addition to protecting the pledge, the covenant helps 
reduce the problems related to asset substitution that drain the company of value, and hence 
protects against the agency cost of debt. By including a put option that can be exercised if certain 
assets are sold and/or substituted, it reduces the management and thus the stockholders’ 
incentives to engage in such activities.     
When CC appears in the indentures, 44 percent also include an “asset sale” covenant. Overall, 
both are included together in approximately ten percent of all the issues, and their development 
follows more or less the same pattern, emphasized by a strong correlation coefficient of 0.96.  
6.2.3 Development in usage of the CC and the Asset sale clause 
Figure 6.4 shows that both CC and asset sale clauses have been more frequently included in loan 
agreements in the later years. Apart from a few cases in 2002
54
 these protection covenants were 
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put to use during 2004 and 2005, and have had a large annual increase in use of around twenty 
percent.  
Figure 6.4: Corporate actions covenants – Development in covenant usage and firm age 
 
Figure 6.4: The vertical axis shows in how many percent of the contracts CC or asset sale are included. It also shows the 
percentage of total issues which is issued by firms younger than three years  
The increased use of the CC that started in 2005 was affected by an event in the autumn of that 
year. Aker Drilling ASA issued a convertible bond, and the company was listed on the stock 
exchange. Shortly after, rumors of the company being taken over started to worry the owners of 
the convertible bonds, which made the market more aware of the need for a covenant like the CC. 
Investors feared that they could not make use of the conversion right or that it would at least 
decrease in value. This was primarily because of the expected lower volatility in the new firm, 
but perhaps worse was the fear of delisting. Ola Nygård at NTM55 emphasizes that both of these 
factors are important reasons for the use of this covenant in convertibles, and that the Aker 
Drilling ASA issue was an eye opener for much of the market with regard to the covenant’s 
importance. Looking at figure 6.3, the event coincided with the soaring use of the covenant in 
convertible issues and seems to help explain this development. On the other hand, this does not 
explain the use of common bonds. One possibility can be the increasing trend in the “acquisition 
market,” making more investors interested in the option of getting their money back at par or 
premium if an unwanted acquisition should occur. A more plausible reason might be that the 
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increased use should be viewed in relation to the increased use of pledged assets. This is 
especially true for the asset sale clause, as there are several indications of its use to protect the 
pledges.    
Another possible explanation can be seen in figure 6.4, which shows the use of both covenants 
compared to the development in the issuers’ firm age. The graph indicates a strong positive 
relationship between the development in the age of the issuing firms and the use of these 
covenants. Interpreting young firms as synonymous with lower creditworthiness/poorer financial 
conditions, ceteris paribus, according to the ATC, these firms should also include covenants more 
often. The correlation coefficients for the development in the firm age and the development in 
CC and asset sale clauses are respectively 0.9 and 0.93, emphasizing the strong covariance 
between these variables. Another interesting observation from the graph is the relatively large 
increase in the use of CC and asset sale clauses from 2001 to 2002 (followed by the large 
decrease in 2003), corresponds to an equal jump in the number of young firms. Bearing in mind 
the low number of issues in 2002, the increase still gives some strong indications of a relationship 
between the covenants and the firm age. Taking a closer look at the issues in 2002, it seems that 
the restructuring process of Kværner could have had some impact on the use of covenants that 
year. The company issued a large percentage of the total issues that year and used a lot of 
covenants for that time. However, Kværner was at the time one of the oldest companies in 
Norway, so it appears that the relationship between the firm’s age and the number of covenants in 
2002 is just a coincidence. DnBNOR managed these issues, and they were the first to include the 
asset sale clause. Overall, Pareto has the highest percentage of the use of these two covenants, 
possibly reflecting the fact that the company made it a “standard” covenant earlier than most.
56
 
Even though we find strong indications that firm age influences the use of both covenants, a 
closer look reveals that this might not be the case. We find that a more plausible explanatory 
factor is that the market has evolved and learned the value of these kinds of covenants. This is 
particularly evident when looking at the use of the CC on convertibles. In regard to the asset sale 
clause, we find that learning over time may be the best explanation for the development in use we 
see, but also that the increase in pledged assets may have had a significant impact.    
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6.3 Corporate covenants – policy restrictions 
6.3.1 Dividend restrictions – an important covenant with several implications 
Restrictions on dividend payments is one of the few covenants we find almost every year in our 
data.
57
 The covenant is based on a broad definition of the term dividends, and includes all types 
of payments to the company’s stockholders. In addition to the regular dividend payments, the 
repurchasing of shares is the most commonly found restriction.  Figure 6.5 shows the rapid 
increase in the use of dividend restrictions, especially between 2002 and 2006. In total over the 
period, 38.1 percent of the contracts included restrictions on dividend payments. The restrictions 
can take many forms. Most commonly, the contract states that only some percentage of the 
company’s earnings each year can be paid out as dividends. Young firms look to have a more 
dynamic set of restrictions, forbidding the payment of dividends altogether for the next two years, 
for example, and subsequently a percentage limit applies. It can be argued that such a clause is 
especially valuable to include in the contracts of young firms. In 2007 we find that 80 percent of 
the young firms do so, but in 2006 the number is only 32 percent, and in 2005 only one of 
seventeen has included the clause. It seems that all types of firms apply this clause to their 
contracts, and that its popularity has increased by a relatively high rate over the last seven years.  
Figure 6.5: Corporate covenants (Policy restrictions) - Development 
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Paying out dividends to the stockholders can reduce the value of the bonds, depending on how 
the payments are financed. If the payments are financed by a reduction in investments, the future 
expected value of the firm’s assets decreases. By reducing the future value of its assets, the 
company increases the probability of default and financial distress, and the value of their 
outstanding bonds today decreases. By paying out extensive dividends, the company may also 
have to reject positive NPV projects. Cash payments and other forms of value that transfer to 
stockholders, like repurchasing of own shares, can be used to “drain” the company of value. It 
can be done directly by selling assets (e.g. production equipment or brands) or by paying out 
liquidation dividends. More indirectly, it can involve issuing debt to repurchase shares, paying 
dividends, or financing investments that otherwise retained earnings could have financed. Either 
way, this increases the company’s financial leverage, and thereby the probability of financial 
distress. In general, paying out dividends in any form is almost never positive for the company’s 
bondholders. They would like as much liquidity in the firm as possible to minimize the 
probability of financial distress and to maintain security for their claims.  On the other hand, 
paying out dividends in any form may reduce the total value if the company does not have 
unlimited positive NPV projects available. If the company has more cash than good investment 
opportunities, value will be destroyed as the total rate of return decreases. The management may 
also overspend on social activities, for example, or it can create slack in the organization. More 
importantly, the stockholders are of course concerned with the total value of the firm, but some 
also value the fact that the company pays dividends, which also can be a powerful form of 
communication. This is one reason why bond contracts never forbid dividend payments per se.
58
  
We find that the covenants restricting dividend payments are primarily based on restricting how 
much the company can pay out, in percentage of some accounting figure. Usually, it is stated 
whether or not unutilized permitted dividend payments are allowed to be carried forward. Most of 
the contracts have an upper limit on dividend payments at 50 percent of last year’s net earnings 
after tax, usually on a consolidated basis. Smith and Warner (1979) found that the dividend 
covenant acts as a restriction on dividends financed by debt or the sale of existing assets (not 
dividends per se), which tends to reduce the value of the bond as the coverage decreases. We find 
that the same is true for the covenants that restrict dividends in Norway over the last ten years. 
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Based on the evidence provided by Kalay (1979), Smith and Warner (1979) show how the 
dividend covenants can have an effect on the firm’s investment policy. One reason for this is that 
by placing an upper limit on dividend payments, one is at the same time setting a lower limit on 
how much to invest. This can help reduce the underinvestment problem.
59
 Based on their 
analysis, Smith and Warner predict that the inclusion of dividend covenants depend on the bonds’ 
maturity. Long term bonds have a higher probability of inclusion than shorter term bonds.
60
 We 
have not been able to find such a relationship in our data, but it should be noted that the issues in 
our data are quite homogeneous with respect to maturity. Our data contain no CDs
61
 (or other 
short term notes), which Smith and Warner use as an example.  
We will argue that including dividend restricting covenants must represent some cost to the 
issuer. Otherwise, every contract should include it in order to help reduce the costs of the 
bondholder/stockholder conflict. In 2007, almost 60 percent of all bonds issued have included it, 
making it one of the most commonly used covenants. We also find it used almost every year in 
our data, but to a lesser extent in the earlier years. This implies that the covenant has been 
“known” to the market for at least ten years. It is also one of the few covenants described to some 
extent in the available literature on the subject, and the effect of its workings should be known to 
the participants in the Norwegian market. For this reason, we would argue that we expect to see it 
included in almost every contract if the cost of including it is zero. The cost associated with 
including it can be related to the loss of freedom over the company’s financial policies and 
capital structure. The covenants also limit the possibilities of selling assets or taking on additional 
debt to pay out dividends to the shareholders. One important function of dividend payments is the 
information they reveal to the capital markets. The management of a company is better informed 
about the company’s future prospects than the outsiders. This information asymmetry means that 
the market closely monitors the management’s actions. This is one of the reasons why 
managements try to keep dividends at a stable level, and at least try not to reduce them. 
Therefore, the management will most likely set the dividends at a level they know the company 
can sustain over a longer period of time and over the economic cycles.
62
 The investors are aware 
of this, and will probably interpret a reduction in dividends as a sign that the management does 
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not believe that today’s level is sustainable; they take it as implicit that the future earnings do not 
look as good as previously expected. If a company experiences a drop in earnings one year and 
has the covenant included, it will have difficulties maintaining the dividend payments. This again 
will most likely put downward pressure on the market price of the stock and reduce the 
stockholders’ wealth. The management (acting on behalf of the stockholders), then recognizes 
this as a cost, and only if this is lower than the cost of including the covenants in the bond 
contract, will it do so. The management may also personally incur costs as a result of this, if parts 
of their compensation are in stocks, warrants/options, or similar.            
6.3.2 Restrictive payments – payments to other creditors 
The restrictive payments covenant includes restrictions on the issuer’s payments to other 
creditors. Usually it limits the company’s ability to redeem loans other than the bond in question 
prior to maturity. The covenant’s main goal is insuring that no other creditors are favored over 
the bondholders, and that other lenders are not granted better terms after the bond is issued. The 
covenant is almost exclusively used in 2006 and 2007 and in fifteen and eleven percent of the 
issues, respectively (figure 6.5). Over 90 percent of the contracts including the covenant also use 
pledged assets as security and includes dividend restrictions. This illustrates that the typical issue 
including the covenant is issued by smaller and younger firms, and the issues are primarily asset 
backed. Furthermore, the covenant has a strong connection to dividend restrictions, and is often 
written as an extension of that clause. The pattern of use indicates that the market at some time 
during 2006 discovered the value of including the covenant.     
6.3.3 Restrictions on cash flow – illustrating the development 
This covenant limits what a company can do with all or some of its cash flow. In eleven of the 
twenty contracts that have included this covenant, the covenant restricts how the proceeds of the 
bond issue shall be used. This version of the covenant is only found in what we refer to as asset 
backed bonds. This is also a plausible explanation for the increase in the use of the covenant in 
2007, a year with many such issues. The other 45 percent of the cash flow restrictions we find in 
our data are different requirements of how much cash or cash equivalent the firm has to keep at 
all times. In this sense, the covenant tries to preserve the issuer’s liquidity. More than 90 percent 
of the companies that included this covenant also included dividend restrictions. The covenant 
can be viewed as a means to provide a minimum level of liquidity in the firm, thereby reducing 
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the probability of financial distress. Another interesting fact that should be mentioned about this 
covenant is that 55 percent of the issues that included it were managed by Pareto Securities, and 
that 55 percent were issued in USD. In general, these contracts also have considerably more 
covenants in total, and the contracts appear to be more “sophisticated.” The covenant is another 
example of what appears to be an underlying trend in the market. The contracts use more specific 
and clear phrasings, and are in general more detailed. The introduction of this covenant is 
evidence of this trend and illustrates how the contracts to a larger degree try to increase the value 
of the covenants by making them more precise and accurate.      
6.3.4 Sales leaseback – should be used more in Norway 
Figure 6.5 shows that the sales leaseback63 covenants are almost never used in Norway. Only six 
contracts in our data have included it, five of which were issued in 2007, just above four percent 
of the issues that year. Only three issuing companies have included them in their contracts.
64
 
Billet et al. (2007) have documented relatively extensive use of this covenant in US. The 
economic rationale behind including the covenant is quite obvious and straightforward. If a 
company sells some of its asset, merely to lease it back again, this reduces the value of the 
outstanding bonds. Because leasing liabilities rank ahead of debt liabilities such as bonds, 
engaging in significant sale leaseback deals will dilute the bondholders’ claims, putting them 
further down the “list” of creditors. Giving up the ownership of an asset also reduces the 
bondholders’ (indirect) collateral for their claims, as the assets available for sale in case of 
financial default are reduced. Based on this, we expected to find it used to a larger extent. 
Because so many issues in Norway are by firms with few and expensive assets, with relatively 
liquid secondhand markets (e.g. shipping and oil), this covenant could prove valuable for the 
bondholders if included.      
6.3.5 Sale assets – widely used but subject to interpretation 
The sale asset covenant is one of the most widely used in our data, one of only a few that are used 
every year in our data. Figure 6.5 illustrates that already in the year 2000; almost 25 percent of 
the issues included this covenant. After being used relatively little during the next three years, the 
use of the covenants increased rapidly from 2003 up until today, where it is included in 44 
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percent of the contracts issued. We found many variations of this covenant in our data, both with 
respect to the phrasing and the actual contents. Therefore, this category was quite difficult to 
register, but we believe that our approach provides a good description of the situation. Our 
approach is based on what kind of protection it provides the bondholders with. To exemplify the 
difficulties, consider this paragraph from one bond contract issued by DNO ASA: “The Company 
shall not sell or dispose of a substantial part of its operations, which might jeopardize the 
Borrower’s ability to comply with its obligations under the Loan Agreement.” 65 The contract 
does not clarify this any further, and the definition of what for example “a substantial part of 
operations” means, in terms of which or how much of its assets the company is allowed to sell, is 
subject to interpretation. It is also difficult to address what the contract means by “jeopardizing 
the borrower’s ability to comply.” We would argue that a strict interpretation would be that no 
assets are allowed to be sold unless replaced by an equivalent, as this would reduce the 
company’s ability to “comply with its obligations.” This is just one of many examples of general 
and vague paragraphs regarding restrictions on the sale of assets. We solved this problem by not 
including these types of phrases. The covenant includes restrictions on either specific assets that 
not are allowed to be sold, clauses that restrict how the proceeds of assets sold may be used, and 
at which price they are allowed to be sold, or how much/many assets are allowed to be sold, 
disposed of, or in other ways transferred from the company.  
In its simplest form, the economic rationale behind restricting the company from selling off its 
assets seems uncomplicated enough. According to Smith and Warner (1979) and the Costly 
Contracting Hypothesis, this covenant is used because the value of each asset sold separately is 
less than the value of the assets as a going concern. It can also serve as a valuable protection 
against asset substitution, which Smith and Warner argue is one of the most important sources of 
conflict between bondholders and stockholders. By including this covenant, it is more difficult 
for the management (the stockholders) to replace the firm’s asset with new higher variance and 
even negative NPV ones. It is not difficult to see how this covenant protects against asset 
substitution, but in Norway its most important function seems to be a bit different. In most of the 
cases where we find it used, it restricts the sale of one or more specific assets, such as named oil 
rigs or vessels. This may again be due to the fact that the firms owning these kinds of assets are 
often very dependent on them in terms of future earnings. We expected, and did find, that such 
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firms, with few but very valuable assets, would include covenants that restricted the sale of these 
assets. As previously noted, many of these firms issue bonds to finance the purchase of their 
assets, and the assets serve as collateral. Thus, almost 85 percent of the contracts that have a sale 
asset covenant also have pledged assets. When included in these contracts, the covenant directly 
or indirectly serves as a protection of the pledged asset. This seems to be the main motivation for 
why this covenant is included in Norwegian bond contracts: to ensure that specific assets do not 
get sold in order to protect either a pledged asset or assets that are considered to be of utmost 
importance for the company. We also find some contracts forbidding the sale of assets altogether 
or over a specified value. However, these covenants do allow for assets to be sold as long as they 
are replaced by similar ones.  
 
Clauses that restrict the use of proceeds from the sale of assets, and not the sale per se, were 
included in this category, but we do not find this version of the covenant in our data (although the 
asset sale put is similar). We will argue that such a clause could be valuable for many firms to 
include in their contracts, instead of restricting asset sales altogether. The strict version of this 
covenant is more “expensive” for the issuer to include. One reason for this is the possible case 
where the asset is more valuable to others than to the firm now owning it. It is also costly for the 
issuer to give up control over its own assets. The stockholders “lose” the opportunity to engage in 
asset substitution or to drain the company of value, which would be especially tempting in times 
of financial distress. This makes the covenant costly for the issuer to include. The softer version 
does not protect the bondholders from asset substitution, but help prevent the stockholders from 
draining the company. Thus, the optimal solution depends on how the two sides view the costs 
and benefits, but we are a bit surprised that no issuer has chosen the softer version of the 
covenant.      
6.3.6 Investments – indirectly restricting the issuer’s investment policy 
This covenant restricts the investment opportunities for the issuing firm. The Mergent FISD 
refers to this covenant as restrictions that limit the issuer’s investment policy in order to prevent 
“risky investments.” In theory, this is desirable, but in practice it is difficult to make contracts 
that can prevent a firm from engaging in risky investments. How should risk be defined or 
measured? In some cases, measurements such as the expected or historical standard deviation can 
be applied, but in many cases the calculations would be, at best, based on many assumptions. 
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Another possible solution could be to state that all projects invested in should at least yield some 
hurdle rate or have a positive NPV. Unfortunately, this is difficult to include in bond contracts, 
which is most likely the reason we do not find it in any of our contracts. How to measure risk and 
forecast cash flows are difficult to agree upon in a contractual setting, and would also be difficult 
and time consuming for the trustee to follow up. We believe this is the reason why we do not find 
any evidence of this being applied to contracts in Norway. 
We find primarily two different aspects which we have chosen to include in this category. First of 
all, it includes clauses that directly restrict the company’s investment policy. The only form of 
restriction we find is that which states that the company is not allowed to make investments in 
other business sectors than the one they are in today. When the covenant is phrased like this, the 
covenant protects the bondholders from asset substitution. Thus, it can reduce the cost of the 
bondholder-stockholder conflict. It also makes it more difficult for the management to engage in 
acquisitions of firms in other lines of business, or to use surplus cash to speculate in financial 
markets, which might affect their ability to meet their obligations to the bondholders in the future. 
In addition to clauses that restrict the issuer from investing in other businesses, we also find some 
contracts that restrict the company’s investment policy to investments related to a specific asset 
(e.g. a certain, named vessel). This covenant is sometimes included in asset backed bonds that use 
the asset as collateral. By including this, the bondholder can give the management incentives to 
invest in the pledged asset, while preventing asset substitution and unwanted diversification. This 
is particularly true if the contract also includes cash flow restrictions and/or restrictions on 
dividend payments. We find that 73.3 percent of the contracts that have restrictions on 
investments also include restrictions on dividends, suggesting that this might be the case. Another 
explanation could be that the firms including this covenant generally include many covenants. 
In this covenant, we have included restrictions on granting loans or guarantees to any third party, 
as Smith and Warner (1979) do in their article. The restrictions account for most of the findings 
in our data for the last three years. In 2007, 29.7 percent of the contracts (90 percent of the 
investment covenants that year) have such restrictions. The figure was 6.5 percent in 2006 and 
2.5 percent in 2005. The first time it was introduced to the Norwegian market was in late 2005 by 
SEB Merchant Banking, and we find it quite quickly in other managers’ issues. This can be 
ascribed to the fact that Pareto manages many of the small oil and shipping issues.  
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Generally speaking, we find that restrictions on investments are not much used in Norway. The 
only exception is in 2007, where 30 percent of the contracts restricted the respective firms from 
granting loans or guarantees to any third parties. We find this result a bit surprising because the 
covenant, at least theoretically, can help reduce the agency cost of debt, both by reducing the 
incentives for over- and/or under-investing and asset substitution. On the other hand, it is difficult 
in practice to write contracts that can control the issuing firm’s investment policy. This might be 
the reason why we do not see it used more, and why the managers try to influence the investment 
policy by using other covenants, such as dividend restrictions. It is easier to restrict the firm from 
granting loans and guarantees in an effective manner. However, we do not see why firms should 
have significant incentives to do so in the first place, making this a “cheap” covenant to include 
for the issuer. 
6.3.7 Consolidated mergers  
This covenant restricts the issuer from consolidating or merging with other companies. 
Demergers are also often included in this covenant. By looking at our data, it would appear that 
the use of this covenant has rapidly increased during the last ten years (figure 6.6). The fact is 
that a vague version of this covenant is included in every issue, written as a restriction on merger 
activity if the merger prevents the issuer from “meeting its obligations under the loan agreement.” 
We have registered this covenant when the wording is more concrete and operative. In 2006 and 
2007, we find a clear shift to a more precise restriction of mergers, and this explains much of the 
increased use. Without this covenant, the value of the bond can decrease as the new firm has a 
higher variance. Prohibiting mergers can also come at a high cost for the bondholders. In relation 
to company takeovers, the acquisition firm is often larger and has a lower variance, making a sale 
of the company beneficial for the bondholders. All other things being equal, lowering the 
variance of the firm increases the bondholders’ wealth. The early “vague restrictions” seem to 
have taken this into account by making it a topic open for discussion. It is the role of the trustee 
and ultimately the bondholders’ meeting to decide on a merger. The strengthening of the 
covenant’s protection and more specific language during 2006 may be a sign that this former 
strategy did not provide enough protection for the bondholders. The new version of the covenants 
looks more like a flat-out prohibition against mergers. It is our perception that the question is still 
up for discussion, but the new phrasing provides the bondholders with better “bargaining power.”     
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6.3.8 Transaction affiliates – from zero to standard in a year 
This covenant restricts the issuer from engaging in transactions with its subsidiaries that are not 
carried out in line with prevailing market prices. This covenant was used in 78 percent of all the 
contracts in 2007. Figure 6.6 shows how the use “exploded” from 2006 to 2007, when it seems to 
have become an almost standard phrasing in the contracts. The first issue that included the 
covenant was one of the important Kværner issues in 2002 managed by DnB NOR. After this, the 
covenant was not used again until 2005.66  
Figure 6.6: Transaction affiliates and merger restriction – From low use to standard phrases 
 
The covenant protects against the transfer of value within the group of companies. This is 
particularly important if the mother company does not own all the shares in a subsidiary. By 
“giving” such subsidiaries assets or services for less than the going market price, this company 
will increase its value at the expense of the mother company. Therefore, the covenant can be 
valuable for bondholders if the issuing company has subsidiaries or is part of a group of 
companies, especially if the issuer does not own 100 percent of its subsidiaries. By including the 
covenant, the stockholders accrue costs by giving up the possibility of making dispositions within 
the group that may be favorable for them. Almost 80 percent of the contracts in 2007 included 
this covenant. We do not see any other reason for this than that the market has learned about its 
use, and hence the covenant has become a standard formulation that most of the issuers include. 
We would argue that the issuers’ cost of including this covenant is not very high. This can also 
support the notion that it has quickly become a standard in the Norwegian market. 
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6.4 Stock related covenants 
6.4.1 Stock issuance issuer – possibly not the best way to protect the bondholders 
This covenant restricts the issuer from issuing additional common stock. Figure 6.7 shows that 
the covenant is not used much in Norway, but the use has increased from nothing at all to just 
above four percent of the contracts in 2007. 60 percent of the contracts that included the covenant 
were issued in USD, and exclusively by firms in the oil or shipping sector. It seems that the 
covenant is primarily used to ensure that the ownership of important assets is not diluted by 
issuing new stocks. In other words, it serves somewhat of the same function as an asset sale or 
change of control covenant, ensuring control over important assets or preventing today’s owners’ 
stock in the company from being diluted. We believe that bondholders’ interests are better served 
by including these covenants. Generally speaking, it is positive for a company’s bondholders 
when new stocks are issued. By decreasing the firm’s financial leverage, all other things being 
equal, the probability of financial distress are reduced. This implies that there are high costs for 
the bondholders to include this covenant, in addition to the costs facing the issuer; thus, we find it 
difficult to see in which situations these costs would be lower than the perceived benefits of 
including the covenant. This may well be the reason why we observe the low use of it in our data. 
Figure 6.7: Stock related covenants – Development in percentage of total issues 
 
6.4.2 Stock transfer sale disposition – regulating the ownership of subsidiaries 
This covenant has been increasingly used in Norway since 2002. In 2007, 18.6 percent of the 
contracts included this covenant. Generally speaking, this covenant restricts the issuer from 
“transferring, selling, or disposing of its own common stock or the common stock of a 
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subsidiary.”
67
 In our data, we did not find any clauses restricting the sale of stocks in the issuing 
firm the issuers has repurchased or similar. In the Norwegian market, this covenant is used to 
restrict the issuer from selling the stocks in a subsidiary or in other ways making dispositions that 
result in the loss of control in subsidiaries. The covenant is primarily used if the pledged assets or 
other important assets are under the control of a subsidiary. We have shown earlier how it is 
common practice for many firms in oil and shipping to create subsidiaries for their different 
assets, making the mother company a holding company with ownership in different subsidiaries 
that operate the different assets (e.g. vessels). Therefore, it may be of importance to the 
bondholders to ensure that the issuing company maintains ownership over its subsidiaries. This 
can help prevent asset substitution, the stockholders’ draining the company of value, or losing 
coverage for their claims.  
We find that DnB NOR was the first manager to introduce the covenant to the Norwegian market 
in October 2003.
68
 Since then, Pareto has used the covenant most frequently. After including it 
for the first time in March 2003, they have managed 56 percent of the issues that have included 
this covenant. We would argue that many firms prior to this date also would have benefited from 
including this covenant, and that the kind of firms in our data has not changed so dramatically in 
this respect since at least 2003. Thus, the increased use of this covenant is most likely a result of 
some kind of learning or awareness that has occurred in the marked. 
6.4.3 Maintain listing – the value of information and the conversion rights 
This covenant is used to ensure that the issuer is listed on an exchange during the life of the bond. 
Usually the contracts in our data state that the company should be listed at Oslo Børs or another 
exchange approved by the trustee. The economic rationale behind this covenant primarily relates 
to aspects of information and valuation. The stock exchange has strict regulations for providing 
the market with accurate and extensive information about the company’s development and future 
prospects. This information is also valuable for the bondholders, and one way to ensure this 
information flow is by including this covenant. By demanding that the bond should be listed, the 
bondholders would to a large extent achieve the same as demanding the stock to be listed. This is 
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also one of the reasons why companies that list their shares often list their bonds at the same time, 
as well as the reason why we have included both types of phrasings in the covenant.       
Ensuring this information is important for many reasons. First of all, it is very important for 
bondholders with conversion rights (convertible bonds). In order to price the underlying asset, 
having a market price in the form of a stock price at an exchange can prove invaluable. Thus, in 
the worst case, the bondholders’ conversion right can be worthless if pricing the underlying asset 
is difficult. For this reason, we would expect to find that most of the issues including this 
covenant are convertibles, but convertibles only account for 28 percent of its use. Prior to 2004, 
the covenant was not used in Norway at all. Pareto introduced it for the first time in September 
2005, and the use has increased to over eleven percent of the contracts in 2007. DnB NOR has 
managed half of the issues that include this contract.  
We cannot find any plausible explanation for the development in the covenant’s use, other than 
learning and awareness from the side of the market participants. We expected to find it included 
mostly in convertible issues, but they do not dominate the use of the covenant; thus, shifts in the 
number of convertibles cannot explain it. The information this covenant ensures is also valuable 
for other issues than convertibles. It can provide liquidity in the form of accurate pricing of the 
bonds themselves, and/or inform the bondholders of possible changes in the firm’s ability to meet 
its obligations. To a large extent, this information also can be provided by including information 
covenants, thus ensuring the flow of information. Every issue in our data contains information 
covenants, and this may be one reason why it is not included in more bonds, but this does not 
explain the low use in convertible issues.   
6.5  “Norwegian” corporate covenants 
In the following section, we will present the corporate covenants that we find in the Norwegian 
market, but are not listed in the Mergent FISD main list of covenants. The categorizing is based 
on our findings in reading through the contracts, and is inspired to some extent by earlier works. 
Figure 6.8 displays the development to the covenants to be discussed in this section. 
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Figure 6.8: ”Norwegian” corporate covenants – Development in percentage of total issues 
 
6.5.1 Change of contract – control of assets under construction 
This covenant restricts the issuer from making material changes to their already-entered-into 
construction or rental contracts. The covenant was first used in Norway in 2004, and the use has 
increased from 4.7 percent in 2004 to 19.5 percent in 2007. We find evidence for this 
development being related to the increased use of pledged assets. The covenant is primarily used 
to secure the pledged asset in asset-backed issues where the asset is not already in place, by not 
allowing the issuer to agree to change important aspects of the construction contract. These 
changes can be, for example, with regard to the delivery data, quality, or quantity of assets. We 
find that 100 percent of the issues including this covenant also have pledged assets, providing an 
explanation for the development. This would support a hypothesis that the market has learned and 
evolved on this point. The covenant is also used by real estate companies in their rental contracts.  
6.5.2 Maintenance, insurance and monitoring – uncertain level of protection 
In contrast with most of the other covenants, this one requires the issuer to perform certain 
actions. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that maintenance requirements with regard to property, 
for example, will not have much impact if they are costly to enforce. Furthermore, they argue that 
this problem can be solved if third parties provide the maintenance, which often is the case in 
businesses such as shipping. Requiring sufficient insurance is easier and less costly to supervise. 
In most cases, the issuer would have incentives to take out insurance that will be viewed as 
satisfactory by the bondholders. However, by looking at the stockholders’ claims in the company 
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as a real option, one can see that this may not always be the case. If the firm in particular has a lot 
of risky debt outstanding relative to equity and/or the risky debt is secured by pledged assets, the 
stockholder/company may not have incentives to invest in insurance. In these situations, the real 
option is a long way from being in the money, and the management has incentives to increase the 
upside potential and the company’s volatility by not buying insurance. Thus, the bondholders 
bear most of the risk, and the covenant can be a valuable tool in minimizing the effect of the 
incentives created by leverage and the conflict between bond- and stockholders. This is the 
reason why we would expect to find this covenant in issues by firms that are young and/or highly 
leveraged, and when assets are used as collateral.  
Most examples we find state that maintenance, insurance and monitoring should be at a 
satisfactory level. The contracts that include all three aspects of this covenant are almost 
exclusively found in asset-backed issues where the asset is not yet in place. Restrictions on 
maintenance and insurance are also found in issues by real estate companies and other firms with 
valuable assets already in place. The use of this covenant has increased from being included in no 
contracts at all in the year 2000, to inclusion in 36.5 percent of the total contracts in 2007. We 
almost never find a specific explanation of what a satisfactory level implies and means in 
practical terms. We never find stated in the contracts the frequency of maintenance, how much to 
spend on it, or which suppliers to use. The level of insurance is also not specified in the contracts. 
The monitoring as a part of the covenant is exclusively related to issues where the asset not is yet 
built. In these cases, the covenant is used to ensure that the company oversees the construction, 
and makes them to some extent liable for how the supplier carries out the agreed-upon building 
of the asset.  
We find evidence indicating a strong relationship between pledged assets and the use of this 
covenant; 93 percent of the contracts with the covenant are secured by pledged assets. This 
supports the argument that protecting pledged assets is one of the important rationales behind this 
covenant. All the contracts with this covenant have also included the CC covenant, illustrating 
the fact that this covenant is almost exclusively used when the pledged asset is not yet delivered 
to the issuer (with a couple of real estate companies being the exception). In line with Smith and 
Warner’s argument, we do find that most of the issuers using this covenant are in shipping or oil, 
businesses that at least to some extent use external providers. More importantly, we find that this 
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covenant can provide valuable protection when included in these types of contracts, or if the firm 
has a high degree of leverage. It is possible to specify both insurance and maintenance more 
extensively to provide better protection, increasing the company’s incentive to spend money on 
maintenance and insurance. From the company’s point of view, this covenant has some obvious 
and direct costs, but from the way it is formulated in the contracts in our data, it is not clear how 
high these costs are in reality. One reason why it has become so popular may be that the real cost, 
and therefore the real protection it gives the bondholders, is in fact quite low.  
6.5.3 Restriction on registration  
This covenant was used in 11.9 percent of the contracts in 2007 and 6.5 percent in 2006. Prior to 
this, we do not find it used in Norway. Fearnley and Pareto are the managers that use the 
covenant the most, but First Securities was the first to include the covenant in an issue. Basically, 
the covenant restricts two things, the classification and/or the jurisdiction of assets. The 
classification is mainly related to ships (or floating oil rigs, etc.), where the covenant places a 
limitation on which class the vessel may be in. Indirectly, this restricts the issuer from rebuilding 
or making other material changes to the vessel. This helps prevent asset substitution, and thus 
contributes to reducing the agency cost of debt. The covenant can also restrict which country a 
company or asset is to be juridically registered in. This can prove important, especially when the 
bond uses the asset in question as collateral. Changing the jurisdiction can be one way of 
transferring wealth to the stockholder at the expense of the bondholders, if doing so makes it 
more difficult for the bondholders to secure their claims. The covenant is most commonly used 
with respect to which flag a certain vessel is to sail under, but it is also used in more general 
terms.  
6.5.4 Hedging and environmental protection – preventing and creating disaster 
This covenant is not much used, but we find the idea of including it interesting. This is not a 
covenant found in the Mergent database, and we have not found it mentioned in previous 
empirical work. Reading through the contracts in our data, we found that six contracts issued 
between 2005 and 2007 have included paragraphs that state that the issuer must hedge against 
either currency fluctuations or oil prices. The covenant also includes phrases that impose actions 
to prevent oil spills and other environmental catastrophes that the company may be held 
accountable for. We find this interesting because instead of restricting, the covenant imposes 
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some desired actions. The covenant tries to control the factors that contribute most to the 
riskiness of the business for oil companies, i.e. lawsuits and fines as a result of environmental 
disasters or large fluctuations in prices and/or currencies (the USD). By including such a 
covenant, the bondholders try to control the riskiness of the company they lend money by 
encouraging certain actions that can help reduce the risk in the specific business or company. We 
will argue that such covenants, if composed well, can provide the company with incentives to act 
in the best interest of the bondholders. One might argue that including mandatory environmental 
protection has little or no effect. Many countries have experienced the devastation of accidents 
such as that of the Exxon Valdez, and regulations already are very tight, but keeping to the 
minimum standard of security may prove to be insufficient. Another argument may be that the 
stockholders can hedge their own personal portfolios in a better way, and that company hedging 
is an unnecessary expense. This may also be part of the reason why we do not find the covenant 
used more, but the idea behind including it is interesting and may prove an effective way of 
protecting the bondholders.  
On Tuesday, 22 April 2008, the front page of the largest Norwegian financial newspaper, Dagens 
Næringsliv (DN), read: “Must sell oil at half price” (“Må selge olje til halv pris”). As the oil price 
at the time reached new heights almost daily, the small Norwegian oil company Interoil was 
forced to sell approximately 12 percent of its total production at half price.
69
 The three-year 
hedging deal was a condition two banks set if they were to provide the company with a loan. The 
small company stood to lose over 60 million NOK (or ca. 13 million USD) on the deal, and the 
constantly increasing oil price only added to the losses. This example illustrates the potential high 
cost of including such a covenant for the issuing firm. The hedging covenant shifts much of the 
bondholders’ risk over to the issuing firm. The company can of course also benefit from such 
deals. The market for futures and derivatives can be characterized as zero-sum games, and had 
the oil price decreased in the above example, the company would have made a profit on the 
hedging deal. The important thing to bear in mind is the risk involved for the issuer when this 
type of covenant is included. The above example is from the world of bank loans, but we find 
similar contracts in our data (e.g. Norwegian Energy Company’s issue in 2007
70
). Including the 
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covenant is primarily relevant for small companies that are very dependent on the price of oil (or 
other volatile prices). It can also be beneficial to include in issues by small companies with most 
of their earnings in a foreign currency. From a bondholder’s point of view, it can be very 
desirable to include such covenant. Up to this point, the covenant has not been much used, even 
as a significant number of small oil companies have issued bonds over the last few years. It is 
possible that the examples of how costly this covenant can turn out will contribute to decreased 
use in the future. 
6.5.5 Restrictions on or demand for new capital  
This covenant is meant to ensure that additional capital raised (e.g. equity issues) shall be used to 
finance the same project the bond issue finances. It may also include a minimum required amount 
that has to be raised in additional financing, when it should be done, and how. The covenant is 
included to ensure that projects have enough capital to be finished, and that this capital is not 
used differently. The covenant is used in 17 percent of the bonds issued in 2007 and 4.5 percent 
in 2006, but prior to that we do not find it in use. Interestingly enough, we sometimes find the 
covenant to be very specific compared to most of the others. Some contracts state how the 
company shall obtain the additional capital (debt or equity), within which date, and the exact or 
minimum amount that shall be raised. The covenant may prevent asset substitution, as it directly 
or indirectly limits the company’s investment opportunities. It can also be viewed as a restriction 
on financial gearing, preventing the company from increasing the probability of financial distress 
and thereby the agency cost of debt. In contrast with the covenant that restricts leverage, equity 
ratio, or net worth, this covenant aims at controlling much of the same by stating a specific 
amount needed to be raised in equity to finance the rest of the project. The covenant is only used 
in asset-backed issues, by companies in oil (oil supply) and shipping. The increase in use can 
therefore to some extent be explained by the increase in such issues, but as previously shown, 
similar issues are also found in previous years, and learning may be as good as an explanation.  
6.6 Financial covenants 
In the next section, we will present the financial covenants used in Norway. The primary 
objective for this group of covenants is to limit the management’s possibilities of increasing the 
firm’s financial leverage, and hence the probability of financial distress and default. They also to 
some extent serve as early warning signals, and can be useful tools for the trustee and 
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bondholders, enabling them to take control over the situation early on. The main difference 
among them is how they try to control the issuer’s financial policy. We find that DnB NOR has 
introduced four of the financial covenants to the Norwegian market, but otherwise we do not find 
any particular patterns in terms of the type of company specifics, businesses, or similar that 
determines the use of these covenants. 
6.6.1 Equity ratio and maintenance net worth – important covenant for investors 
These two covenants are in many ways the same covenant. Equity ratio states a minimum 
percentage of equity the issuer shall obtain at any time. The maintenance net worth covenant is 
similar, but it states in absolute terms a minimum level of equity that needs to be maintained 
during the life of the bond. Both covenants are very straightforward. They are usually written in 
one sentence and clearly state the minimum equity level. This makes the covenants easy to spot 
and interpret in the indenture, and this might be the reason for their popularity among investors. 
Furthermore, the impact of including this covenant is also uncomplicated. According to NTM,
71
 
it is one of the first covenants Norwegian investors look for in a new issue. It can be argued that 
the equity ratio, as it is stated in relative terms, is more suitable for growing firms. Over time, 
covenants stated in absolute terms will lose their effect as the total assets grow. On the other 
hand, it may be easier to use absolute terms with regard to monitoring the compliance. We find 
that the equity ratio is the most used of the all the financial covenants, and one of the most used 
of all covenants the last few years. More than 35 percent of the issues in 2006 and 2007 include 
the equity ratio covenant, see figure 6.9. It is also the only financial covenant with a pronounced 
increase in use during the same period. We will argue that the simple equity ratio has taken over 
for many of the other financial covenants during the period. This may indicate that the equity 
ratio is viewed as sufficient to protect the bondholders, or that other types of covenants are being 
used instead. Maintenance net worth may also serve as a protection and early warning sign for the 
bondholders when the profitability is declining. 
 
 
 
                                                           
71
 Meeting with representatives from NTM 
Page | 78  
 
Figure 6.9: Financial covenants – Development in percentage of total issues 
 
6.6.2 Leverage test and indebtedness  
The relationship between the leverage test and indebtedness covenants is very similar to the one 
described in the above section. Leverage test is a relative restriction (in percentage terms) of the 
issuer’s total amount of debt. It is almost identical to the equity ratio, except it uses the debt as 
the basis for the restrictions. The covenant that restricts indebtedness establishes a maximum 
amount of debt that the issuer can take on during the life of the bond. The covenant is often used 
to hinder the firm from issuing any additional debt at all by setting the limit to zero. The 
absoluteness of the covenants can make them unsuitable for many firms, especially growing 
firms, both because it may hamper profitable growth and/or because the real protection for the 
bondholders may be drastically reduced when the firms total equity grows.  
Smith and Warner (1979) emphasize the importance of understanding the scope of restrictions 
when including limitations on additional debt, as it can apply to other aspects than just money 
borrowed. Furthermore, their analysis suggests that including restrictions on further debt issues is 
not optimal. At some time, assets have to be replaced by new ones; using retained earnings 
(lower dividends) or issuing new equity to invest will to some extent compensate bondholders at 
the expense of the stockholders, and increase the bond value. Since stockholders in these 
conditions will not pursue all positive NPV projects – the situation of underinvestment – the 
company value will be negatively affected. However, some limitations on debt also can also be in 
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the interest of stockholders, as they reduce the probability of financial distress. The use of 
indebtedness follows a relatively atypical development, as we find it used the most in some of the 
earlier years.  
6.6.3 Minimum net working capital (NWC) and fixed charge coverage – the liquidity  
These two covenants are used to preserve a minimum level of liquidity in the issuing firm. NWC 
can be a useful measure of short term liquidity and by keeping it at a satisfactory level, the 
probability of financial distress is reduced. Changes in the NWC can also be a valuable early 
warning with regard to future liquidity problems. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that this is an 
important aspect of this type of covenant, and that the value of the signal lies in the opportunity 
of commencing debt renegotiation at an early stage.  
We find that the fixed charge coverage states a minimum interest coverage ratio the issuer has to 
maintain. Thus, it serves both as an indirect restriction on the amount of debt and as a restriction 
on the level of liquidity. The use of the covenant is stable but low during the entire period. Many 
of the financial covenants also apply to the issuer’s subsidiaries, as seen in the next section.   
6.7 Subsidiary restrictions 
When a company raises capital in the bond market, restrictions are sometimes also imposed on 
the borrowers’ subsidiaries. The main reason is to give a better protection for the bondholders. 
These covenants are included in order to avoid providing the issuer with “loopholes,” i.e. 
avoiding compliance with the covenants by actions through its subsidiaries. Most importantly, 
value shifts from the bond- to the stockholders by asset substitution, over/under investment, 
increased leverage, and/or draining the company of value. Mostly, these covenants are used in 
industries which to a great extent demerge large investments (e.g. vessels) in a new subsidiary in 
order to reduce the parent company’s risk exposure. Generally, these contracts express many of 
the covenants as applying to the issuer “on a consolidated basis” or to “the whole Group.” There 
are also some covenants that are especially designed for subsidiaries and their relation to the 
mother company. 
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Table 6.2: Subsidiary covenants - Development 
 
One such covenant is the subsidiary guarantee, which is included to assure that subsidiaries never 
issue guarantees for debt obligations. This covenant reduces the risk for the bondholder, as the 
bond issuer is partially or wholly responsible for the subsidiary’s guarantees. The covenant 
appeared for the first time in 2006 and was introduced by ABG Sundal Collier. 
Borrowing restrictions have become quite popular after they were introduced in a bond indenture 
in late 2005 on a bond issue by Nor Property Holding AS. Its use has increased, and it was 
included in almost 13% of the issues in 2007. The covenant restricts the issuer’s subsidiaries 
from taking on any debt obligations other than intergroup loans (from the parent company). It is 
worth noticing that all the contracts that include this covenant are asset-backed issues with 
pledged assets and negative pledge clauses. 50 percent of the issues also restrict the mother 
company from issuing debt. By combining these two covenants, one allows the group to transfer 
capital internally to where it is needed the most, without the fear of increasing the consolidated 
leverage. This reduces the probability of increased financial distress.   
All covenants colored in table 6.2 have the same interpretation and use as when they are applied 
to the mother company. However, two differences are worth mentioning. First, the dividend 
related payments for subsidiaries include limitations on how much dividend can be paid to the 
parent company. The covenant protects the bondholders against a parent draining assets from the 
subsidiary, if the value of the subsidiary as a going concern is higher than its parts. The draining 
of assets can happen fast by selling off assets, or slowly by paying all retained earnings as 
dividend and not investing. This covenant protects against both. Secondly, investment restrictions 
for subsidiaries are generally very strict and restrict the subsidiaries from investing in anything 
other than the pledge asset, for example.   
Year
Subsidiary 
guarantee
Borrowing 
restrict
Investments 
unrestricted 
subsidiary
Sale 
assets
Sales 
leaseback
Dividends 
related 
payments
Indebtedness
Leverage 
test
Maintenance Net 
worth
EQ-ratio
Fixed charge 
coverage
Merger 
restriction
2007 4.2 % 12.7 % 15.3 % 4.2 % 2.5 % 5.9 % 21.2 % 0.8 % 3.4 % 23.7 % 0.0 % 60.2 %
2006 2.8 % 1.9 % 0.9 % 6.5 % 0.0 % 5.6 % 10.2 % 8.3 % 7.4 % 24.1 % 2.8 % 0.9 %
2005 0.0 % 2.8 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 7.0 % 2.8 % 5.6 % 4.2 % 0.0 % 2.8 %
2004 0.0 % 0.0 % 4.7 % 14.0 % 2.3 % 0.0 % 7.0 % 4.7 % 2.3 % 14.0 % 7.0 % 2.3 %
2003 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 3.8 % 3.8 % 0.0 % 7.7 % 7.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
2002 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 29.4 % 23.5 % 0.0 % 5.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
2001 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 4.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 4.3 % 0.0 % 4.3 % 17.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
2000 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 5.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 5.9 % 5.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
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Subsidiary covenants were introduced in the Norwegian bond market for the first time in an issue 
by Seadrill in 2000 (managed by Nordea). The indenture included restrictions on maintaining a 
minimum net worth in addition to maintaining a minimum equity ratio on a consolidated basis, 
and was one of the more “comprehensive” loan agreements regarding restrictions on the 
subsidiaries before Aker Yards’ bond issue in 2004. This was managed by DnBNOR and 
included more than double the number of restrictions on subsidiaries than any previous issue. 
During the past few years, it has become more common to impose covenants on the subsidiary, 
but mostly, covenants apply to the entire group of companies. 
The covenants seem to have a relatively fluctuating development. The equity ratio has almost 
switched from a positive increase to a negative increase each year, but has been stable for the past 
two years, with usage close to 25 percent. It has been the most used subsidiary covenant over the 
period. The use should be seen in light of the increased use of the covenant applied to the mother 
companies. Subsidiary merger restrictions have appeared more clearly in 2007. Mostly, the 
merger restrictions’ large increase can be ascribed to a revision of a standard formulation. It 
seems that the market wanted to specify that it also applies to the subsidiaries and the phrasing of 
many merger restrictions has been changed to also include this.   
By looking at the subsidiary’s covenant usage at an aggregate level in comparison with the 
average number of subsidiaries the issuers have, we expected to find a positive relationship. The 
relationship is shown in figure 6.10. Surprisingly, we find a strong indication of a negative 
relationship between these average measurements. The annual change goes in the opposite 
direction each year (except for the change from 2004 to 2005). 74 percent of the younger firms 
issuing bonds in 2006 and 2007 included subsidiary covenants, compared to 38 percent of the 
older firms. Furthermore, much of the increased use is due to the fact that an increasing number 
of covenants in the later years are applied to both the issuer and all of its subsidiaries (through 
such phrasings as “whole group,” etc.). We believe this reflects an increased awareness and that 
the market participants have learned the benefits of including such covenants over the last few 
years.  
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Figure 6.10: Average subsidiary covenants compared to the average use of covenants 
 
Figure 6.10: The left vertical axis shows average subsidiary covenants per contract while the right vertical axis shows average 
number of subsidiaries for the bond issuing firms. 
6.8 Standard and information covenants 
6.8.1 Cross default 
The cross default covenant states that the bondholders may declare the issuer in default if it does 
not fulfill any of its other obligations. Usually there is a lower threshold amount on the issuing 
firms’ aggregate unpaid obligations which decides when the bondholder can bring the bond in 
default. We find that all corporate contracts issued in Norway over the last ten years have 
included a cross default covenant. 
The covenant can provide the bondholders with valuable protection, especially if the issuer is 
facing financial distress. It can help ensure that the bondholders receive what they are entitled to 
if the firm is heading for default. This is particularly important in bonds with high duration.
72
 The 
covenant can also protect the lenders indirectly through other loans, as covenants on bank loans 
and other loans apply indirectly for the bond. At least in theory, it could be expected that 
covenants on other loans also to some extent apply indirectly to this bond contract. In practice, on 
the other hand, several factors reduce the value and impact of this. Private loan agreements, such 
as bank loans, are not publicly available information. Furthermore, commercial banks usually 
waive covenants, and rather increase the margin and/or their control of the company. As long as 
the other lenders regard the value of the going concern as higher than the default, they will not try 
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to preserve the value of their own claims rather than using their right to default the company. In 
view of the fact that private debt loan agreements are not accessible for the public, it is 
impossible for an investor to take these covenants into account when reviewing investment 
opportunities. If for some reason the private debt indenture is accessible, covenants in private 
debt indentures could probably be included in the bond contract at a lower price for the issuer.     
6.8.2 Cease to carry on, sell, or dispose a substantial part of the business… 
“The Borrower shall not without the approval of the Loan Trustee; 
 (a) Cease to carry on its business, or 
(b) Sell or dispose of all or a substantial part of its operations or change the nature of its 
business which might jeopardize the Borrower‘s fulfillment of its obligations under 
The Loan Agreement.” 
 The standard formulation comes from a template made by the Norwegian banking industry in 
1991, when a change of bond indentures came to pass in close to all indentures.
73
 The phrasing is 
included in close to all Norwegian corporate bond issues, but due to its vagueness, we will argue 
that it provides little real protection for the bondholders. It leaves very much room for 
interpretation, and results in a lot of discussions and compromises being made between the issuer 
and the trustee. In principle, the covenant can have the same function as restrictions on merger 
activities, asset sales, and many other covenants. The high use of these other covenants reflects 
the relatively low value of this covenant. We will argue that the covenant can of course in some 
cases have some sort of value, but it seems to be a covenant that Miller (1977) would refer to as a 
“neutral mutation that serves no function, but does no harm, and can persist forever.”        
6.8.3 Information covenants 
Almost every contract we have been examining includes information covenants. Usually, if the 
bond indenture includes this type of covenants, it uses more or less the same covenants. This may 
be an argument for low cost including such covenants or that information is important for the 
bondholders. Together, the covenants instruct how the issuing company shall provide the trustee 
and the bondholders with updated information during the life of the bond. It also specifies the 
minimum level of information that is to be provided and when this should be done. Including 
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these kinds of covenants is especially important if the bond issue is not listed on any exchange, as 
the issuer in this case has a limited legal obligation to provide the bondholders with information. 
The covenants call for information much like the requirements at any exchange, and include 
updated quarterly or annual reports and future expectations. We find that all market participants 
have understood the importance of including such covenants, and the variation between the 
contracts is minimal. Thus, we will not analyze the information covenants any further in this 
study. It is important, however, that the reader is aware that such information requirements exist, 
and that they are in general very homogeneous.     
6.9 Bonds with and bonds without covenants 
In the previous we presented the covenants used in Norway, and how this has changed over time. 
We will finish this chapter by looking at some typical characteristics of bonds that include 
covenants and compare it with those which do not. Table 6.3 provides a comparison analysis of 
the issues with no covenants at all and issues that include one or more. We have also divided the 
group with covenants in to two parts, to illustrate the difference between the indentures with few 
and those with many covenants. 
The table shows that the spread, both FRN and fixed looks to be considerably higher for the 
bonds including more than five covenants, while the average spread for bonds without covenant 
and with fewer than five covenants are more equally. Higher spread in issues with many 
covenants can be interpreted as firms with higher credit risk include more covenants. Another 
explanation for this is provided by the median issue year for the bonds with covenants. The bonds 
with the highest use of covenants seem to have been issued later. Thus, it can be argued that the 
price of risk was higher in 2007 than in 2004 (the respective medians) and that this influences the 
average. On the other hand, the median age can also support our argument that the marked has 
evolved and learned during the last few years. For now the reader should have in mind that 
factors such as maturity, type of bond (e.g. callable or convertible), credit risk and the use of 
covenants all influences the size of the spread, and that the decisions often are made 
simultaneously.  
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Table 6.3: Bonds with and bonds without covenants 
 
Furthermore, the analysis illustrates an interesting point in regard to the listing of bonds. We find 
the average number of listings to be almost identical for both the bonds with and without 
covenants. Looking at the two groups that include covenants the shows that indentures with just a 
few covenants are often listed than bonds without, but a significant lower number of those with 
several covenants are listed. This illustrates the fact that the more complicated the contracts are in 
terms of covenants and security, the harder it is to have them listed, but including just a few 
covenants seems to enhance the probability of the bond being listed. The analysis shows that all 
the other bond characteristics that were presented in chapter 5 are more frequently found in bonds 
that include covenants. One thing though stands out, the there seems to be little difference in the 
average firm age of the groups with and without covenants. The firms including covenants have 
Without Covenants
Characteristics 1-17 cov 1-4 cov 5-17 cov
Number of issues 56 267 155 112
*Covenant - 4 2 8
FRN spread (avg.) 1.70 2.72 1.80 4.09
Coupon spread (avg.) 3.64 4.13 3.18 5.33
Interest type
                Fixed 52 % 46 % 44 % 49 %
                FRN 36 % 51 % 54 % 47 %
                Zero 13 % 3 % 2 % 4 %
Maturity (avg.) 4.5 4.8 5.3 4.2
*Amount in NOK 145 000 000 300 000 000 300 000 000 275 000 000
*Issue year 2004 2006 2005 2007
Listed 66 % 61 % 77 % 38 %
Bonds/Convertibles 43% / 57% 92% / 8% 92% / 8% 92% / 8%
Foreign currency 2 % 20 % 12 % 30 %
Callable 18 % 45 % 26 % 72 %
Guarantee 5 % 15 % 6 % 26 %
Pledge 11 % 37 % 18 % 64 %
Unsobordinated 71 % 95 % 96 % 94 %
Z-score
Median 0.87 1.10 1.11 1.01
Average 1.41 1.18 1.11 1.32
***Total assets (avg.) 3 152 908 9 165 957 14 457 573 1 937 231
**Debt ratio (avg.) 0.61 0.58 0.62 0.51
Firm age (avg.) 9.78 9.49 10.31 8.35
Foregin issuer 2 % 7 % 4 % 12 %
*Median, **Debt/Total assets, *** NOK Thousand
With Covenants
Loan Agreements
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only a slighter lower average age than those which do not. On the other hand is it a relative large 
difference between the firms including many covenants and those including few. 
Summarizing the analysis of table 6.3, the typical bonds issue not including any covenants at all 
is a convertible issue, with a lower than average spread, issued in NOK, listed on a exchange, has 
no security, is issued in 2004 by a medium sized firm and is relatively smaller in amount. 
The most interesting results of the above analysis are the difference between the indentures which 
include only a few covenants and those including more than five. First, the typical issue with only 
a few covenants included is an unsubordinated bond with a lower than average spread. It is in 
general an uncomplicated indenture, listed on an exchange, and issued by a very large and 
financial solid firm and most likely in 2006.  
The typical issue with many covenants has a relatively high spread. It is a common bond, but 
includes call provisions and other structures. It is secured by pledge assets and/or guarantees, not 
listed on an exchange and is issued by a small and relatively young firm. It is also more likely 
than other bonds to be issued in a foreign currency and by a foreign issuer 
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7 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS – HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
In this chapter we take the analyses of individual covenants and their development a step further, 
and analyze the average covenants in the loan agreements. We will test five hypotheses based on 
our descriptive analysis in the previous two chapters, and previous empirical work on the subject. 
We will show how the data indicates that the size and the age of the firm seems to affect the use 
of covenants, and how the same is true for important bond characteristics and the issue year. We 
will also show that, contrary to what the ATC predicts and some previous empirical work, the 
covenant usage does not seem to be significantly different for firms with high or low probability 
for distress. We use standard t-test to test our hypotheses by comparing means for two different 
groups, and the chapter is structured in such a manner that each hypothesis is presented and tested 
separately. The chapter starts with a presentation of the assumptions common to all the tests. 
7.1 Assumptions and interpretations  
In this chapter we use the total number of covenants (‘NumbCovenants’) as a measure of the use 
of covenants in the loan agreement. We assign an equal value to all covenants. Interpreted as the 
level of protection which the bondholders are given, the measurements should be used with some 
caution. Different covenants has different degrees of protection
74
, hence a covenant score of five 
does not necessarily mean that the bondholders are better protected than in an indenture with 
three. However, we believe that an accurate assessment of the protection provided by the 
covenants requires an individual evaluation of each contract, and quantifying it would prove 
difficult. In light of the analysis in chapter 6, we have also chosen to include subsidiary 
restrictions as a binominal variable
75
 instead of including all the covenants to better reflect the 
real protection the covenants provide. Thus, we will argue that the total number of covenants in 
each contract is a good estimate of the bondholders’ protection, and that the results may be 
interpreted in this manner. However, the main goal with the analysis in this chapter is to provide 
some insight to what factors that influence the use of covenants in general. Thus, the level of 
protection is not crucial for this type of insight and the results can be viewed without considering 
the difference in real protection between the issues.  
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 Quite obvious, and in line with Reisel (2004) 
75
 Having one or more subsidiary covenants is represented with a value of 1 
Page | 88  
 
Furthermore, in this chapter we assume covenant variables being normally distributed (N(µ,σ
2
)) 
regardless of how they are grouped in each hypothesis. We do some robustness checks for the 
hypothesis by testing the hypothesis the “other way around”. For example if one hypothesis test if 
low rated firms have higher number of covenants than high rated firms, we also test the average 
rating for firms with low covenant usage compared to those with high covenant usage. We are 
well aware of that it is not the same hypothesis, but are of the opinion that it is good as a 
robustness check as they test more or less the same. 
7.2 The probability of default - Hypothesis one 
Our first hypothesis is based on ATC and previous empirical work on the subject. ATC predicts a 
positive relation between covenants and probability of default, while some empirical studies find 
opposite indications, for example McDaniel (1986) and Begley (1994) who base their argument 
on the importance of flexibility when facing financial distress. Thus, in light of other empirical 
work and the ATC, we want to examine if firms with different probability of default have 
different use of covenants (on average). 
We use the issuers Z-score to measure the firms’ probability of default. We examine if borrowers 
with low Z-score (high probability of default) tends to have different use of covenants compared 
to those with high Z-score, by comparing the means in two different groups. A natural basis for 
the classification of the two groups is Altman’s (2006) three different “zones”. COVZLOW 
represents the number of covenants in the loan agreement for the respective borrowers with a Z-
score below 1.23 (the distress zone). COVZHIGH indicates the number of covenants for the 
respective bond issuers with a Z-score higher than 1.23 (categorized as either in the grey or in the 
safe zone).  
We formulate the null hypothesis (H0) that there are no differences in covenant usage between 
firms with high probability of default and those with low probability of default, and want to test 
to see if we can find significant result of having different covenant usage between them. We 
perform a two sided test, to account for that some previous studies and ATC give different 
expectations. 
H0: There is no difference in covenant usage between the firms with high probability of default 
and the firms with low probability of default  [Mean(COVZLOW) – Mean(COVZHIGH)] = 0 
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HA: There is a difference in covenant usage between the firms with high probability of default 
and the firms with low probability of default  [Mean(COVZLOW) – Mean(COVZHIGH) ≠ 0] 
We fail to reject the null hypothesis, as shown in table 7.1. The average use of covenants is 
higher for firms not classified as being in the distress zone, a negative t-value. The averages are 
in line with for example Begley (1994), and indicate that firms in the distress zone are willing to 
pay a higher yield to have more flexibility. The standard deviations indicate a more scattered use 
of covenants in the distress firms. This is taken into account when we run the t-test. As 
COVZLOW has a variance of 1.62 times the variance in COVZHIGH, significantly different 
from equal variance at p < 0.01, we correct for unequal variances. 
Table 7.1: Hypothesis one – The probability of default 
 
We also check the robustness, by regrouping the variables by Z-score higher or lower than 2.9 
(i.e. safe zone as one group and distress plus grey zone as the other group, COVZHIGH1 and 
COVZLOW1 respectively), we find significant result p < 0.1 for the null hypothesis, thus still 
failing to reject it. We only have 15 observations here, but the average is still higher for firms 
with higher Z-score. Furthermore, instead of grouping the variables in line with Altman’s 
classification, we also make a robustness test by grouping the samples by the median of the Z-
score (COVZLOW2, COVZHIGH2). Still, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. Worth mentioned 
here is that by dividing the sample in two equally large groups (in number of issues), the average 
covenant usage becomes higher in firms with higher likelihood of financial distress, and in line 
with ATC, though not being significant. Furthermore, we test if the average Z-score for firms 
issuing bonds with more than two covenants included in the contract have lower z-score on 
Variable Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. T-statistics
name Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff ≠ 0 Ha: diff > 0
covzlow Z-score < 1.23 150 3.08 3.564***
covzhigh Z-score ≥ 1.23 111 3.31 2.799*** -0.5743 0.2831 0.5662 0.7169
Robustness:
covzlow1 Z-score < 2.90 246 3.17 3.264
covzhigh1 Z-score ≥ 2.90 15 3.27 3.240 -0.1105 0.4560 0.9121 0.5440
covzlow2 Z-score < Median 131 3.29 3.730***
covzhigh2 Z-score > Median 130 3.06 2.707*** 0.5668 0.7143 0.5714 0.2857
lowcovzscore Covenants < 3 139 1.17 2.026***
highcovzscore Covenants ≥ 3 122 1.28 1.364*** -0.518 0.3025 0.6049 0.6975
***, ** or * in std.dev means that we have corrected for unequal variance at a level of significanse of at least 1%, 5% or 10% respectively
***, ** or * in  in P-Values indicate the significanse level of the alternative hypothesis, at of least 1%, 5% or 10% respectively
P-Value
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average (LOWCOVZSCORE). The result is close to what we find in the original t-test, hence 
increasing the reliability of failing to rejecting the null hypothesis.  
The above results indicate and that the Norwegian market has features analogous with the 
findings of, among others, Gilson and Warner (1998) but there is no statistical significant result 
which gives evidence of different use of covenants in the two groups. This is emphasized in our 
findings that indicate higher use of covenants in firms with high probability of financial distress, 
in line with ATC, when dividing in two equally large groups. What it seem to be like is that firms 
in the distress zone approaching a Z-score of 1.23, has more covenants than other firms in the 
distress zone, as the average changes from negative to positive when testing on median instead of 
distress zone. 
7.3 The firm age - hypothesis two 
With our second hypothesis we want to explore if the firms’ age decides the use of covenants. 
We have shown throughout chapter five and six that the age of the issuing firm seems to have a 
strong influence on the development in the use of covenants over the years. As in previous 
chapter, we define young firms as those younger than three years at the time of the bond issue 
(COVYOUNG), and compare them to those older (COVMATURE). We use a one sided test, 
thus our hypotheses looks like the following: 
H0: There is no difference in the average use of covenant between young and mature firms 
[Mean(COVYOUNG) – Mean(COVMATURE) = 0] 
HA: Young firms include more covenants on average than more mature firms 
[Mean(COVYOUNG) – Mean(COVMATURE) > 0] 
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Table 7.2: Hypothesis two – The firm age 
 
From table 7.2 we can read that firms younger than three years have on average 6.29 covenants 
included in the loan agreement, while the more mature firms only have 2.71. In other words, 
young firms use over twice as many covenants on average compared to older firms. We reject the 
null hypothesis (t-statistics: 7.7297) and accept the alternative hypothesis, that young firms 
include more covenants on average in their bond indentures. The alternative hypothesis is highly 
significant at a p < 0.001 level, with an estimated power equal to 1. Young firms using more 
covenants than more mature firms can among other things be explained by their asset backed 
issues.
76
 
We check the robustness of our answer by regrouping and defining young firms as being those 
younger than five years, and one more time defining young firms as those being younger than one 
year. Both provides significant results, younger firms include more covenants on average, but 
with lower difference in the mean compared to the original t-test. When examining firms younger 
than one year the p-value of the HA is less than 0.05, indicating that younger firms have lower use 
of covenants. We also check the hypothesis the “other way around”, dividing the average firm 
age in two groups, one with low covenant usage (LOWCOVAGE) and one with high covenant 
usage (HIGHCOVAGE). The average age is significantly higher (p < 0.001) for those who 
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 This is discussed extensively through chapter 5 and 6 
Variable Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. T-statistics
name Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff ≠ 0 Ha: diff > 0
covyoung Firmage < 3 y 112 6.29 4.395***
covmature Firmage ≥ 3 y 211 2.71 2.974*** 7.7297 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000***
Robustness:
covyoung1 Firmage < 5 y 136 5.54 4.413***
covmature1 Firmage ≥ 5 y 187 2.79 3.038*** 6.2556 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000***
covyoung3 Firmage < 1 y 41 5.12 3.675
covmature3 Firmage ≥ 1 y 282 3.78 3.927 2.0654 0.9802 0.0397 0.0198**
lowcovage Covenants < 4 185 9.77 6.188
highcovage Covenants ≥ 4 138 6.45 6.912 4.5425 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000***
***, ** or * in std.dev means that we have corrected for unequal variance at a level of significanse of at least 1%, 5% or 10% respectively
***, ** or * in  in P-Values indicate the significanse level of the alternative hypothesis, at of least 1%, 5% or 10% respectively
P-Value
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include few covenants compared to those who include many covenants, hence supporting our 
first result.77 
Based on the above, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis, and the 
answer seems to be relatively robust. We find that young firms on average include more 
covenants than the older ones. 
7.4 The size of the firm - hypothesis three 
In the next we test if the firm size, measured as the size of its total assets, affect the use of 
covenants in general. Bradley and Roberts (2004) finds that larger firms use fewer covenants in 
their contracts.
78
 Smith and Warner (1979) and Griner and Huss (1995) argues that the size of the 
firm can be used as a measure of the probability of financial distress. The total asset can also be 
an estimate of the age of the firm, and it is also highly dependent on what type of business the 
company operates in. We will in the next not place much weight on what total assets can be a 
measure of, except the size of the firm. Thus, we will simply test if the size of the firm influences 
the average use of covenants, based on what Bradley and Roberts (2004) finds. Thus: 
H0: There is no difference in average covenant usage between large and small companies 
[Mean(COVTOTASSLOW) – Mean(COVTOTASSHIGH) = 0] 
 
HA: Small companies include, on average, more covenants than larger companies 
[Mean(COVTOTASSLOW) – Mean(COVTOTASSHIGH) > 0] 
COVTOTASSLOW represents the average number of covenants in the loan agreement for those 
firms with low total assets, while COVTOTASSHIGH is the average for firms with high total 
assets. We use the median of the sample to categorize the firms.    
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 Five observations of firm age are changed from approximately 100 years to 25 years to decrease the standard 
deviation. 
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 Again, this is on private corporate debt but we find it realistic to assume the same in public debt 
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Table 7.3: Hypothesis three – Size of the firm 
 
Firms with low total assets include more covenants on average than the firms with high total 
assets. The statistic is significant. With a t-statistics of 7.6314 we reject the null hypothesis, and 
finds support for the alternative hypothesis at a significance level of p < 0.001, stating that firms 
with lower total assets include more covenants. This is in line with our discussion in previous 
chapters, and with previous empirical work (e.g. Bradley and Roberts, 2004) depending on how 
you interpret the total asset figure. We also do a robustness check and find that firms with total 
assets lower than 200.000 uses significantly more covenants on average than firms with a higher 
total asset. We also checked if we could find significant differences in average total asset when 
dividing them in two groups; one with few covenants (LOWCOVTOTASS) and one with many 
covenants (HIGHCOVTOTASS). We also find this to be highly significant (p < 0.001), 
indicating that average total assets in the firms with few covenants are significantly higher than 
the average total assets in those firms with many covenants.
79
 Thus, with more certainty we can 
reject the null hypothesis, and accept the alternative hypothesis that smaller firms have more 
covenants included in the bond indentures. Interpreting total assets as a measure of financial 
distress, this is in line with ATC. 
7.5 Important bond specifics - hypothesis four 
Our fourth hypothesis is actually a number of hypotheses, and is summarized in table 7.4. We test 
how a number of different important bond specifics affect the average use of covenants. 1 
indicates presence of a bond specific. 
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 This was also true by omitting extremely high values in total assets 
Variable Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. T-statistics
name Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff ≠ 0 Ha: diff > 0
covtotasslow Total assets < median 160 5.52 4.365***
covtotasshigh Total assets  median 160 2.44 2.650*** 7.6314 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000***
Robustness:
covtotassolow1 Total assets < 200.000 63 5.777778 4.382*
covtotasshigh1 Total assets ≥ 200.000 257 3.536965 3.677* 3.7477 0.9998 0.0003 0.0002***
lowcovtotass Covenants < 3 148 1.32E+07 29400000***
highcovtotass Covenants ≥ 3 172 3785699 9277002*** 3.7283 0.9999 0.0003 0.0001***
***, ** or * in std.dev means that we have corrected for unequal variance at a level of significanse of at least 1%, 5% or 10% respectively
***, ** or * in  in P-Values indicate the significanse level of the alternative hypothesis, at of least 1%, 5% or 10% respectively
P-Value
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H0: The presence of grouping variable X does not affect average number of covenants 
[Mean(GROUPVAR(0)) – Mean(GROUPVAR(1)) = 0] 
HA: The presence of grouping variable X result in higher covenant usage 
[Mean(GROUPVAR(0)) – Mean(GROUPVAR(1)) < 0]
80
 
Table 7.4: Hypothesis four – Important bond specifics 
 
The mean comparison test finds significant result for our entire alternative hypotheses, with large 
differences in the mean. We find that issues secured by pledge assets or that is callable prove to 
have the outcome with the greatest difference between the issues including it and the ones which 
do not. This is statistically in line with our analysis in chapter five, where we find strong 
indications that issues with pledge assets include more covenants. Except for unsubordinated 
issues, which are significant at a level of p < 0.05, all others are significant at a level of p < 0.01. 
We reject our entire null hypotheses and accept the entire alternative hypotheses. Thus, the tests 
indicate that bonds not listed, are not convertibles, are callable, include guarantees or pledges, are 
issued in a foreign currency, or are unsubordinated result in higher average use of covenants 
compared to bonds with opposite characteristics.81 This is in line with our indication in chapter 
5.
82
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 For ’Listed’ the hypothesis is the opposite, that is [Mean(GROUPVAR(0)) – Mean(GROUPVAR(1)) > 0]based on our 
previous discussion that unlisted bonds seem to have more covenants included 
81
 See table 7.4 column 5 
82
 Reasons for higher use of covenants with one or more of these bond characteristics are the same as discussed in 
chapter 5. 
One tailed test Corrected for
 (mean (0) - mean (1)) sign. unequal Meaning, significantly, on
Grouping Variable t-value Diff. mean Std.dev average:
Listed (1=Listed, 0=Notlisted) 6.9228*** 3.17 x Unlisted bonds more covenants
IssueType (1=Bond, 0=Convertible) -5.4244*** -2.52 x Bonds more covenants
Currency (1=Foreign, 0=NOK) -5.5747*** -3.53 x Foreign currecy issues more covenants
Callable (1=Callable, 0=Not callable) -9.7290*** -4.11 x Callable more covenants
Guarantee (1=Guarantee, 0=Not Guarantee) -5.2922*** -3.92 x Guarantee more covenans
Pledge (1=Pledge, 0=Not pledge) -10.6901*** -4.88 x Pledge more covenants
Unsubordinated (1=Unsub., 0=Sunordinated) -2.0714** -1.57 Unsubordinated more covenants
* Significant at a level of 10%, ** Significant at a level of 5%, *** Significant at a level of 1%
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7.6 Year of issue – hypothesis five 
We have through our thesis argued for an increased covenant usage on individual covenants, 
hence in this hypothesis we want to test if the year the bond was issued affects the average 
number of covenants included in the bond indentures. Thus, we have the following hypotheses: 
H0: Year X does not have different average use of covenants than the other years 
[Mean(COVYEARXall-i)) – Mean(COVYEARXi) = 0] 
HA: Year X have different average use of covenants than the other years      
[Mean(COVYEARXall-i)) – Mean(COVYEARXi) ≠ 0], 
where COVYEARXi is the average covenant usage per loan agreement in year i, and 
COVYEARXall-i is the covenant usage on average for all the other years than year i.  
Table 7.5: Hypothesis five – Year of issue 
 
We find strong evidence of increased use of covenants in the past few years. The development in 
the differences in average goes from being largely positive and significant in 2000, to highly 
negative and significant in 2007. This gives strong indications of increased usage over the years. 
There can be several explanations for this development. First, it can be explained by an obtained 
experience and more professional market participants – a view both we and NTM share.
83
 
Furthermore, as the market is relatively new and have been exposed to few cyclical turnarounds, 
the market conditions might be one explanation. However, there is no question about increased 
covenant usage. 
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 Meeting with representatives (NTM) 
Corr. For
 (mean (0) - mean (1)) unequal Meaning, significantly, on
STATAVARIBLE t-value Diff. Mean  Std.Dev. HA average:
2007 YEAR10 -9.3869*** -4.97 x HA < 0 2007more covenants than the other years
2006 YEAR9 -1.7719** -.86 HA < 0 2006 more covenants than the other years
2005 YEAR8 3.4962*** 1.58 x HA > 0 2005 fewer covenants than the other years
2004 YEAR7 8.1879*** 2.72 x HA > 0 2004 fewer covenants than the other years
2003 YEAR6 5.7531*** 2.92 x HA > 0 2003 fewer covenants than the other years
2002 YEAR5 1.4287* 1.89 HA > 0 2002 fewer covenants than the other years
2001 YEAR4 7.1984*** 3.05 x HA > 0 2001 fewer covenants than the other years
2000 YEAR3 9.3840*** 3.11 x HA > 0 2000 fewer covenants than the other years
* Significant at a level of 10%, ** Significant at a level of 5%, *** Significant at a level of 1%
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8 MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
In this chapter we focus on a regression model to find what aspects which affect covenant usage 
and to what extent some variables affect the number of covenants in the loan agreements. We 
focus on regressions for bond issues with fixed interest rate, owing to the fact that most other 
literature have this focus, hence making our empirical testing more comparable with others. In 
Norway, approximately half of the corporate issues are coupon bonds. This chapter is structured 
as follows; Section 8.1 presents assumptions regarding the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. 
Section 8.2 defines the explained variable and the explanatory variables in the regression model 
together with results. Section 8.3 presents possible approaches to go around the endogeneity 
problem, while a short summary is present in section 8.4.  
8.1 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) - Assumptions 
“OLS is a method for estimating the parameters of a multiple regression model. The OLS 
estimates are obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals (RSS)” (Wooldridge, 2006, p: 
867). To perform an unbiased Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) by OLS estimation of 
parameters, several assumptions have to be “fulfilled”.  
First of all, and what forms the MLR model, it assumes a linear relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables, which by violation can result in 
underestimated OLS estimators and R2.84 Furthermore, the model have an assumption of 
independence of error terms, that is the error terms are uncorrelated (cov(ui, uj) = 0, i ≠ j). If this 
assumption is violated, we refer to the variables as being auto-correlated. With positive 
autocorrelation the estimates of the standard error will be underestimated, which again result in 
that OLS undervalues the true variation in the error term, and can also inflate R
2
.
85
 Moreover, it 
assume normally distributed error terms with an average of zero and constant variance 
(homoskedasticity: Var(ut) = σ
2
). In other words, this is an assumption of no systematic variation 
by the error terms and the dependent variable and will in general prevent inefficient estimators 
and biased error terms so that one can use t-statistics to get reliable conclusions. 
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Additionally, E(ut) = 0 is an assumption in the unbiased OLS model. “The error term has an 
expected value of zero given any values of the independent variables” (Wooldridge, 2006, p: 92). 
Furthermore, he argues that this is the most important assumption needed for unbiasedness. If the 
assumption is violated the result will be biased estimators and error terms. We will discuss this 
further in section 8.3. Finally, the model assumes no perfect collinearity
86
, which means no 
perfect correlation among independent variables. Some correlations are allowed, but at least there 
cannot be perfect correlation. A rule of thumb is that correlation above 0.3 is not good, while a 
correlation over 0.5 is bad.
87
 As MLR coefficients provide estimates for a change in one 
explanatory variable, keeping all the other explanatory variables constant, high correlations 
between explanatory variables bias these coefficients, increasing in the level of correlation. Thus 
multicollinearity results in unreliable coefficients, but it does not affect the efficiency of the 
estimators.88 
If these assumptions hold, OLS will have several beneficial characteristics, known as Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimators (BLUE).
89
  
8.2 The explained, the explanatory variables and regression coefficients 
The following variables to be discussed are summarized in appendix 6 
8.2.1 The explained variable 
As mentioned earlier, the variable to be explained, ‘NumbCovenants’, is a measure of total 
number of covenants included in the bond indentures.  
“An empirical model should include variables which are expected to have a causal effect to the 
explained variable” (Keller and Warrack, 2003). Due to extensive analyses of some explanatory 
variables in previous chapters, we will not discuss how they are affecting covenant usage to a 
great extent. However, new variables will be discussed extensively. 
                                                           
86
 Referred to as multicollinearity if the independent variables have high, but not perfect correlation, or if it is 
correlation among several variables. 
87
 Carsten Bienz (2008) 
88
 Ayyangar (2004) 
89
 For further discussion on BLUE, see Wooldridge, 2006, p: 108-109 
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8.2.2 The explanatory variables 
We have divided the explanatory variables in four different groups; bond-specific variables, firm-
specific variables, macroeconomic variables and dummy variables.  
8.2.2.1 Bond-specific variables 
Bond maturity (‘Maturity’) is the maturity of the bond issue. Choosing a shorter maturity will 
reduce the underinvestment- and the assets substitution problem, thus the longer time to maturity, 
the more covenants do we expect to find in the loan agreements. Billet et al. (2007) are one of 
many who use maturity in their model. 
 
‘CouponSpread’ is the difference between the bond’s coupon yield and the Government bond 
with equal maturity. As Government bond with exactly the same maturity as the corporate issue 
usually not exists, we have calculated the coupon spreads against Government bonds with 
maturity as close as possible to the corporate bonds maturity.90 Ceteris paribus, we expect to find 
more covenants the lower the spread is and vice versa. 
In accordance with Nash et al. (2003) we are taking into account that there can be a temporal 
pattern in our data. ‘IssueYear’, a value from 0 (1998) to ten (2008) depending on the year the 
bond was issued, is included to intercept changes in covenant usage which have occurred over the 
sample period, owing to the worked up experience, a more professional market and other factors 
which may influence covenant usage. 
8.2.2.2 Firm-specific variables 
As an input in our regression model we have calculated a “rating” based on Altman’s Z-score. 
Using ‘Zscore’ is in line with Nash et al. (2003) which have used this measure among others on 
likelihood of default. 
 
We include ‘FirmAge’ in years as an explanatory variable. Younger firms are often smaller, with 
higher growth opportunities. According to Dunne et al. (1989) who analyze US firms find, 
                                                           
90
 If corporate bond maturity ≥ 7 years: Coupon minus 10 year Government bond is used. 
    If 4 years ≤ corporate bond maturity < 7 years: Coupon minus 5 year Government bond is used. 
    If corporate bond maturity < 4 years:  Coupon minus 3 year Government bond is used. 
    All connected to the prevailing Government bonds in the year of issue. 
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consistent with previous research, that the growth variance decrease with age.
91
 Thus, by 
including firm age we cover, at least to some extent, growth opportunities, which among others 
Kahan and Yermack (1998) includes. 
  
Total assets (‘TotAss’) is included as a measure on the size of the firm. We expect larger firms to 
include fewer covenants as they have lower possibility to face financial distress, ceteris paribus. 
“Investors are though less concerned about conflicts of interest between bondholders and 
shareholders” (Nash et al. 2003, p: 221). We use total assets in billions just to get higher 
coefficients in the regression. 
While total assets say something about the size of the firm, debt to total assets (‘DebtRatio’) 
points out how much of the assets which is financed by debt, and is included to account for that 
higher debt ratio often resulting in higher probability of default. 
8.2.2.3 Macroeconomic factors 
We use the difference between government bonds 10 year minus Government bond 3 year 
(‘Government10minus3’) to say something about the market conditions.
92
 A government 10 year 
higher than Government 3 year, that is positive difference and an upward sloping yield curve, 
gives indications of improving conditions in the economy; hence we are expecting fewer 
covenants in these periods compared to periods with negative difference in interest rates. This is 
in line with Riger (1991) who argue that market condition is important when choosing covenant 
structure. 
Another good measure to say something about the market conditions at a given time is the 
number of bankruptcies the year after the issue. We have used the year after as it takes time from 
having financial trouble to the bankruptcy actually occurs. This is though almost perfectly 
positively correlated with ‘government10minus3’,
93
 giving strong indications of 
‘government10minus3’ as a good measure of the market condition in a given year. 
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 Coad (2007) 
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 Appendix 7 shows the market conditions for each year 
93
 Correlation close to 0.95 
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8.2.2.4 Dummy variables 
The dummy variables are present in table 8.1. We have had, earlier in this paper, extensive 
discussions on why these dummy variables affect the number of covenants, thus omitting the 
discussion here.
94
 
Table 8.1: Dummy variables in the regression model 
 
8.2.3 The regression model and results 
Based on the discussion in the two previous sections, we apply the following regression equation: 
NumbCovenants = β0 + β1 * ‘FirmAge’ + β2 * ‘Zscore’ + β3 * ‘TotAss’ + β4 * ‘DebtRatio’ + β5 * 
‘CouponSpread’ + β6 * ‘Maturity’ + β7 * ‘IssueYear’ + β8 * ‘Govern10minus3’ + β9 * ‘Listed’ + 
β10 * ‘Callable’ + β11 * ‘IssueType’ + β12 * ‘Pledge’ + β13 * ‘Guarantee’ + β14 * ‘Currency’ + β15 * 
‘Unsubordinated’ 
Table 8.2: Full sample regression coefficients
95
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 The dummies are extensively discussed in chapter 5 
95
 See appendix 8 
DUMMY VALUE DUMMY VALUE
Explanation Variable name 1 0
Listed at an exchange Listed Listed Not listed
Callable bond Callable Callable Not callable
Bond versus converible issue IssueType Bond Convertible
Pledge assets Pledge Pledge No pledge
Guarantee Guarantee Guarantee No guarantee
Unsubordinated Unsubordinated Unsubordinated Subordinated
Currency for the bond issue Currency Foreign currency NOK
Variables Regression 1 Variables Regression 1 (Cont.)
firmage 0.0369739 listed -0.4340455
(0.96) (-0.9)
zscore 0.0599464 callable 1.436359***
(0.57) (2.83)
totass 0.0171578* issuetype 1.453743**
(1.94) (2.38)
debtratio -0.5500937 pledge 1.817491***
(-0.58) (3.57)
couponspread 0.1275892 guarantee 3.054866**
(1.1) (2.29)
maturity 0.0246771 currency 0.2494541
(0.38) (0.36)
issueyear 0.6088196*** unsubordinated -0.2793594
(5.58) (-0.36)
govern10minus3y -1.769616*** constant -2.54648*
(-4.64) (-1.93)
R-squared 0.6435
***, **, * indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
T-statistics are present in parentheses. 
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The firm size, measured by total assets,
96
 has significant influence on number of covenants. 
Interestingly, the relation is positive which imply that larger companies include more covenants. 
However, the coefficient is slightly positive on total assets in billion meaning that per billion 
increase in total assets, the number of covenants only increase with 0.017. When the largest 
company in our sample has total assets of approximately 104 billion
97
, the argument of low 
influence is emphasized. Even though it is not affecting covenants, it is surprising according to 
the ATC and the simple t-test we did in chapter seven, that number of covenants seem to be 
higher in large firms. 
Regression results shows that ‘issueyear’ has a highly significant influence on covenants. The 
later the issue year, the more covenants are included, as the value of the variable have a score of 0 
for 1998 to 10 for 2008. This might be explained by the experienced obtained, and a more 
professional bond market over the sample period. We have in the previous chapters, in addition to 
obtained experience, ascribed this increase to larger share of younger firms issuing bonds, more 
foreign currency issues and indicated the general situation in the economy as a possible 
explanation for this. However, younger firms show tendency of lower use of covenant than more 
mature firms, though not significant.
98
 This is quite surprising in elucidation of our descriptive 
part and the t-test in chapter 7.3. However, defining young firms as growth companies, this is in 
line with Kahan and Yermack (1998) which find a negative relation between restrictive covenants 
and growth opportunities.
99
 Issues in foreign currencies seem to have a positive relation to 
covenant usage, in line with our previous indications. However, this is far from being significant. 
At a highly significant level, general conditions (‘govern10minus3’) in the economy seem to 
reduce the covenant usage, in periods with expectations of improving economical conditions. 
This is in line with our expectations and empirical studies like Bradley and Roberts (2004) which 
finds that covenants varies systematically with macroeconomic factors.
100
 
The regression results indicate close to no relation between the issuer’s probability of financial 
distress and covenants, similar to what we find when comparing means in firms with high- and 
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 In billion 
97
 Norsk Hydro ASA 
98
 In addition; a very small coefficient (0.0369 per year) 
99
 We find it realistic to assume that the statement also applies to number of covenants, not only the restrictive 
covenants that argues for 
100
 On private corporate debt 
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firms with low z-score. However, the coefficient is slightly positive, indicating a tendency of that 
lower probability of default results in more covenants, without statistical significance.101 This is 
the opposite of what ATC predicts, and are in line with for example Begley (1994) and other 
which ascribe low covenant usage in firms facing financial distress as firms value flexibility. 
Debt ratio seems to emphasize the tendency in z-score. Even though it is not significant, it shows 
tendency of highly levered firms including less covenants.  
Several of the other dummy variables affect covenants significantly with great positive influence. 
If the bond issue is issued with a redemption right for the issuer (callable), more covenants are 
included. One possible explanation can be that bondholders require more covenants as 
compensation of the bond issuer’s redemption right. Bond issues compared to convertible issues 
have also more covenants, represented in a positive coefficient of 1.45. Convertibles using fewer 
covenants than bond issues are similar to what Billet et al. (2007) finds, and can be ascribed to 
convertibles having a call option on the issuers’ stocks. Pledge assets and guarantee have also 
significant coefficients, 1.81 and 3.05 respectively, and are those two with highest coefficients. 
Based on our discussion in chapter 5 and 6 several covenants are included to protect the pledged 
assets, hence in line with the results here. Furthermore, the regression shows tendency of fewer 
covenants for issues which is unsubordinated, though not being significant, something which also 
seem to be the case for bonds which is listed. 
In contrast to what Billet et al. (2007) finds, we have indications of slightly more covenant usage 
in bonds with longer maturity. The result is not significant, which may ascribe this to 
contingency. Furthermore, the impact is small, represented in a coefficient of 0.0246. Finally, 
higher coupon spread seems to, surprisingly, increase number of covenants. This is not 
statistically significant. According to previous empirical work102, ‘CouponSpread’ and ‘Maturity’ 
are determined simultaneously as covenants. We will address this problem in the next section. 
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 Remember that higher z-score indicates lower probability of default. 
102
 For instance Billett et al. (2007), Reisel (2004), Bradley and Roberts (2004)  
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8.3 Endogenous variable – Violation of OLS assumption 
One of the assumptions presented in section 8.1 are expectations of error terms equal zero. This 
assumption can be violated in many ways. The two most important cases are instances of omitted 
variables and when one or more explanatory variables are correlated with the error term in the 
regression equation. The latter violation is often referred to as endogeneity. In other words, this is 
a problem as causal connection in regression is that the explanatory variables affect the variable 
to be explained, not the other way around (i.e. the explained variable should not affect the 
explanatory variable). In other word, the explained and the explanatory variable should not be 
determined simultaneously. 
Covenants and the bond coupon are determined simultaneously according to for example Goyal 
(2003) and Bradley and Roberts (2004). Statistical models ignoring this simultaneity between 
spread and covenants, are miss specified, hence might result in biased statistics.103 Bradley and 
Roberts (2004) also suggests that maturity can have the same endogeneity problem as spread, 
without doing further research.  
We have the endogeneity problem in the explanatory variable, ‘couponspread’. Number of 
covenants should, to some extent, be explained by the spread on the bond. This can be 
emphasized by that the lower the spread is, ceteris paribus, the more covenants have to be 
included in the loan agreement to get investors who are interested in lending money to the bond 
issuing firm, and vice versa. However, the covenant usage should also have effects on the spread, 
as the borrower has to include more covenants to get cheaper loans. Thus it is not a truly 
independent variable. We do neither have the option to exclude spread from the regression model 
as this will result in violation of the assumption, referred to as omitted variable bias, under 
specifying the model or excluding a relevant variable.
104
 Owing to the fact that this is a problem 
in our regression model, and according to Wooldridge (2006) who argues that this is the most 
important assumption with OLS regression for unbiasedness, we cannot trust our OLS regression 
as it will result in biased and inconsistent estimators. Two possible approaches to go around the 
problem are two stage least square (2SLS) regression, with a variable working as an instrument 
for spread, or divide our sample in several subsamples with different spread intervals. 
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 Wooldridge, 2006, p:95 
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As emphasized in section 8.2.3, Bradley and Roberts (2004) give indications of bond maturity 
also being an endogenous variable. We assume that is not much of a problem in our case as our 
sample has relatively homogenous maturity.
105
 
8.3.1 Approaches to by-pass the endogeneity problem 
8.3.1.1 2SLS - Finding an instrumental variable 
There are several important aspects to the instrumental variable which has to be fulfilled making 
it appropriate as an instrument. First, the instrument has to be correlated with the endogenous 
variable and significantly affect it. Second, the instrument cannot have the same problem as the 
original endogenous variable, which cannot correlate with the error term in the regression 
equation. Finally, an instrument cannot be a variable that belongs as an explanatory variable in 
the regression equation, even though it is not correlated with the error term and are correlated 
with the endogenous variable.  If an instrument fulfills all these three conditions, consistent 
estimates might be obtained.
106
 
We had problems finding such a variable, even though great effort was embedded in this work. 
‘Manager’ was one variable we examined. It is economical rationale to assume that the manager 
will not directly affect the number of covenant in a bond indenture. If manager affect the number 
of covenants it has to be indirectly through other variables as for example in what kind of 
business sectors the different managers acting as organizers. In addition, our data implies no 
connection between manager and number of covenants. Furthermore, spread also has to be 
significantly affected by manager. Economical rationale sustain that manager can explain some of 
the spread, as the quality of the managers can differ. However, examining this further we did not 
find such a relation, thus we had to look at other variables as instruments for spread.
107
 All 
variables were examined to try to find instruments, but owing to the fact that almost everything 
which affects the spread also affects covenant usage, we did not succeed in finding an instrument.  
8.3.1.2 Omitting spread by regression of subsamples 
Another approach to solve the regression is to exclude the spread from the regression model and 
run several regressions on subsamples of spread. In other words, by dividing the spread into for 
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 This section is based on Wooldridge, 2006, p: 521 
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 See Appendix 10 for information regarding manager as not being an appropriate instrument for spread 
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example four intervals (e.g. 0-200 basis points, 201-400 basis points etc) we obtain different 
results for each spread interval. It is better the smaller the spread intervals are regarding 
individual predictors, but smaller intervals does also complicate the interpretation of the 
regression results. In addition, we only have 115 coupon bonds which contain all firm specific 
information, thus we have divided them into four groups. On the other hand, dividing them into 
fewer subsamples will do the interpretation easier, but also be more like disregarding spread in 
the regression model, hence being without intention. 
In appendix 11, we have shown the result from sub- regressions of four different spread intervals. 
There seems to be very different results for each spread interval which might imply that the 
spread affects the number of covenants in great extent. However, by dividing our sample into 
four intervals when we do this analysis, a new problem arise due to fewer observations in each 
group; multicollinearity. Since multicollinearity result in unreliable coefficients, and that we have 
extensive problems with it, several coefficients are biased.
 
Thus, making any conclusion is 
“dangerous” and not suitable.
108
 However, one main “benefit” with the multicollinearity problem 
is that those variables with low correlation to other explanatory variables with the 
multicollinearity problem are, to some degree, accurate. The accuracy is increasing in lower 
absolute correlation. In appendix 11, coefficients without suspicion of being exposed to 
multicollinearity are colored. This is based on variance inflation factor (VIF) were we have 
colored those variables with lower VIF than 10 and 1/VIF lower than 0.1
109
 in addition to having 
a correlation at least under 0.51 to all other variables. Thus, the colored coefficients are more 
comparable within the different spreads. Since the multicollinearity problem is extensive making 
conclusions inappropriate, we tried to use it in the context of saying something about the 
reliability of the full regression model by looking at the “unbiased” coefficients. If the 
coefficients between the different spread intervals had been relatively close to each other (the 
colored coefficients), we could have compared them to the full regression model. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case. Thus, we will only conclude with, from the sub- regressions, that 
‘CouponSpread’ seems to affect covenant usage. 
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 By deleting the correlated variables, which is often present as one option, we might introduce omitted variable 
bias, that is having a violation of the assumption mentioned in chapter 8.3. As we have several correlating 
variables, this is not a good option. 
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 These rules of thumb are present by Acock, 2006 (p:229) 
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8.4 Summary 
We have not been able to go around the endogeneity problem. Thus, our result from the full 
sample regression model in section 8.2.3 has to be interpreted in elucidation of a possibly 
endogeneity problem. We have several arguments for having an endogeneity problem. First, other 
empirical work argues (and prove) the simultaneously determination of spread and covenants. 
The low influence ‘CouponSpread’ has in the full sample regression compared to what we get an 
idea of in the sub- regressions (by large difference in the comparable coefficients)
110
, gives 
indication of endogeneity problem in the full sample model. Furthermore, it is economical 
rationale to assume such a problem. Finally, our analyses through chapter 5 to 7 indicate stronger 
relationship between the firm specific characteristics and covenant usage then what we find here 
in the full sample regression model. 
However, for those variables showing large and significant coefficients, that is ‘callable’, 
‘issuetype’, ‘pledge’, ‘guarantee’, ‘govern10minus3’ and ‘issueyear’, we can probably say that 
the direction they affect covenants, as discussed in section 8.2.3, are correct, even though we 
have a endogeneity problem in a model with high variance. Though we place higher uncertainty 
to what extent they affect covenants - the share size of coefficients. 
However, we will not conclude with anything when it comes to the firm specific variables. All 
shows small coefficients not being significant, in a model with high variance and an endogenous 
variable. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
An important part of this thesis has been to construct a database containing the information 
needed to gain insight to the use of covenants in Norway. Our database covers the period between 
01/01/1998 and 03/31/2008. It includes information about the use of covenants and key bond 
characteristics of close to all the corporate issues in the period, in total amounting to 438 issues. 
For 323 of the indentures we have also calibrated this with the issuing firms’ relevant financial 
statements, the year of incorporation and other variables. The construction of the database has 
been a significant part of our work, and it is the foundation for this thesis. 
Based on the descriptive analyses, and a t-test, we find strong evidence of a large annual increase 
in the average use of covenants throughout the period. It is especially evident the last three years. 
We also find this underlying trend in close to all the individual covenants. This evident increase 
in it selves can be interpreted as showing that the market has evolved and “learned” about the use 
of covenants during the period. 
We also find that the market has learned how to use the different covenants during the period. 
Our analyses of the theoretical and economical rationale for including the different covenants, 
reveals examples strengthening the argument of learning. One example is the Change of control 
covenant’s importance in convertible bonds, and the use of the covenant going from not included 
to become a standard phrasing in convertible indentures in the course of a year. This emphasizes 
our statement of obtained experience and more professional market participants. A notion shared 
by practitioners.  
Furthermore, we observe that several covenants have been vaguely formulated. We argue that 
clarification and more specific phrasing of some covenants could reduce the cost of monitoring 
and increase the bondholders’ level of protection. We find that several of these unclear 
formulations has been changed and specified during the period. This indicates that the market has 
“learned” how to phrase many of the covenants more appropriate. We find some covenants still 
to be diffuse, and expect this process to continue in the future.  
In addition to more accurate phrasing of the covenants, we find that the market has begun to use 
some new and more “advanced” types of covenants; covenants that are more adapted to the 
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specific issuing firm and the business sector it operates in. Some are also more dynamic in the 
sense that they account for expected changes during the life of the bond.  
Based on our descriptive analyses and our statistical models, we find strong evidence of certain 
bond characteristics influencing the average number of covenants included in the indentures. We 
conclude that convertibles bonds in general including fewer covenants, while issues with pledge 
assets as collateral, issues with guarantees and issues with call provisions, use more covenants 
overall. We ascribe the use of more covenants in issues with pledge assets to the fact that many of 
these issues finance specific and often highly risky projects, so called asset-backed issues. We 
also find that several covenants are specifically aimed at protecting the pledge assets, also 
contribute to explaining the higher use of covenants.  
In our descriptive analyses and t-tests, we find strong indications of more covenant usage in 
issues denominated in foreign currencies and unsubordinated issues, while listed bonds seem to 
include fewer covenants. We find the arguments behind these relationships to be convincing. 
However, our multiple regression model does not support these findings. Even though the model 
probably is biased, due an endogenous variable, we cannot conclude with certainty that these 
bond characteristics significantly influence the use of covenants.  
Contrary to the ATC and other empirical work (e.g. Begley, 1994), which respectively 
predicts/finds higher and lower use of covenant for firms facing financial distress, we do not find 
evidence of different covenant usage between firms with high or low probability of default.  
Based on our descriptive analyses and simple statistical test, we find that younger firms seem to 
include more covenants on average. If age is interpreted as a measure of future growth 
opportunities, this is contrary to previous empirical studies (e.g. Begley, 1994). We also find that 
smaller firms seem to include more covenants than larger ones. Nash (2003) uses this as a 
measure of the probability of financial distress. Interpreted this way, our findings are in line with 
the predictions of the ATC. However, because of contradictory indications in the regression 
model, and small coefficients with low statistical significance, we are not able to conclude with 
certainty that any of the firm specific variables significantly influence the total use of covenants.  
Interestingly, bond indentures with or without covenants do not seem to be as different, regarding 
bond and issuer characteristics, as we were expecting. Spread is though higher on average for 
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those including covenants, especially those which have many covenants included. Our suggestion 
is that this can be ascribed to the increased part of risky issuers the last few years in a time were 
covenants have been more incorporated. This is emphasized in issues without covenants have an 
issue year median of 2004, while those with more than five covenants have a median of 2007. 
We find that the typical bond not including covenants at all is; a convertible issue, with a lower 
than average spread, issued in NOK, listed on an exchange, has no security, is issued earlier in 
the period, by a medium sized firm. 
The typical issue with only a few covenants is; an unsubordinated bond with a lower than average 
spread. In general an uncomplicated indenture, listed on an exchange, and issued by a very large 
and financial solid firm.  
The typical issue with many covenants has a relatively high spread. It is a common bond, but 
includes call provisions and other similar structures. It is secured by pledge assets and/or 
guarantees, not listed on an exchange, and issued by a small and relatively young firm. It is also 
more likely to be issued in a foreign currency 
We have through this thesis provided the reader with a comprehensive description of both the 
theoretical foundation and the practical use of the different covenants used in Norway. We hope 
that this can be used as a foundation for further studies on the subject. 
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9.1 Further studies 
The most obvious extension of our work is to develop the full sample regression model to address 
the problems regarding endogeneity. This can be done by developing our suggested approaches, 
or to use a different method such as logistic regression. By solving the problems in the model, it 
would also be possible to focus more on the benefits of including covenants in terms of the 
spread.  
Furthermore, it could be interesting to expand the analyses by looking at the covenants that we 
did not found used in our sample. One example could be Legal defesance or other covenants that 
looks to be important in other countries. Such a study could possibly further promote the 
development of the Norwegian market. It could also be interesting to directly compare the 
Norwegian market to those of other countries with developed corporate bond markets such as the 
US, or for example to our neighboring countries.   
A study of how the general market conditions affect the use of covenants could also prove 
valuable. Our regression model indicates that macro economical factors may influence the use of 
covenants. However, the total use of covenants has increased rapidly during the last years, a time 
of booming financial markets. Thus, in order to obtain unambiguous results, such a study would 
benefit from being conducted a bit further into the future.    
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Sources of additional data input 
Amadeus database 
www.bvdep.com/en/amadeus.html (Financial statements) 
Financial dictionary (www.financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com) Searchword: Negative 
pledge  
Konkursrådet (www.konkursradet.no) 
www.konkursradet.no/art/?id=145 (Bankruptcies in 1998 and 1999) 
Norges Bank (www.norges-bank.no) 
http://www.norges-bank.no/Templates/Article____41851.aspx (Interest rates) 
Norsk tillitsmann (www.norsktillit.no) 
Oslo Børs (www.oslobors.no) 
www.oslobors.no/ob/aarsstatistikk_obligasjoner 
www.osloabm.no/ob/abm_aarsstatistikk 
www.oslobors.no/ob/meglerfirmaer 
Stamdata (www.stamdata.no) 
Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no) 
www.ssb.no/emner/11/02/konkurs/tab-2008-04-25-02.html (Bankruptcies 2000-2008
  
11 APPENDIX 
11.1 Short description of covenants in the database 
This appendix provides the reader with a list of all the definitions of the different covenants used 
in our database. The primary objective is to facilitate further research using our database. It can 
also serve as an introduction to the different types of covenants used, and provide the reader with 
valuable background information. The list is presented in an alphabetical order, enabling the 
reader to use it as a reference list. Covenants peculiar to the Norwegian market, or decided to be 
separated as an own covenant, are marked with *. 
Asset sale clause: If the issuer sells some specified assets, it has to redeem the bond or use the 
proceeds from the sale to replace the asset. The clause specifies to what price the loan shall be 
redeemed. It is in practice a put option for the bondholders. 
Borrowing restrict (subsidiary): Restricts subsidiaries from borrowing. Only borrowing from 
parent is allowed. 
*Cash flow restrictions: The covenant covers restrictions to maintain a stated minimum amount 
of free available cash. Also include restrictions on future cash flow, for example restriction on 
what to do with cash flow from certain assets (e.g. has to be placed on an escrow account) and 
limitations/restriction on what to do with the bond proceeds. 
*Change of contract: Restricts the issuer from making material changes to their already signed 
construction or rental contracts. Includes changes is delivery date, price, quantity, quality or 
scope. 
Change control put provisions (CC): States that if a change of control event occurs, the issuer 
has to redeem the loan. Gives the bondholders a put option, and is somewhere referred to as a 
poison put.   
Consolidation merger: The clause prohibits consolidation or merger with other entities. 
Dividends related payments: Include restrictions on how much (in percent or absolute figures) 
the company are allowed to pay out in dividends and/or which criteria that have to be meet in 
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order for them to do so. Also include restrictions on other transfers to shareholders (e.g. 
repurchase of shares) 
*Equity ratio: Restrictions on a minimum equity ratio. 
Fixed charge coverage: Limitations on minimum interest coverage ratio. 
*Hedging/Environment: Imposes mandatory hedging against fluctuating prices such as in 
currency or oil price, or commands certain actions to lower the probability of environmental 
disasters. 
Indebtedness: Restrictions on the borrower’s possibilities to incur further debt. It includes both 
restrictions on a stated maximum debt amount or a total prohibition of raising further debt. 
Restrictions on issuing subordinated debt are also included. 
Investments: The clause includes all types of restrictions on the firms’ investments policy. It can 
limit possible investments to same industry or to specific assets. Also includes restrictions on 
granting loans or to furnish guarantees to any third parties. 
*Junior security: Prohibits the issuer to permit junior security in the pledged asset. If the 
covenant is included in an indenture without pledge, it restricts the highest total amount of pledge 
assets. Junior security clauses imposed on subsidiaries are also included. 
Leverage test: Includes restrictions on a maximum leverage ratio. 
*Maintain listing: Includes commands to maintain the bonds and/or the company’s stocks listed. 
Maintenance net worth: Covers restrictions on maintaining a minimum level of net assets or 
equity. 
*Maintenance, insurance and monitoring: Commands the borrower to keep maintenance, 
insurance and/or monitoring of certain asset(s) or projects at a satisfactory level.  
*Materials included in the security: The covenant emphasizes that all material and/or 
equipments acquired as part of the construction process shall, to the extent possible, be 
segregated and separated from other material equipments and machinery and clearly be identified 
as the borrower’s property, and be included in the loan security.  
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*Minimum net working capital: Restrictions on maintaining a specified net working capital. 
For example stated in absolute figures, percentage or just emphasizing that it has to be positive. 
Negative pledge clause: Restrict the issuer from issuing new debt secured by pledged assets, 
unless better or the same protection is given to the bondholders. Also includes total restrictions 
on issuing new debt pledged by assets.    
Restricted payments: Includes restriction on the repayment of debt or other payments to 
creditors. For example a prohibition of paying back debt before maturity or limitations on when 
and in what amount, the debt shall be repaid.  
*Restrictions on, or demand for new capital: The covenant commands certain use of additional 
raised capital. Also includes requirements on additional financing regarding how, when and in 
what amount that should be raised. 
*Restriction on registration: Includes restrictions or requirements regarding a firms’ or assets’ 
jurisdiction (e.g. under which law), flag or classification (e.g. of vessels).     
Sale assets: Prohibits the sale of assets in general or sale of a specific asset, in addition to 
restrictions on hiring out assets. 
Sales leaseback: Partial or total restrictions on sale-leaseback transactions. 
Senior debt issuance: Includes restrictions on the total amount of senior debt the issuer is 
allowed to issue. 
Stock issuance: Prohibits the issuer from issuing new common stocks neither in the issuing firm 
or its subsidiaries.  
Stock transfer sale disposing: Restrictions on selling the common stocks of a subsidiary.  
Subsidiary guarantee: Includes restrictions that prohibit the issuers’ subsidiaries to guarantee 
for debt obligations. 
Subsidiary restrictive (others): Dividend related payments, investments, sale assets, 
indebtedness, leverage test, maintenance net worth, equity ratio, fixed charge coverage and 
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merger restriction includes restrictions on the subsidiaries in similar way as for the issuer. See the 
respective covenant. 
Transaction affiliates: The covenant restricts the issuer from engaging in transactions with its 
subsidiaries that are not carried out in line with prevailing market terms and prices. 
Voting power percentage: Wording in a bond indenture defining what classifies as a change of 
control event. 
11.2 Stamdata – how we got bond specific information 
 
This “picture” from Stamdata.no (source: NTM - Bond trustee as investor protection) shows how the bond specific 
data were collected. We had to manually copy and paste information, as NTM did not have the possibility to provide 
us with these data. 
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11.3 Bond characteristics 
 
The table shows, annually, how many bonds which have the respective bond “characteristic”, expressed in both 
occurrences and in percentage of annual issues, and percentage change from the previous year. It also include total 
for the whole period. 2008 is per 03/31/2008. 
 
Year
Number of 
issues
Exchange Callable
Called/ 
Converted
With 
Warrants
Guarantee Pledge Unsobordinated Subordinated
2008 Occurrences 5 0 2 0 0 1 4 5 0
In percent 0.0 % 40.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 20.0 % 80.0 % 100.0 % 0.0 %
%-change -29.7 % -21.0 % -3.4 % -7.6 % 7.3 % 30.0 % 8.5 % -8.5 %
2007 Occurrences 118 35 72 4 9 15 59 108 10
In percent 29.7 % 61.0 % 3.4 % 7.6 % 12.7 % 50.0 % 91.5 % 8.5 %
%-change -31.5 % 11.9 % -8.6 % 3.9 % -4.0 % 9.3 % -2.9 % 2.9 %
2006 Occurrences 108 66 53 13 4 18 44 102 6
In percent 61.1 % 49.1 % 12.0 % 3.7 % 16.7 % 40.7 % 94.4 % 5.6 %
%-change -2.3 % 13.9 % -16.1 % 0.9 % 1.2 % 11.2 % -2.7 % 2.7 %
2005 Occurrences 71 45 25 20 2 11 21 69 2
In percent 63.4 % 35.2 % 28.2 % 2.8 % 15.5 % 29.6 % 97.2 % 2.8 %
%-change -18.0 % 9.6 % 7.2 % 2.8 % 3.9 % 8.6 % 6.5 % -6.5 %
2004 Occurrences 43 35 11 9 0 5 9 39 4
In percent 81.4 % 25.6 % 20.9 % 0.0 % 11.6 % 20.9 % 90.7 % 9.3 %
%-change 12.2 % 14.0 % 5.5 % 0.0 % 0.1 % -2.1 % 2.2 % -2.2 %
2003 Occurrences 26 18 3 4 0 3 6 23 3
In percent 69.2 % 11.5 % 15.4 % 0.0 % 11.5 % 23.1 % 88.5 % 11.5 %
%-change 10.4 % -41.4 % -37.6 % 0.0 % 11.5 % 17.2 % 35.5 % -35.5 %
2002 Occurrences 17 10 9 9 0 0 1 9 8
In percent 58.8 % 52.9 % 52.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 5.9 % 52.9 % 47.1 %
%-change -19.4 % 26.9 % 26.9 % -4.3 % 0.0 % 1.5 % -42.7 % 42.7 %
2001 Occurrences 23 18 6 6 1 0 1 22 1
In percent 78.3 % 26.1 % 26.1 % 4.3 % 0.0 % 4.3 % 95.7 % 4.3 %
%-change 1.8 % -9.2 % -9.2 % -1.5 % 0.0 % 4.3 % 36.8 % -36.8 %
2000 Occurrences 17 13 6 6 1 0 0 10 7
In percent 76.5 % 35.3 % 35.3 % 5.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 58.8 % 41.2 %
%-change 26.5 % -39.7 % -14.7 % 5.9 % -25.0 % -25.0 % -41.2 % 41.2 %
1999 Occurrences 4 2 3 2 0 1 1 4 0
In percent 50.0 % 75.0 % 50.0 % 0.0 % 25.0 % 25.0 % 100.0 % 0.0 %
%-change -33.3 % 41.7 % 16.7 % 0.0 % 25.0 % -41.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
1998 Occurrences 6 5 2 2 0 0 4 6 0
In percent 83.3 % 33.3 % 33.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 66.7 % 100.0 % 0.0 %
Total 438 247 192 75 17 54 150 397 41
56.4 % 43.8 % 17.1 % 3.9 % 12.3 % 34.2 % 90.6 % 9.4 %
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11.8 (6.) Summarizing explained and explanatory variables 
 
 
This table shows all variables included in the full sample regression model. The high standard deviation in some 
variables can be explained by a few issuers, and are, to some extent account for in the robustness check (appendix 8). 
11.9 (7.) Government bonds 10 – 3 year 
 
 
The table displays Government bonds with 10 and 3 years to maturity. “The interest rates are estimated by weighing 
one or two government bonds with remaining term to maturity. End of day quote” (Norgesbank.no). Positive 
difference in Govern10minus3 indicates improving market conditions. 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NumbCovenants 115 3.156522 3.44529 0 16
firmage 115 7.556957 5.920049 0.02 20.8
zscore 115 1.002643 2.007609 -7.049 14.913
totass 115 8.392188 20.91457 0.002474 104.169
debtratio 115 0.587087 0.2126951 0.03 0.999
couponspread 115 3.811391 2.417936 0.14 10.76
maturity 115 4.916174 2.954657 1 24.75
issueyear 115 6.286957 2.372227 0 10
govern10minus3y 115 0.4685217 0.5357782 -0.39 1.4
listed 115 0.5391304 0.5006479 0 1
callable 115 0.3826087 0.488151 0 1
issuetype 115 0.6695652 0.4724282 0 1
pledge 115 0.3304348 0.4724282 0 1
guarantee 115 0.0782609 0.2697571 0 1
currency 115 0.173913 0.3806935 0 1
unsubordinated 115 0.8434783 0.3649394 0 1
Year 10year 3 year Govern10minus3
2008 4.43 4.55 -0.11
2007 4.78 4.79 -0.02
2006 4.07 3.74 0.34
2005 3.74 2.90 0.84
2004 4.36 2.95 1.40
2003 5.04 4.24 0.80
2002 6.38 6.39 -0.01
2001 6.24 6.44 -0.21
2000 6.22 6.61 -0.39
1999 5.52 5.39 0.12
1998 5.40 5.32 0.08
Government Bonds
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11.10 (8.) Regression coefficients 
 
 
The table above shows the regression results with the problem of endogeneity represented with ‘CouponSpread’. 
Regression 1 includes all the explanatory variables present in chapter 8.2, while regression 2 excludes 
‘Unsubordinated’ due to suspicion of multicollinearity. As we can see, the coefficients are almost identical for both 
regressions, something which imply relatively low correlations between unsubordinated and the other variables than 
issuetype. Hence we keep unsubordinated in the regression to not face the problem of an omitted variable bias. The 
regression is also checked for heteroskedasticity. Due to high standard deviation in some of the variables, we have 
run several robustness tests by deleting extreme values in the different variables. The coefficients did not change 
much. Due to our endogeneity problem, we will not include these robustness checks in the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Variables Regression 1 (Cont.) Regression 2 (Cont.)
firmage 0.0369739 0.0370463 listed -0.4340455 -0.4633648
(0.96) (0.97) (-0.9) (-0.97)
zscore 0.0599464 0.0626032 callable 1.436359*** 1.419134***
(0.57) (0.6) (2.83) (2.84)
totass 0.0171578* 0.0163473* issuetype 1.453743** 1.353373***
(1.94) (1.91) (2.38) (2.79)
debtratio -0.5500937 -0.6189063 pledge 1.817491*** 1.782539***
(-0.58) (-0.63) (3.57) (3.62)
couponspread 0.1275892 0.1261728 guarantee 3.054866** 3.04939**
(1.1) (1.09) (2.29) (2.28)
maturity 0.0246771 0.0280185 currency 0.2494541 0.2270208
(0.38) (0.44) (0.36) (0.34)
issueyear 0.6088196*** 0.5991128*** unsubordinated -0.2793594
(5.58) (5.78) (-0.36)
govern10minus3y -1.769616*** -1.776862*** constant -2.54648* -2.57925
(-4.64) (-4.6) (-1.93) (-1.97)
R-squared 0.6435 0.643
***, **, * indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. T-statistics are present in parentheses. 
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11.11 (9.) Bond maturity not a endogenous variable 
 
As we can see from the table, the bonds’ maturities are centered around three to five years. Thus, we find it as a 
fairly assumption to disregard the possible endogeneity in this variable. Maturities are rounded to nearest integral 
number, to better show our argument. 
11.12 (10.) Manager not appropriate as an instrumental variable 
for coupon spread 
 
The table shows the different managers influence to spread. As discussed in chapter 8.3 regarding finding an 
instrumental variable, several aspects with the instrumental variable has to be fulfilled. A requirement mentioned is 
that the instrumental variable has to significantly affect the endogenous variable, in this case the managers has to 
affect ‘CouponSpread’. As we can see from the table over, this is not the case. The coefficients are not in great extent 
different from zero, which saying that manager actually not having large influence on ‘CouponSpread’. 
Maturity
years Frequency Percent Cum.
0 1 0.65 0.65
1 6 3.92 4.58
2 9 5.88 10.46
3 30 19.61 30.07
4 11 7.19 37.25
5 63 41.18 78.43
6 9 5.88 84.31
7 8 5.23 89.54
8 1 0.65 90.2
10 12 7.84 98.04
11 1 0.65 98.69
15 1 0.65 99.35
25 1 0.65 100
Total 153 100
Number of obs 153
F( 14,   138) 3.43
Prob > F 0.0001
R-squared 0.2579
Adj R-squared 0.1827
Root MSE 2.2482
couponspread Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
_Imanager_1 -2.72 3.179475 -0.86 0.394
_Imanager_4 -0.1500001 3.179475 -0.05 0.962
_Imanager_5 -0.3300002 3.179475 -0.1 0.917
_Imanager_8 -0.4433334 2.596031 -0.17 0.865
_Imanager_9 4.33 3.179475 1.36 0.175
_Imanager_10 0.0285713 2.403458 0.01 0.991
_Imanager_11 -3.2425 2.513596 -1.29 0.199
_Imanager_12 -0.6414286 2.403458 -0.27 0.79
_Imanager_13 -0.6733333 2.596031 -0.26 0.796
_Imanager_14 1.124545 2.348198 0.48 0.633
_Imanager_15 -1.67375 2.384607 -0.7 0.484
_Imanager_16 -1.654546 2.348198 -0.7 0.482
_Imanager_17 -0.6334616 2.291056 -0.28 0.783
_Imanager_18 1.193382 2.264699 0.53 0.599
_cons 3.93 2.248229 1.75 0.083
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11.13 (11.) Sub-regressions on spread intervals 
 
 
The table display regression coefficients for four different intervals. The main point of doing this analysis was to get 
around the endogeneity problem. However, by doing this a new problem arise, multicollinearity, mostly because of a 
small sample in each spread interval. The problem is extensive, and just the colored coefficients do not have too high 
correlation. When comparing the “unbiased” coefficients for different spreads, the spread seem to have great 
influence on spread, owing to the great difference in the coefficients. However, these coefficients are mostly not 
significant, and to some degree influenced by the correlation to the variables with mulitcollinearity problem. 
‘Unsubordinated’ is dropped in spread interval 601-1100 due to only one observation. 
Variables 0-200 201-400 401-600 601-1100
firmage 0.025742 0.0293663 -0.1033838 -0.336227*
(0.3) (0.17) (-1.29) (-2.49)
zscore -0.2669076 -0.2614299 0.2292962* -1.393157**
(-0.22) (-0.74) (1.85) (-2.76)
totass 0.0173577 -0.0174707 -0.0068731 0.0255931
(1.03) (-0.44) (-0.14) (0.06)
debtratio -2.453095 -6.637579 1.674828 -17.59157*
(-0.6) (-0.95) (0.7) (-2.29)
maturity -0.0097734 0.1154539 -0.7745113** 0.0065883
(-0.1) (0.49) (-2.15) (0.01)
issueyear 0.5164517** 0.3247481 0.790276*** -1.432443
(2.37) (1.12) (2.99) (-1.91)
govern10minus3y -1.263285 -0.2645807 -1.873412*** -10.88667**
(-1.6) (-0.14) (-3.75) (-3.28)
listed -1.278667 -0.9650421 0.9188525 4.867622***
(-1.17) (-0.7) (0.59) (4.82)
callable 2.032422 0.9874154 1.394163 7.662922***
(0.96) (0.38) (1.51) (8.09)
issuetype 2.997494 2.835791 1.116462 17.14474*
(1.05) (0.9) (0.94) (2.15)
pledge 2.616384** 0.1748041 1.25432 6.827632***
(2.36) (0.05) (1.32) (6.1)
guarantee 2.794653 4.997059 5.156115*** -0.9018013
(1.36) (1.43) (3.92) (-1.36)
currency -1.435332 0.2466002 0.386844 1.521227
(-0.52) (0.11) (0.28) (1.51)
unsubordinated -1.956272 0.7416556 -0.8839644 (dropped)
(-0.7) (0.46) (-0.58)
constant 0.6847257 2.36627 0.0615631 6.490886
(0.19) (0.34) (0.03) (1.93)
R-squared 0.7093 0.6529 0.7331 0.9810
***, **, * indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
T-statistics are present in parentheses. 
Regression on spread intervals - basis points
